Cryptographic signatures are something we should have been normalizing for awhile now.

I remember during the LTT Linux challenge, at one point they were assigned the task "sign a PDF." Linus interpreted this as PGP sign the document, which apparently Okular can do but he didn't have any credentials set up. Luke used some online tool to photoshop an image of his handwriting into the document.

Such a simple idea, not you designed authorized vendors and keep the signing keys secure forever.

While you’re at it, make sure the chip itself can’t be reverse engineered and run in a VM.

It’s been around with printer fingerprinting unique yellow dot patterns. I think the key is purchase dates that can be tied to locations and identities. But now you’re into big brother status.

What you need instead is a a public ephemeral bloom filter with plausible deniability built in.

We allow everything to sign, black box only overlays bloom filter bits. Have some longer lived biotokens around to extra harden it between manufacturers.

Now you’re in the real world and journalism. Camera equipment is disposable, so just rotate the key on unit build, load it in an fips wipe cipher to be extra sure.

Now you need that bloom central database with some “stewards” to be trusted hosts. No CA shenanigans anymore.

Picture output, steg encoded for authenticity by real lens IR laser verified. Can be traced if need be, but probably unnecessary.

The NFTs tried to solve this problem already and it didn't work. You can change the hash/sig of a video file by just changing one pixel on one frame, meaning you just tricked the computer, not the people who use it.

That’s not really feasible without phones doing this automatically.

Even then didn’t the first Trump admin already argue iPhone video can’t be trusted because it’s modified with AI filters?