Well I am of the same opinion of the philosopher Alexandr Bogdanov and the philosopher Jocelyn Benoist which is that indirect realism is based on very bad arguments in the first place, and this is the first premise of Chalmers' argument for the "hard problem," and so to drop it as a premise drops the "problem." I would recommend Bogdanov's book The Philosophy of Living Experience and Benoist's book Toward a Contextual Realism. The uniting theme is that they both reject the existence of a veil that blocks us from seeing reality, and thus Chalmers' notion of "consciousness" is rejected, and so there is no "hard problem" in the first place.

The "hard problem" is really just a reformulation of the mind-body problem, and Feuerbach had originally pointed out in his essay "On Spiritualism and Materialism" that the mind-body problem is not solvable because to derive it, one has to start from an assumption that there is a gulf between the mind and the body (the phenomena and the noumena, "consciousness" and physical reality), and so to then solve it would be to bridge that gulf, which contradicts oneself, as that would mean a gulf didn't exist in the first place. He thus interprets the mind-body problem (later reformulated as the hard problem) as a proof by contradiction that indirect realism is not tenable, and so materialists should abandon this gulf at the very axiomatic basis of their philosophy.

There will never be a "solution" because it's better understood as a logical proof that indirect realism is wrong. That means, no matter how intuitive indirect realism may seem and no matter how many arguments you think you can come up with off the top of your head to defend it, you should step back and actually rigorously evaluate those arguments as they cannot actually be correct and you must be making a mistake somewhere.