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The people before us weren't perfect. Their mistakes are blueprints to learn from and build a better world
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this post was submitted on 20 May 2026
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The Soviet Union did not agree to invade Poland with the Nazis, it was about spheres of influence and red lines the Nazis should not cross in Poland. Spheres of influence were not agreements to jointly work together. When the USSR went into Poland, it stayed mostly to areas Poland had invaded and annexed a few decades prior. Should the Soviets have let Poland get entirely taken over by the Nazis, standing idle? The West made it clear that they were never going to help anyone against the Nazis until it was their turn to be targeted.
Further, you're ignoring the Munich Agreement, where Czechoslovakia was given to the Nazis by the west. Not only was the west on good terms with the Nazis, signing many non-aggression pacts, they fostered healthy relationships. Finally, the Soviets were reasonably highly suspicious that Britain and Germany would ally. This was not unfounded, both were friendly enough until the outbreak of war. The Soviets desperately needed to make sure that the British and Germans would not ally, which reasonably would have happened had the Soviet Union taken unilateral action against the Nazis, rather than waiting to be attacked first.
Stalin was said to have "obsessed over quantitative and qualitative" improvements in arms in the years leading up to World War II, and had soldiers stationed on high alert, preparing for a German attack. Despite the insistence of many Generals to muster forces on the German border, it was Stalin's insistence that forces not be so concentrated that prevented the Nazis from totally routing the Red Army, enabling the greatest counteroffensive in history.
Hitler himself was quite honest at times, to himself at least:
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The Soviets expected and planned for it, they were never allies with the Nazis.
That's historical revisionism not even supported by Russian historians. That page is full of nonsensical statements too. On the page dedicated to "disproving" the secret protocols, it makes two claims:
But the text of the secret protocols as I have linked already handily disproves both notions. First, it explicitly mentions that the question of whether a Polish state should remain is to be decided later; clearly this means that the existence of Poland itself is not a precondition for the protocols holding. The protocols also basically outline "what happens after Poland is invaded and how should it be divided", you can call it a partitioning into spheres of influence if you like, but the protocols did not care exactly what the Soviets or Nazis would do on either side of the line, annexation, puppeting or otherwise. All that mattered was declaring where belonged to who. That's colloquially known as a partitioning.
The setting up of independent states east of the line is also not proof of anything. This was being considered before the USSR invaded, and the Germans needed to decide on something with the remaining land. They opted for independent countries over puppet governments or direct annexation, so as to leave the area to the USSR to deal with.
Ultimately both countries invaded, and the Nazis retreated back to the demarcation line.
The USSR was aware of the defensive pact between the west and Poland, and the west declared war on Germany when they invaded Poland.
The west was still on appeasement mode (which was a mistake in hindsight). But they were not on "friendly" terms at all, clearly evidenced by the fact they were still negotiating with the Soviets to form an alliance against the Germans. The west was actively negotiating treaties to contain Germany where possible, but not all countries targetted by the Nazis agreed to one since they were worried aligning against Hitler would make them a target (the concern of the Baltics for example).
This was, as far as I could find, never a Soviet concern. They did not believe the west would ally with Hitler, rather they were mistrusting that the west would let the USSR fight Germany on its own, weakening both states. This was actually the same concern the west had, they feared the Soviets would pull the west into a war against Germany without a cause they could support. This deep mistrust was a key reason why the triple alliance failed to materialize. Ultimately it was the west that declared war on Germany first, and the Soviets indeed let them fight before being forced into the conflict by Germany.
You're reading the spheres of influence aspect of Molotov-Ribbentrop with hermeneutics of suspicion. The implication on your end is that the Soviets expected the pact to hold, and to split Europe with Nazi Germany. This implies the expectation of a lasting alliance, which is immediately thrown out the window when you see just how much the Soviets were preparing for war against the Nazis, and that the Red Army was specifically told to watch out for German soldiers.
Regarding Poland in particular, the Soviet sphere of influence, again, was made up of areas Poland had violently annexed from countries like Lithuania and Ukraine only a couple decades prior. The Soviets did not plan on conquesting Poland, they simply stated that Nazi Germany was not allowed to take former Soviet land. When Poland was invaded by Germany, the state was destroyed, and the Red Army took formerly Lithuanian, Ukrainian, etc areas, sparing them from the Holocaust.
Would you want the entirety of Poland to go to the Nazis? Should the USSR have gone to war with Nazi Germany then and there, with the possibility of the west aiding the Nazis to take out the USSR?
As for the West, again, you ignore that at the time they were quite honest with wanting to contain the Bolsheviks. They were more than willing to work with the Nazis, America even kept trading with them during the war, and American factories were deliberately not targeted in Nazi Germany even if Nazis were hiding in them. Truman was honest:
The whole time in the background, Britain and France were attempting to get the Soviets and Nazis to kill each other off. France spread faulty rumors of a fabricated speech by Stalin wanting to conquest Europe, Britain warned Germany of an impending soviet attack at the same time they warned Russia of Barbarossa, and the Nazis themselves were constantly posturing around either invading Britain, using Crete as a template for naval invasion, or making a deal with them. Before Barbarossa, Rudolf Hess flew to England, drawing the appearance of an impending deal.
The entirety of the pre-War period was a tumultuous game of trying to decide what the lines of the war would be. The west made it clear that it hated the Soviets, and the Soviets made it clear that they hated the Nazis, but did not want to risk both the Nazis and the west coming after them, which would have been unwinnable most likely. Nobody could be confused of an actual Soviet-Nazi alliance.
Regarding Poland, again, this was territory Poland had conquered previously that historically belonged to countries in the Soviet Union. This was a return of territory. By no means did it come without bloodshed, but nevertheless the soviets were not nearly the butchers the Nazis were.
As for the west conspiring to kill of the Soviet Union, and letting Germany do so, again, I gave naked testimony that this was the case. The Soviet Union wanted above all else to survive, the Nazis wanted new colonial territories, and the west wanted to not get colonized by the Nazis while also wanting the Soviets to stop being socialist.
Wolkow W. K. (2003), Stalin wollte ein anderes Europa. Moskaus Außenpolitik 1940 bis 1968 und die Folgen, Edition Ost, Berlin, p. 110.
I already explained this earlier. There was a massivedisinformation campaign, with feints from both Germany and the western powers. The first few weeks went as everyone expected, the Nazis advanced quickly over largely open land until running face to face with the full industrialized might of the Red Army. Goebbels' diary is quite telling of the change in attitude. On the 22nd-23rd of June, the Nazis attacked confidently. On July 2nd, Goebbels wrote the following:
July 24th:
August 1st:
August 9th:
September 16th:
This was not a walk in the park for the Nazis, because the Soviets planned for it. Modern historiography makes it quite clear that the Nazis and Soviets were never allies in any capacity, for any length of time, and were always conspiring against each other with no expectation of actual peace, just biding their time before what they desired to be a favorable start to war.
Regarding Poland, no, the Soviets were not worse. The Nazis subjected the Polish to the holocaust, and was committed to exterminating millions of Poles. One historian saying "in many ways, the soviets were worse" doesn't even mean the soviets were worse in total, yet that's the implication you bring. Historical evidence backs up that the Nazi colonization of Poland was a prototype for the Nazi colonization of the Soviets.
As for Stalin and preparation for Barbarossa, again, reports conflicted. The Soviets knew that the Nazis were going to eventually invade, which is why Stalin had the Red Army prepare for German invasion. It wasn't that Stalin didn't mobilize the Red Army, it's that Stalin refused to muster forces on the border, which was exactly what the Nazis wanted. The Nazis wanted to quickly route the Red Army and march straight to Moscow relatively unopposed, instead they ran through largely empty, wide-open land quickly, before running into extreme resistance.
If you don't trust Goebbels, there's plenty of other testemonies from Nazi officials, such as General Fedor von Bock in late July:
Here's an excerpt from Domenico Losurdo's book on Stalin:
Now, you may say that Zhukov was simply trying to play the political line. However, it's abundantly clear that this is in fact exactly how it played out. The rapid conquest of largely open land was met with a rapid counteroffensive that placed the Nazis in a dreadful stalemate, and eventually a legendary counterattack. Had Stalin listened to his generals, it's likely they would have played into the Nazi's plans.