I know I'm going to be bludgeoned for this. But I'm mystified by this 'iterative' approach to development. I wonder if they got this from the IT industry. Charles Bolden once remarked that the congress would have shut down the Apollo program if they lost vehicles at the rate spacex does now. These failures also often feel like the result of lack of foresight and critical thinking, rather than the consequence of complex chains of events that are hard to predict.

Consider the first flight. They decided to launch it without a flame deflector or a deluge system. They thought that it would be OK based on a hot test of the superheavy at half thrust. I don't think any other rocket company would have made the same decision. Even if the concrete slabs didn't shatter into a thousand pieces, the reflected shock wave would have been damaging enough to the engine compartment. They predictably lifted off with several failed and failing engines.

Another problem was the stage separation maneuver. They had planned on a full 360 degree cart wheel to separate the upper stage with centrifugal force. Not only was it going to cause enormous lateral and bending loads on the two stages, I'm still confused about how they would separate at all when the airflow is pushing the top stage (whichever happens to be on the top) against the bottom one. Perhaps the sideways loads might snap the joint. But the two stages are still in danger of collision due to airflow. This concern was proven to be valid when that flight cartwheeled several times without separating and then buckled. I don't know if that's the reason why they abandoned the maneuver, but something was definitely wrong with it. And it was bad enough to switch to hot staging.

I don't have many comments about the second flight. Both stages failed in flight. The first stage failed due to problems with filters. I'm willing to give them a pass here.

As for the third flight, the superheavy exploded 400m above the seas. It was clear that it didn't decelerate enough due to engine failures. More engine problems. But a pass here too, since engines are generally hard and the raptor is particularly nasty at that.

The real problem in that flight was the starship. It was tumbling pretty badly even in space. The video didn't give any clue about how they could arrest the tumbling. I was looking for the operation of attitude/RCS thrusters and I couldn't find any solid evidence of any of it. It was more like the starship had no attitude control at all, rather than one failing. Perhaps I'm completely wrong and it had attitude thrusters. But it was clearly deficient at least. The commentators of flight 4 said that they added more thrusters for attitude control. That would mean that either they didn't consider tumbling as a problem or they completely underestimated it for flight 3. Why? Attitude control isn't the hardest problem in rocketry. Very good simulation and analysis techniques exist for it. Anyway, a sideways reentry is bad enough. Even worse is an unarrested attitude rate at reentry. The atmosphere predictably incinerated the ship's engines and exposed steel skin.

If this afterthought feels like a conspiracy theory, remember the time when Musk made a change to starship after Tim Dodd (earlyastronaut) asked him a question on the same? Or the time when someone on Twitter asked Musk why they didn't start two raptor engines and then shutoff the underperforming one during Starship's flip maneuver at landing? They do this now. Afterthoughts are evidently not a rare thing at SpaceX.

And finally flight 4. I'm not taking any credit away from them. They seem to have just made it till the landing. Superheavy worked all the way for the first time. But my concern is about the place where the starship's fin burned through - exactly at the hinge. I would have expected them to focus more on that region as a weak spot and to have given it a better thermal protection. That would be the last region I would expect a burn through. Instead, it would have been in some spot where they didn't expect any problem and missed something very subtle.

All these give me the impression that they are trying things and seeing what sticks. That's not how traditional rocketry works. There's a s**t load of analyses, simulations and small scale tests that precede the production stage. The result is that when such rockets fail, they fail in a spectacularly complex, unpredictable and mind bending sequence of cascading failures (unlike what I see on starship). They also tend to succeed with minimum test flights and work reliably over decades. Apollo is a great example. The first test flight achieved everything that starship achieved in 4 flights.

The only other industry that I've seen behaving like this is the IT industry. "Deploy whatever you have and we'll debug in production". Coincidentally, Tesla does the same with their cars - the only car company to do so. So perhaps there is a Musk factor here. The SpaceX engineering team is incredibly talented, skilled and capable. The only reason I can think of for them to behave like this is an enormous pressure on them to deliver results at high rates. That's the only reason I can think of for them to proceed without satisfying themselves.

Now you may want to argue that SpaceX's approach is better than what everyone else does. After all, they make bigger things, faster. They advanced the industry like no one else did or could. Perhaps you're right. Only time will tell, since this approach is so novel that we haven't had enough opportunity to assess the results. But my instincts worry me about one thing - technical debt. Mechanical engineering is not like software engineering. In software, a problem once solved is gone forever. In mechanical engineering, any problem you work around is a disaster waiting to happen in the future. The right approach here is to design things properly and meticulously so that the final product has minimum work around. I fear that the software style of design is leaving unknown flaws or technical debts that may compound together into a cascading failure on some flight in the future.

To those who are planning to reply:

What I wrote is not a criticism of the SpaceX employees or Starship programme. I'm genuinely fascinated by the interplay of technical design, development styles, management styles and human factors. I'm extremely curious about how the situation is evolving.

Please don't attack me or question my abilities if you feel that I'm being unfair about this (that's definitely not my intention). I may be just a kid in this arena, but it's never wrong to ask, is it? I'm extremely interested in hearing your insightful opinion on this topic, based on your experience or your logic. If you think I'm wrong on any of these, please share your perspective and reasons here - I (and possibly others) may learn something new.

Well it was landing in the ocean so it was never going to be reusable.