Not "by my definitions" by the simple fact that we can't test for it. Technically, no one knows if any other individual has internal experiences or not. I know for a fact that my sensorium provides me data, and if I assume that data is at all accurate, I can be reasonably confident that other entities that look and behave similarly to me exist. However, I can't verify that any of them have internal experiences the way I do. Sure, it's reasonable to expect that, so we can just add that to the pile of assumptions we've been working with so far without much issue. What about other animals, like dogs? They have the same computational substrate, and the same mechanism for making those computations. I think it's reasonable to say animals probably have internal experiences, but I've met multiple people who insist they somehow know they don't, and so animal abuse is a myth. Now if we assume animals have internal experiences, what about nematodes? Nematode brains are simple enough that you can run them on a computer. If animals have internal experiences, does that include nematodes, and if so does that mean the simulated Nematode brain has internal experiences? If a computer's subroutine can have internal experiences, what about the computer?

Do you now understand why and what I'm saying? Where's the line drawn? As far as I can tell, the only honest answer is to admit ignorance.