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Let's blame the dev who pressed "Deploy" - by Dmitry Kudryavtsev
(yieldcode.blog)
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It's a systematic multi-layered problem.
The simplest, least effort thing that could have prevented the scale of issues is not automatically installing updates, but waiting four days and triggering it afterwards if no issues.
Automatically forwarding updates is also forwarding risk. The higher the impact area, the more worth it safe-guards are.
Testing/Staging or partial successive rollouts could have also mitigated a large number of issues, but requires more investment.
Four days for an update to malware definitions is how computers get infected with malware. But you're right that they should at least do some sort of simple test. "Does the machine boot, and are its files not getting overzealously deleted?"
One of the fixes was deleting a sysm32 driver file. Is a Windows driver how they update definitions?
The driver was one installed on the computer by the security company. The driver would look for and block threats incoming via the internet or intranet.
The definitions update included a driver update, and most of the computers the software was used on were configured to automatically restarted to install the update. Unfortunately, the faulty driver update caused computers to BSOD and enter a boot loop.
Because of the boot loop, the driver could only be removed manually by entering Safe Mode. (That's the thing you saw about deleting that file.) Then the updated driver, the one they released when they discovered the bug, would ideally be able to be installed normally after exiting Safe Mode.