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How is Apple on privacy ? (sh.itjust.works)

Vs dog crap windows..im curious.

My friend wants to go linux because he hates Microsoft but im worried he will have issues and hes not very techy. Mostly he uses it for a daw, and a lot of that stuff is not compatible with linux. An older MacBook would work better for him I think...he wants to be more privacy conscious but hes not crazy about it.

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tosdr.org says MEGA tracks you and stuff. I use the DuckDuckGo tracker blocker things, but my space is getting smaller and I'll soon need to pay for a bigger plan. But I'm really wondering if they won't steal my bank data if I pay for the bigger plan.

(Using MEGA snce it had the free plan with the biggest space I could find)

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Cross posted from: https://feddit.uk/post/40600495

After a years-long battle, the European Commission’s “Chat Control” plan, which would mandate mass scanning and other encryption-breaking measures, at last codifies agreement on a position within the Council of the EU, representing EU States. The good news is that the most controversial part, the forced requirement to scan encrypted messages, is out. The bad news is there’s more to it than that.

Chat Control has gone through several iterations since it was first introduced, with the EU Parliament backing a position that protects fundamental rights, while the Council of the EU spent many months pursuing an intrusive law-enforcement-focused approach. Many proposals earlier this year required the scanning and detection of illicit content on all services, including private messaging apps such as WhatsApp and Signal. This requirement would fundamentally break end-to-end encryption.

Thanks to the tireless efforts of digital rights groups, including European Digital Rights (EDRi), we won a significant improvement: the Council agreed on its position, which removed the requirement that forces providers to scan messages on their services. It also comes with strong language to protect encryption, which is good news for users.

Continue reading here - https://www.eff.org/deeplinks/2025/12/after-years-controversy-eus-chat-control-nears-its-final-hurdle-what-know

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It's a Samsung A16, by the way.

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US citizen here. I recently returned from my first international travel in a few years, and I was unpleasantly surprised by how easy it was to get back into the country.

In the returning citizens line, everyone was directed by an officer to one of three tablets each on a stand about 3-4 feet high. You stuck your face in the right spot for the camera and the tablet turned green. And that was it, free to go. No conversation with a human about where you went, no human verifying your passport, no need for the passport at all. Just a face scan (presumably matching a database of digitized passport photos) and you’re done.

Makes me wonder what the bar is for various local law enforcement or different federal agencies to get access to the database and hook in with surveillance cameras.

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submitted 1 week ago by floofloof@lemmy.ca to c/privacy@lemmy.world

cross-posted from: https://beehaw.org/post/23492355

Ah, yes ... back to the scare tactics that the only use of a VPN is to access CSAM.

Almost Everyone Uses VPNs

Let’s talk about who lawmakers are hurting with these bills, because it sure isn’t just people trying to watch porn without handing over their driver’s license.

  • Businesses run on VPNs. Every company with remote employees uses VPNs. Every business traveler connecting through sketchy hotel Wi-Fi needs one. Companies use VPNs to protect client and employee data, secure internal communications, and prevent cyberattacks.
  • Students need VPNs for school. Universities require students to use VPNs to access research databases, course materials, and library resources. These aren’t optional, and many professors literally assign work that can only be accessed through the school VPN. The University of Wisconsin-Madison’s WiscVPN, for example, “allows UW–‍Madison faculty, staff and students to access University resources even when they are using a commercial Internet Service Provider (ISP).”
  • Vulnerable people rely on VPNs for safety. Domestic abuse survivors use VPNs to hide their location from their abusers. Journalists use them to protect their sources. Activists use them to organize without government surveillance. LGBTQ+ people in hostile environments—both in the US and around the world—use them to access health resources, support groups, and community. For people living under censorship regimes, VPNs are often their only connection to vital resources and information their governments have banned.
  • Regular people just want privacy. Maybe you don’t want every website you visit tracking your location and selling that data to advertisers. Maybe you don’t want your internet service provider (ISP) building a complete profile of your browsing history. Maybe you just think it’s creepy that corporations know everywhere you go online. VPNs can protect everyday users from everyday tracking and surveillance.
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submitted 2 weeks ago by Babalugats@feddit.uk to c/privacy@lemmy.world

Cross posted from: https://feddit.uk/post/40232992

european funds recovery initiative Search Search... Digital Omnibus: How Big Tech Lobbying Is Gutting the GDPR HOME Related News

Digital Omnibus: How Big Tech Lobbying Is Gutting the GDPR Last week we at EFRI wrote about the Digital Omnibus leak and warned that the European Commission was preparing a stealth attack on the GDPR

Since then, two things have happened:

The Commission has now officially published its Digital Omnibus proposal.

noyb (Max Schrems’ organisation) has released a detailed legal analysis and new campaigning material that confirms our worst fears: this is not harmless “simplification”, it is a deregulation package that cuts into the core of the GDPR and ePrivacy.

What noyb has now put on the table

On 19 November 2025, noyb published a new piece with the blunt headline: “Digital Omnibus: EU Commission wants to wreck core GDPR principles

Here’s a focused summary of the four core points from noyb’s announcement, in plain language:

New GDPR loophole via “pseudonyms” and IDs

The Commission wants to narrow the definition of “personal data” so that much data under pseudonyms or random IDs (ad-tech, data brokers, etc.) might no longer fall under the GDPR.

This would mean a shift from an objective test (“can a person be identified, directly or indirectly?”) to a subjective test (“does this company currently want or claim to be able to identify someone?”).

Therefore, whether the GDPR applies would depend on what a company says about its own capabilities and intentions.

Different companies handling the same dataset could fall inside or outside the GDPR.

For users and authorities, it becomes almost impossible to know ex ante whether the GDPR applies – endless arguments over a company’s “true intentions”.

Schrems’ analogy: it’s like a gun law that only applies if the gun owner admits he can handle the gun and intends to shoot – obviously absurd as a regulatory concept.

arzh-CNnlenfrdeitptrues european funds recovery initiative Search Search... Digital Omnibus: How Big Tech Lobbying Is Gutting the GDPR HOME Related News

Digital Omnibus: How Big Tech Lobbying Is Gutting the GDPR Last week we at EFRI wrote about the Digital Omnibus leak and warned that the European Commission was preparing a stealth attack on the GDPR

Since then, two things have happened:

The Commission has now officially published its Digital Omnibus proposal.

noyb (Max Schrems’ organisation) has released a detailed legal analysis and new campaigning material that confirms our worst fears: this is not harmless “simplification”, it is a deregulation package that cuts into the core of the GDPR and ePrivacy.

What noyb has now put on the table On 19 November 2025, noyb published a new piece with the blunt headline: “Digital Omnibus: EU Commission wants to wreck core GDPR principles”

Here’s a focused summary of the four core points from noyb’s announcement, in plain language:

New GDPR loophole via “pseudonyms” and IDs The Commission wants to narrow the definition of “personal data” so that much data under pseudonyms or random IDs (ad-tech, data brokers, etc.) might no longer fall under the GDPR.

This would mean a shift from an objective test (“can a person be identified, directly or indirectly?”) to a subjective test (“does this company currently want or claim to be able to identify someone?”).

Therefore, whether the GDPR applies would depend on what a company says about its own capabilities and intentions.

Different companies handling the same dataset could fall inside or outside the GDPR.

For users and authorities, it becomes almost impossible to know ex ante whether the GDPR applies – endless arguments over a company’s “true intentions”.

Schrems’ analogy: it’s like a gun law that only applies if the gun owner admits he can handle the gun and intends to shoot – obviously absurd as a regulatory concept.

Weakening ePrivacy protection for data on your device

Today, Article 5(3) ePrivacy protects against remote access to data on your devices (PCs, smartphones, etc.) – based on the Charter right to the confidentiality of communications.

The Commission now wants to add broad “white-listed” exceptions for access to terminal equipment, including “aggregated statistics” and “security purposes”.

Max Schrems finds the wording of the new rule to be extremely permissive and could effectively allow extensive remote scanning or “searches” of user devices,ces as long as they are framed as minimal “security” or “statistics” operations – undermining the current strong protection against device-level snooping.

Opening the door for AI training on EU personal data (Meta, Google, etc.)

Despite clear public resistance (only a tiny minority wants Meta to use their data for AI), the Commission wants to allow Big Tech to train AI on highly personal data, e.g. 15+ years of social-media history.

Schrems’ core argument:

People were told their data is for “connecting” or advertising – now it is fed into opaque AI models, enabling those systems to infer intimate details and manipulate users.

The main beneficiaries are US Big Tech firms building base models from Europeans’ personal data.

The Commission relies on an opt-out approach, but in practice:

Companies often don’t know which specific users’ data are in a training dataset.

Users don’t know which companies are training on their data.

Realistically, people would need to send thousands of opt-outs per year – impossible.

Schrems calls this opt-out a “fig leaf” to cover fundamentally unlawful processing.

On top of training, the proposal would also privilege the “operation” of AI systems as a legal basis – effectively a wildcard: processing that would be illegal under normal GDPR rules becomes legal if it’s done “for AI”. Resulting in an inversion of normal logic: riskier technology (AI) gets lower, not higher, legal standards.

Cutting user rights back to almost zero – driven by German demands

The starting point for this attack on user rights is a debate in Germany about people using GDPR access rights in employment disputes, for example to prove unpaid overtime. The German government chose to label such use as “abuse” and pushed in Brussels for sharp limits on these rights. The Commission has now taken over this line of argument and proposes to restrict the GDPR access right to situations where it is exercised for “data protection purposes” only.

In practice, this would mean that employees could be refused access to their own working-time records in labour disputes. Journalists and researchers could be blocked from using access rights to obtain internal documents and data that are crucial for investigative work. Consumers who want to challenge and correct wrong credit scores in order to obtain better loan conditions could be told that their request is “not a data-protection purpose” and therefore can be rejected.

This approach directly contradicts both CJEU case law and Article 8(2) of the Charter of Fundamental Rights. The Court has repeatedly confirmed that data-subject rights may be exercised for any purpose, including litigation and gathering evidence against a company. As Max Schrems points out, there is no evidence of widespread abuse of GDPR rights by citizens; what we actually see in practice is widespread non-compliance by companies. Cutting back user rights in this situation shifts the balance even further in favour of controllers and demonstrates how detached the Commission has become from the day-to-day reality of users trying to defend themselves.

EFRI’s take: when Big Tech lobbying becomes lawmaking

For EFRI, the message is clear: the Commission has decided that instead of forcing Big Tech and financial intermediaries to finally comply with the GDPR, it is easier to move the goalposts and rewrite the rules in their favour. The result is a quiet but very real redistribution of power – away from citizens, victims, workers and journalists, and towards those who already control the data and the infrastructure. If this package goes through in anything like its current form, it will confirm that well-organised corporate lobbying can systematically erode even the EU’s flagship fundamental-rights legislation. That makes it all the more important for consumer organisations, victim groups and digital-rights advocates to push back – loudly, publicly and with concrete case stories – before the interests of Big Tech are permanently written into EU law.

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submitted 2 weeks ago by floofloof@lemmy.ca to c/privacy@lemmy.world
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submitted 2 weeks ago* (last edited 2 weeks ago) by hodgepodgin@lemmy.zip to c/privacy@lemmy.world

Just want to share since I recently learned about PKI.

Turns out I have parental controls enabled on my account still. I’ve been on this plan for years. Anyways, here’s what I get when I visit mullvad.net:

This is no doubt because VPNs are on the naughty list of what kids can’t access, since that obviously bypasses their restrictions. For some reason it’s in Italy. What I’m supposed to get:

It looks like T-Mobile is basically MiTM me to get web filtering to work. The only reason I noticed this is because I got an invalid CA warning, since ofc they aren’t using a real CA to impersonate this website (no legitimate CA allows that). Unfortunately I can’t see whatever dumb warning page they were trying to send me.

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submitted 2 weeks ago by Babalugats@feddit.uk to c/privacy@lemmy.world

Cross posted from: https://feddit.uk/post/40205739

I'm posting this to hopefully stop the posts that keep appearing, suggesting that progress has been made to defeat chat control. That's not correct.

The article:

Contrary to headlines suggesting the EU has “backed away” from Chat Control, the negotiating mandate endorsed today by EU ambassadors in a close split vote paves the way for a permanent infrastructure of mass surveillance. Patrick Breyer, digital freedom fighter and expert on the file, warns journalists and the public not to be deceived by the label “voluntary.”

While the Council removed the obligation for scanning, the agreed text creates a toxic legal framework that incentivizes US tech giants to scan private communications indiscriminately, introduces mandatory age checks for all internet users, and threatens to exclude teenagers from digital life.

“The headlines are misleading: Chat Control is not dead, it is just being privatized,” warns Patrick Breyer. **“What the Council endorsed today is a Trojan Horse. By cementing ‘voluntary’ mass scanning, they are legitimizing the warrantless, error-prone mass surveillance of millions of Europeans by US corporations, while simultaneously killing online anonymity through the backdoor of age verification.” ** Continue reading here - https://www.patrick-breyer.de/en/reality-check-eu-council-chat-control-vote-is-not-a-retreat-but-a-green-light-for-indiscriminate-mass-surveillance-and-the-end-of-right-to-communicate-anonymously/

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submitted 2 weeks ago* (last edited 2 weeks ago) by A_norny_mousse@feddit.org to c/privacy@lemmy.world

I have a new job in the social sector. Our boss seems to have slipped into position sideways (they did not do our work for a significant amount of time before).

I got zero onboarding when I started working there; everything I know about the organisational ins and outs I learned by asking my colleagues.

The boss seems to actively want to not inform me of things, i.e. even if I ask about something they reply in the most cursory manner or immediately refer me to somebody else. I have no idea why they do it, my guess is that they sense that they're woefully inadequate for the job, plus me being much older triggers insecurities?

For example, when I could not log into an app to see my future shifts, I asked the boss about it first but they immediately refered me to tech support. Calling them, after a while we found out that the boss had mistyped my name. Then I could log in.

Last week I was sick and waited til Sunday noon to check this week's shifts - but again I couldn't log in. The boss answered neither phone nor email. Fair enough I guess, on a sunday. Thankfully tech support was working and after a long while we found out that the app for checking my shifts only allows log-ins from within the workplace network, not the open web.

I almost missed my monday shift because of that. Boss calls me, enraged. I explained the situation. They clearly did not know that the app only allows log-ins from within the workplace network.

All my coleagues tentatively/silently agree that this boss is useless. How do we keep the workplace running, and why is it me who is left in the dark? Turns out they have a Whatsapp group. I don't use Whatsapp. They asked me repeatedly and urgently to join.

tl;dr: this workplace would fall apart if people wouldn't communicate through Whatsapp instead of official channels.

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submitted 2 weeks ago* (last edited 2 weeks ago) by msokiovt@lemmy.today to c/privacy@lemmy.world

cross-posted from: https://lemmy.today/post/42390703

I don't really tend to use these blocklists often, but when speed is needed, this is what I'll use. For now, I'm utilizing the HaGeZi Multi pro blocklist, which is recommended for most users. It's the most balanced blocklist offered by HaGeZi, and from my experience, the speeds are exceptional.

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submitted 2 weeks ago* (last edited 2 weeks ago) by Babalugats@feddit.uk to c/privacy@lemmy.world

Cross posted from: https://feddit.uk/post/39979350

[TRANSLATED ARTICLE]

EU chat control comes – through the back door of voluntariness

The EU states have agreed on a common position on chat control. Data protection advocates warn against massive surveillance. What is in store for us?

After lengthy negotiations, the EU states have agreed on a common position on so-called chat control. Like from one Minutes of negotiations of the Council working group As can be seen, Internet services will in future be allowed to voluntarily search their users' communications for information about crimes, but will not be obliged to do so.

The Danish Council Presidency wants to get the draft law through the Council "as quickly as possible", "so that the trilogue negotiations can begin promptly", the minutes say. Feedback from states should be limited to "absolute red lines".

Consensus achieved

The majority of States supported the compromise proposal. At least 15 spoke in favor, including Germany and France. Germany "welcomed both the deletion of the mandatory measures and the permanent anchoring of voluntary measures", said the protocol.

However, other countries were disappointed. Spain in particular "continued to see mandatory measures as necessary, unfortunately a comprehensive agreement on this was not possible". Hungary also "seen voluntariness as the sole concept as too little".

Spain, Hungary and Bulgaria proposed "an obligation for providers to detect, at least in open areas". The Danish Presidency "described the proposal as ambitious, but did not take it up to avoid further discussion.

The organization Netzpolitik.org, which has been reporting critically on chat control for years, sees the plans as a fundamental threat to democracy. "From the beginning, a lobby network intertwined with the security apparatus pushed chat control", writes the organization. “It was never really about the children, otherwise it would get to the root of abuse and violence instead of monitoring people without any initial suspicion.”

Netzpolitik.org argues that "encrypted communication is a thorn in the side of the security apparatus". Authorities have been trying to combat private and encrypted communication in various ways for years.

A number of scholars criticize the compromise proposal, calling voluntary chat control inappropriate. "Their benefits have not been proven, while the potential for harm and abuse is enormous", one said open letter.

According to critics, the planned technology, so-called client-side scanning, would create a backdoor on all users' devices. Netzpolitik.org warns that this represents a "frontal attack on end-to-end encryption, which is vital in the digital world".

The problem with such backdoors is that "not only the supposedly 'good guys' can use them, but also resourceful criminals or unwell-disposed other states", argues the organization.

Signal considers withdrawing from the EU

Journalists' associations are also alarmed by the plans. The DJV rejects chat control as a form of mass surveillance without cause and sees source protection threatened, for which encrypted communication is essential. The infrastructure created in this way can be used for political control "in just a few simple steps", said the DJV in a statement Opinion.

The Messenger service Signal Already announced that it would withdraw from the EU if necessary. Signal President Meredith Whittaker told the dpa: “Unfortunately, if we were given the choice of either undermining the integrity of our encryption or leaving Europe, we would make the decision to leave the market.”

Next steps in the legislative process

The Permanent Representatives of the EU states are due to meet next week on the subject, followed in December by the Ministers of Justice and Home Affairs, these two bodies are due to approve the bill as the Council's official position.

The trilogue then begins, in which the Commission, Parliament and Council must reach a compromise from their three draft laws. Parliament had described the original plans as mass surveillance and called for only unencrypted suspect content to be scanned.

The EU Commission had originally proposed requiring Internet services to search their users' content for information about crimes without cause and to send it to authorities if suspected.

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submitted 3 weeks ago by hansolo@lemmy.today to c/privacy@lemmy.world

Based on a recent post now deleted from !privacy@lemmy.ml, which was itself based on this article, it sounds like there's some misunderstandings and misconceptions about how Wifi Positioning (WPS) works, and how to mitigate it to the best of one's ability.

First off, Apple and Google are the primary culprits here. Every time someone who has not adjusted their settings on their phone and has location data on connects to a wireless access point of any kind, Apple and Google collect that data and location data.

This is 100% different than wardrivers, who go around scanning and mapping SSIDs and BSSIDs.

After research from the University of Maryland showed how deep the WPS database goes, they suggested the following ways to mitigate having your wifi mapped:

-Rename your network to end with _nomap, so like "FBISurveilanceVan_nomap" would be how to do that. Larger WPS operators honor it as an opt‑out because these are automated systems. This cuts you out of many crowdsourced location DBs. This is not foolproof, but it will handle 99.9% of any use cases from anyone here.

-> This doesn't prevent wardrivers from indexing your wifi. This prevents your Mother in Law or cousin that has their iPhone or Android phone with all the original settings and bloatware from letting either company index you by using the location data on their phones.

Next...

-Turn off SSID broadcast if you can. This cuts down on lazy wardrivers scanning unhidden SSIDs.

-Change the name of your SSID and router's MAC/BSSID regularly.

-> This doesn't prevent sophisticated wardrivers from indexing your wifi. It prevents lazy ones from indexing it, as well as any personal devices that index wifi signals based on simply seeing the broadcast SSID, which is a thing.

If you plan on hosting family for the holidays, now is a great time to do this.

This NOT a 100% invisible wifi network solution. This is a "best as we can get" solution. If you want truly invisible internet connections, get shielded RJ45 cable like you live in a radio blackout zone.

How to check if your wifi has been indexed? https://wigle.net/ is a good starting point. I've never had a wifi network appear on there, so apparently I'm doing something right.

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