Could the XZ backdoor have been detected with better Git and Debian packaging practices? (optimizedbyotto.com)

submitted 1 month ago by otto@programming.dev to c/security@lemmy.ml

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How did the changes in the binary test files tests/files/bad-3-corrupt_lzma2.xz and tests/files/good-large_compressed.lzma, and the makefile change in m4/build-to-host.m4) manifest to the Debian maintainer? Was there a chance of noticing something odd?

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[-] adespoton@lemmy.ca 2 points 1 month ago

Well, eventually it WAS noticed before making it to Stable, partly by chance, but partly because of the existing process.

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this post was submitted on 19 Oct 2025

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