Fifteen months ago, Vladimir Putin’s army was on the outskirts of Kyiv. Now the Russian leader is struggling to maintain control in Moscow. The rebellion of Wagner forces, led by Yevgeny Prigozhin, is the final confirmation of how catastrophically wrong the war in Ukraine has gone for Putin. Even if the Russian leader prevails in the immediate battle against Wagner, it is hard to believe that Putin can ultimately survive this kind of humiliation. His prestige, his power, even his life, are now on the line.
The historic irony is that Putin’s own actions have brought about the thing he fears most: an insurrection that threatens both the Russian state and his own personal power. Putin’s fear of a “colour revolution” in Russia dates back almost 20 years. Fittingly, its origins lie in Ukraine. The Orange revolution of 2004 — a popular, democratic uprising against a rigged election in Ukraine — sparked a paranoia in the Russian president that has steadily intensified over the years.
Ever since, Putin has been haunted by two linked fears. First, that Ukraine would slip irrevocably from Russia’s grasp. Second, that a successful pro-democracy uprising in Kyiv would be a dry run for the same thing in Moscow.
His decision to invade Ukraine in 2022 was an effort to finally snuff out both dangers — by installing a pro-Russian, authoritarian government in Kyiv.
As a former intelligence operative and conspiracy theorist, Putin was convinced that the origins of any “colour revolution” — whether in Ukraine or Russia — would lie in Washington. His refusal to believe that Ukrainians might have agency or power led to his fatal underestimation of the strength of the country’s resistance to a Russian invasion.
As well as underestimating Ukrainian strength, Putin — drunk on the mythology of the Red Army of the 1940s — fatally overestimated Russia’s own military power. The failure of the Russian army opened the door for the Wagner group to enter the war. This gave Prigozhin his own power base and propaganda platform and ultimately allowed him to turn on the Russian state.
Putin’s pitch to the Russian people has always been that he rescued the country from the anarchy of the 1990s. But what is happening now is reminiscent of the failed military and hardliner coup against Mikhail Gorbachev in 1991, when Boris Yeltsin mounted a tank outside parliament. At that point, the people of Moscow played a vital role in the unfolding events. The reaction of the Russian population to the Prigozhin uprising will be a crucial — and, as yet, unknown — part of this story.
In his own first remarks on the Prigozhin uprising, Putin looked back to an even darker precedent: the alleged “stab in the back” that ended the Russian war effort in 1917 and pitched the country into revolution and civil war. These words were meant to convey firmness of purpose. But they were hardly reassuring.
The Wagner insurrection will give hope to opponents of the Putin regime — both inside and outside Russia. For the Ukrainian military, whose counter-offensive has failed to break through, this looks like a historic opportunity. If Russia’s forces turn on each other, or are pulled back from the frontline to defend Putin, they could fold in eastern Ukraine.
Political prisoners in Russia, such as Alexei Navalny or Vladimir Kara-Murza, must also have a new sense of hope and opportunity. They, too, may play a part over the coming months. Prigozhin, of course, is no liberal. His rhetoric is stridently nationalist and imperialist. The Wagner forces have a well-earned reputation for brutality. But Prigozhin — like Putin — has now unleashed forces that he will struggle to control.
I'm not sure what any of these points have to do with my original point, but let me answer a few of them, which I think are lacking context.
Who's advice? It was mostly the US and the baltic countries. The US because they would prefer to sell their LNG to Europe at a markup. Their advice was not without interest.
Also gas supply are 25 years contracts, Germany (at the time) could not get out of Nordstream 1 without paying heavy penalties. Getting out of Nordstream would have most likely created a EU-wide recession, which could have lead to a wave of right-wing populism, most likely fed by Russia.
This was a very difficult situation. The "germans should have gotten out of nordstream" is a very simplistic argument lacking context.
Which weapons? The Mistral-class ship sale was canceled and France paid heavy fees, and sold them at heavy discount to Egypt.
The scale at which the oligarchs corrupted London is much bigger than what it was for the entirety of the Netherlands. Also, the Dutch didn't vote for Brexit which, in the case of Brexit, was heavily russian-influenced.
They won't even put half of their hardware into battle, that would be suicide. They need reserves. The Ukrainians will have to cross mine-fields in front of trenches, with almost no air support. If they put even half of their hardware and men into a counter offensive today, they will just be leading their material and men to the junk-yard. This is especially true given how well Russians dug their positions. And Russia still have its aviation in reserve, underutilized, as opposed to Ukraine which has been stretching its air-power thin.
Your original point was the UK media isn't to be trusted because the UK is blindly aggressive towards Russia
That's logically flawed to put it mildly. Russia annexed Crimea and conducted two chemical weapons attacks in the UK. Reason enough to be on the front foot against Putin
Do you read your own links? Literally the first line is
Russia funds far right groups throughout Europe, UK is not special
These are the weapons that were supplied even though there was an EU embargo on weapons sales to Russia
https://www.investigate-europe.eu/en/2022/eu-states-exported-weapons-to-russia/
And of course the US wants to sell LNG, that doesn't make it a good idea to claim there's no problems with Russia. They literally said there's no risk less than 4 months prior to Russia's invasion
https://www.politico.eu/article/germany-release-merkel-era-assessment-saying-nord-stream-russia-gas-pose-no-risk/
Yes I do. You literally removed the next part of the sentence:
Regarding the french weapons. I'm not an expert on the subject. It sounds like old deals which were paid at time of delivery. Cancelling these deals right at delivery, after the weapons were manufactured, would have meant telling private companies that they can't recover costs for items already manufactured. These defense contractors would have sued the hell out of the state.
Also, this article focuses on EU countries at the time of the invasion. The UK was excluded, since it wasn't part of the EU.
The UK was by far the biggest weapon exporter to Russia before the invasion of Ukraine
Can we stop talking about Nord Stream 2? I don't understand the fixation on Nord Stream 2. The thing was already controversial in Germany before it was even supposed to be turned on. There were pushbacks from the general population way before the invasion of Ukraine. And at the end it never got turned on! Who cares?
First of all, Poland was also depending on Russian gas, so it was a little hypocrytical from them to call for Germany to stop the dependence.
Also, up to the begining to the war, Ukraine was still indirectly importing Russian gas, so it's the pot calling the kettle black IMHO.
Energy is a very difficult topic. Where should have Germany got their supply? It's easy to criticize with 20/20 hindsight. But given the context at the time, it was not the best decision ever, but it was as insane as people make it sound like today.