cross-posted from: https://scribe.disroot.org/post/9157975

Op-ed by Laura Harth, China in the World director at Safeguard Defenders.

Archived link

...

We already know, however, what an agreement of this kind looks like in practice, because one of Canada’s Five Eyes partners signed one and bore the consequences.

Under a similarly undisclosed MOU, Australia’s Federal Police (AFP) allowed MPS officers to interview targets on Australian soil.

Between 2015 and 2019, at least six Australian residents were interviewed by Chinese police there. Five of them returned to China “voluntarily.” Only one refused.

AFP oversight was found to be negligent or even absent. The AFP ended the agreement in 2024 after the abuses were exposed in Senate hearings.

...

The lesson is straightforward. As a Chinese official lamented in response to our reports on illegal Chinese Police Service Centers abroad: “Extradition proceedings are cumbersome.”

Pressure is easy.

Per official figures, Beijing’s preferred method – persuasion – accounts for more than 70 per cent of the more than 14,000 forced returns globally since Operation Fox Hunt started in 2014 [Operation Fox Hunt is China's Xi Jinping’s rapidly expanding web of relentless – and often illegal - long-arm policing operations around the globe].

The method isn’t subtle. Family members at home are punished. Targets abroad are harassed. The aim, as former justice minister Fu Zhenghua put it, is to “squeeze the living space out of them” until they agree to return.

It has happened in Canada, repeatedly.

Court documents at the trial of former RCMP officer William Majcher revealed at least 25 Canadian residents were targeted under the Fox Hunt campaign.

...

Like Australia, Canada has declined extradition co-operation with China, reflecting a consensus across democratic nations: China’s legal system – with its systematic torture and politicized prosecution – cannot meet Canadian standards.

The new MOU does not formally cross that line. But it appears to walk right up to it.

In its response to CTV News, the RCMP cites Canada’s 2007 Protocol on Foreign Criminal Investigators in Canada – the same kind of framework Australia used – as governing co-operation with the MPS. That protocol allows foreign officers to operate here when a target is voluntarily co-operating with an investigation.

But what counts as “voluntary” when a target’s family is at the mercy of Chinese authorities?

...

That is precisely the climate of fear the Chinese Communist Party seeks to instill, globally and at home.

...

In 2021, then-CSIS director David Vigneault described Operation Fox Hunt as a “covert global operation” used to “target and quiet dissidents to the regime.” In 2023, he singled out the People’s Republic of China’s use of “family and friends living in China as leverage” as the campaign’s most effective tactic.

The CSIS Public Report 2024 went further still. It named the MPS among the agencies whose foreign interference “can include coercing a victim to return to the PRC or threatening their family members in China.”

In June, 2025, Canada led G7 leaders in a joint statement condemning the “misuse of co-operation with other foreign states ... in order to detain, forcibly return, or repress targets.”

Seven months later, an MOU was signed with the world’s most prolific perpetrator of such conduct.

...

Parliament should see the MOU. And when China’s Foreign Minister Wang Yi visits Ottawa this week, Anita Anand should tell him that Canada intends to release the police agreement to the public.

It is hard to believe the agreement would survive such scrutiny.

cross-posted from: https://scribe.disroot.org/post/9157975

Op-ed by Laura Harth, China in the World director at Safeguard Defenders.

Archived link

...

We already know, however, what an agreement of this kind looks like in practice, because one of Canada’s Five Eyes partners signed one and bore the consequences.

Under a similarly undisclosed MOU, Australia’s Federal Police (AFP) allowed MPS officers to interview targets on Australian soil.

Between 2015 and 2019, at least six Australian residents were interviewed by Chinese police there. Five of them returned to China “voluntarily.” Only one refused.

AFP oversight was found to be negligent or even absent. The AFP ended the agreement in 2024 after the abuses were exposed in Senate hearings.

...

The lesson is straightforward. As a Chinese official lamented in response to our reports on illegal Chinese Police Service Centers abroad: “Extradition proceedings are cumbersome.”

Pressure is easy.

Per official figures, Beijing’s preferred method – persuasion – accounts for more than 70 per cent of the more than 14,000 forced returns globally since Operation Fox Hunt started in 2014 [Operation Fox Hunt is China's Xi Jinping’s rapidly expanding web of relentless – and often illegal - long-arm policing operations around the globe].

The method isn’t subtle. Family members at home are punished. Targets abroad are harassed. The aim, as former justice minister Fu Zhenghua put it, is to “squeeze the living space out of them” until they agree to return.

It has happened in Canada, repeatedly.

Court documents at the trial of former RCMP officer William Majcher revealed at least 25 Canadian residents were targeted under the Fox Hunt campaign.

...

Like Australia, Canada has declined extradition co-operation with China, reflecting a consensus across democratic nations: China’s legal system – with its systematic torture and politicized prosecution – cannot meet Canadian standards.

The new MOU does not formally cross that line. But it appears to walk right up to it.

In its response to CTV News, the RCMP cites Canada’s 2007 Protocol on Foreign Criminal Investigators in Canada – the same kind of framework Australia used – as governing co-operation with the MPS. That protocol allows foreign officers to operate here when a target is voluntarily co-operating with an investigation.

But what counts as “voluntary” when a target’s family is at the mercy of Chinese authorities?

...

That is precisely the climate of fear the Chinese Communist Party seeks to instill, globally and at home.

...

In 2021, then-CSIS director David Vigneault described Operation Fox Hunt as a “covert global operation” used to “target and quiet dissidents to the regime.” In 2023, he singled out the People’s Republic of China’s use of “family and friends living in China as leverage” as the campaign’s most effective tactic.

The CSIS Public Report 2024 went further still. It named the MPS among the agencies whose foreign interference “can include coercing a victim to return to the PRC or threatening their family members in China.”

In June, 2025, Canada led G7 leaders in a joint statement condemning the “misuse of co-operation with other foreign states ... in order to detain, forcibly return, or repress targets.”

Seven months later, an MOU was signed with the world’s most prolific perpetrator of such conduct.

...

Parliament should see the MOU. And when China’s Foreign Minister Wang Yi visits Ottawa this week, Anita Anand should tell him that Canada intends to release the police agreement to the public.

It is hard to believe the agreement would survive such scrutiny.

Archived link

Canadian drone company Sentinel is working with Ukrainian company Airlogix to manufacture drones in Canada for Ukraine to deploy in its war against Russia.

The joint venture is moving ahead with a government-to-government arrangement set to be signed later this week at CANSEC, a major defence conference being held in Ottawa. This arrangement will outline the operational scope and support an intellectual property licensing agreement between Airlogix and Hamilton-based Sentinel R&D Inc., subject to export controls.

...

Dmytro Piatrin, chief commercial officer of Airlogix, said it’s in Ukraine’s national interest – and his company’s, too – to ensure manufacturing for critical war supplies can be carried out by his country’s allies.

“As a company, it’s the way to mitigate risk of being destroyed by a Russian rocket anytime,” he [said].

...

The government-to-government arrangement to be signed later this week will be specific to the joint venture between Sentinel and Airlogix but, if successful, could set a precedent for similar ventures in the future.

...

Op-ed by Laura Harth, China in the World director at Safeguard Defenders.

Archived link

...

We already know, however, what an agreement of this kind looks like in practice, because one of Canada’s Five Eyes partners signed one and bore the consequences.

Under a similarly undisclosed MOU, Australia’s Federal Police (AFP) allowed MPS officers to interview targets on Australian soil.

Between 2015 and 2019, at least six Australian residents were interviewed by Chinese police there. Five of them returned to China “voluntarily.” Only one refused.

AFP oversight was found to be negligent or even absent. The AFP ended the agreement in 2024 after the abuses were exposed in Senate hearings.

...

The lesson is straightforward. As a Chinese official lamented in response to our reports on illegal Chinese Police Service Centers abroad: “Extradition proceedings are cumbersome.”

Pressure is easy.

Per official figures, Beijing’s preferred method – persuasion – accounts for more than 70 per cent of the more than 14,000 forced returns globally since Operation Fox Hunt started in 2014 [Operation Fox Hunt is China's Xi Jinping’s rapidly expanding web of relentless – and often illegal - long-arm policing operations around the globe].

The method isn’t subtle. Family members at home are punished. Targets abroad are harassed. The aim, as former justice minister Fu Zhenghua put it, is to “squeeze the living space out of them” until they agree to return.

It has happened in Canada, repeatedly.

Court documents at the trial of former RCMP officer William Majcher revealed at least 25 Canadian residents were targeted under the Fox Hunt campaign.

...

Like Australia, Canada has declined extradition co-operation with China, reflecting a consensus across democratic nations: China’s legal system – with its systematic torture and politicized prosecution – cannot meet Canadian standards.

The new MOU does not formally cross that line. But it appears to walk right up to it.

In its response to CTV News, the RCMP cites Canada’s 2007 Protocol on Foreign Criminal Investigators in Canada – the same kind of framework Australia used – as governing co-operation with the MPS. That protocol allows foreign officers to operate here when a target is voluntarily co-operating with an investigation.

But what counts as “voluntary” when a target’s family is at the mercy of Chinese authorities?

...

That is precisely the climate of fear the Chinese Communist Party seeks to instill, globally and at home.

...

In 2021, then-CSIS director David Vigneault described Operation Fox Hunt as a “covert global operation” used to “target and quiet dissidents to the regime.” In 2023, he singled out the People’s Republic of China’s use of “family and friends living in China as leverage” as the campaign’s most effective tactic.

The CSIS Public Report 2024 went further still. It named the MPS among the agencies whose foreign interference “can include coercing a victim to return to the PRC or threatening their family members in China.”

In June, 2025, Canada led G7 leaders in a joint statement condemning the “misuse of co-operation with other foreign states ... in order to detain, forcibly return, or repress targets.”

Seven months later, an MOU was signed with the world’s most prolific perpetrator of such conduct.

...

Parliament should see the MOU. And when China’s Foreign Minister Wang Yi visits Ottawa this week, Anita Anand should tell him that Canada intends to release the police agreement to the public.

It is hard to believe the agreement would survive such scrutiny.

cross-posted from: https://scribe.disroot.org/post/9096181

Archived link

In response to escalating military maneuvers by Russia and China's growing strategic footprint, seven nations with Arctic interests have agreed to significantly enhance security across the region. The coalition-comprising Canada, Denmark (including Greenland and the Faroe Islands), Finland, Iceland, Norway, Sweden, and the United States-plans to expand its military presence, improve surveillance capabilities, and conduct joint exercises throughout the Arctic and High North.

...

In a joint statement, the seven countries committ to enhance military presence, surveillance capabilities, and joint training in the Arctic and the High North. We do so in a coordinated and calibrated way.

...

As Arctic nations bolster their security in response to the growing military presence of Russia and China, similar initiatives are taking shape across Europe. For instance, a coalition of the UK and nine European countries has recently formed a naval alliance aimed at countering Russian aggression. This development underscores the increasing urgency for collaborative defense strategies among nations facing shared threats. To learn more about this European naval coalition, click here.

..

cross-posted from: https://scribe.disroot.org/post/9096181

Archived link

In response to escalating military maneuvers by Russia and China's growing strategic footprint, seven nations with Arctic interests have agreed to significantly enhance security across the region. The coalition-comprising Canada, Denmark (including Greenland and the Faroe Islands), Finland, Iceland, Norway, Sweden, and the United States-plans to expand its military presence, improve surveillance capabilities, and conduct joint exercises throughout the Arctic and High North.

...

In a joint statement, the seven countries committ to enhance military presence, surveillance capabilities, and joint training in the Arctic and the High North. We do so in a coordinated and calibrated way.

...

As Arctic nations bolster their security in response to the growing military presence of Russia and China, similar initiatives are taking shape across Europe. For instance, a coalition of the UK and nine European countries has recently formed a naval alliance aimed at countering Russian aggression. This development underscores the increasing urgency for collaborative defense strategies among nations facing shared threats. To learn more about this European naval coalition, click here.

..

Archived link

In response to escalating military maneuvers by Russia and China's growing strategic footprint, seven nations with Arctic interests have agreed to significantly enhance security across the region. The coalition-comprising Canada, Denmark (including Greenland and the Faroe Islands), Finland, Iceland, Norway, Sweden, and the United States-plans to expand its military presence, improve surveillance capabilities, and conduct joint exercises throughout the Arctic and High North.

...

In a joint statement, the seven countries committ to enhance military presence, surveillance capabilities, and joint training in the Arctic and the High North. We do so in a coordinated and calibrated way.

...

As Arctic nations bolster their security in response to the growing military presence of Russia and China, similar initiatives are taking shape across Europe. For instance, a coalition of the UK and nine European countries has recently formed a naval alliance aimed at countering Russian aggression. This development underscores the increasing urgency for collaborative defense strategies among nations facing shared threats. To learn more about this European naval coalition, click here.

..

....

The new project with Indigenous communities across the Prairies [is] aimed at addressing the capital gap in Canada’s food production and value-added agriculture sector. The work brings together Alexander First Nation, Saskatoon Tribal Council, Whitecap Dakota First Nation and File Hills Qu’Appelle Tribal Council, who will combine knowledge and resources to set up an Indigenous investment group. The group will establish a Fund focused on investing directly into Canadian food and ingredient processors.

...

As demand for made-in-Canada food and ingredients grows, this Fund will help the food production and value-added agriculture sector develop and commercialize innovative new products. Its focus on involving Indigenous communities, in particular, will also help to expand access to traditional knowledge and practices, access to land and resources, meaningful employment, cultural diversity and inclusivity, and a commitment to reconciliation and social responsibility.

...

Canada will pump $816 million into maritime security over the next seven years to strengthen the coast guard's capabilities from the high Arctic to the country's southern coast lines, Defence Minister David McGuinty announced Friday.

"This is an investment in Canada's Arctic security," McGuinty said in Iqaluit. "It's an investment in the people who protect these waters. It's an investment in our sovereignty. It's an investment in the people who live here."

McGuinty said that while the money will be used on Canada's East and West Coasts, in the Great Lakes and in the St. Lawrence River, the funding would focus specifically on strengthening security and defence capabilities in the Arctic.

...

Archived link

Over the past week, a growing number of tech companies have warned that they may be forced to leave Canada if Bill C-22, the lawful access bill, remains unchanged. The government’s response to warnings from Signal, Windscribe, NordVPN, Apple, and Meta is that the companies are misreading the bill. But the prospect of a tech exodus from Canada rests on clear-cut privacy and security risks that do not apply in the U.S. or Europe.

...

The Act’s definition of “electronic service provider” captures any service involving the creation, recording, storage, processing, transmission, or reception of information, provided either to persons in Canada or by an entity carrying on business activities in Canada.

The breadth intentionally covers far more than just telecom companies and internet providers, extending to platforms, messaging applications, VPN services, and device manufacturers. Every ESP is subject to a general assistance obligation under section 7 and to a secrecy obligation that bars disclosure of the existence of requests.

...

[Signal’s Vice President of Strategy and Global Affairs Udbhav] Tiwari put the point bluntly in his statement to the Globe: “End-to-end encryption is incompatible with exceptional access, no matter how creative the route taken to achieve it.”

What places the Canadian tech sector at risk of an exodus is that U.S. law imposes neither obligation. There is no federal mandatory data retention law in the United States, as the Electronic Frontier Foundation has documented across more than a decade of failed legislative proposals. The closest analog, the preservation provision in 18 U.S.C. § 2703(f) of the Stored Communications Act, allows the government to compel a provider to preserve existing records for up to 90 days while it obtains a court order, with a single 90-day extension available. It is a reactive, targeted mechanism tied to a specific account, not a forward-looking retention mandate covering every user of the service.

...

A U.S.-based VPN or messaging service can therefore lawfully maintain a no-log approach, which is precisely how the no-log policies are built. Given the choice, VPNs and other services will surely leave Canada rather than architect their systems to retain metadata on every single user for a year.

...

In Europe, the Court of Justice of the European Union struck down general data retention regimes in Digital Rights Ireland in 2014 and Tele2 Sverige in 2016, and has continued to constrain them in later rulings. Germany’s Federal Constitutional Court has imposed similar limits, and general retention obligations on email providers remain unlawful there. The jurisdictions that have moved in C-22’s direction are precisely the ones where major services have begun to exit or restrict features.

...

The United Kingdom’s Investigatory Powers Act sparked Apple’s withdrawal of its Advanced Data Protection feature from the U.K. market rather than comply with a Technical Capability Notice ordering it to create access to encrypted iCloud data, and Apple is now litigating that order before the Investigatory Powers Tribunal.

Switzerland’s recent attempt to extend its surveillance ordinance to VPN providers and encrypted messaging services prompted Proton to begin moving infrastructure out of the country to Germany before the Swiss Federal Council paused the amendment pending an impact study. Where jurisdictions impose obligations of the kind Bill C-22 contains, privacy-protective services have either left, scaled back, or restricted features.

...

The compliance obligations on Canadian electronic service providers under Bill C-22 do not apply to a U.S.-based competitor, are limited or unconstitutional in much of Europe, and have led to exits or feature withdrawals in jurisdictions that have imposed them.

The companies aren’t bluffing, and they aren’t misreading the bill. Rather, they are responding to an outlier approach that threatens the Canadian tech landscape with obligations that place the privacy and security of millions at risk.

cross-posted from: https://scribe.disroot.org/post/9077259

Archived link

The Royal Australian Navy’s Anzac Class HMAS Toowoomba and Royal Canadian Navy’s Halifax Class HMCS Charlottetown frigates joined forces for a range of cooperative activities, aiming to increase interoperability and regional collaboration.

For over two weeks, the frigates worked alongside each other as part of bilateral and multinational activities, which HMAS Toowoomba Commanding Officer Commander Alicia Harrison said represents the allyship between the two nations.

“As a Pacific partner, Australia welcomes Canada’s continued presence in the Indo‑Pacific,” she said.

“It is vital that like‑minded nations work together to promote a prosperous, open and inclusive region, and to collectively uphold maritime security.”

...

“Training alongside trusted partners allows us to broaden our perspective and strengthens our collective ability to safeguard the region we call home,” CMDR Harrison said.

...

cross-posted from: https://scribe.disroot.org/post/9055474

The Ford government says it is banning Chinese-made drones from being used in sensitive police investigations as the first step in a broader bid to remove them from the government supply chain altogether.

The move will affect every drone owned and operated by the Ontario Provincial Police, according to the government, which said they currently only use Chinese-made drones.

Still, Stephen Crawford, the minister of public and business service delivery and procurement, said the move was a vital step toward enhanced public safety.

“Now more than ever, it is critical that we are protecting our province’s data and safeguarding our security against bad actors,” he said in a statement.

...

“Banning government use and future purchases of Chinese-made drones is another important step in our plan to protect Ontario and better leverage Canada’s world-class drone manufacturing sector.”

The government said the impetus behind the change is rules that can compel companies incorporated in China to disclose their data, even if it was gathered or stored abroad.

Banning Chinese-made drones, the province said, would align it with the Canadian Armed Forces and the RCMP, among other Canadian organizations.

...