1. Do not take notes on a criminal conspiracy
2. Your notes about whatever ephemeral org work you're doing are useless for future organizers unless you synthesize them into something coherent
3. You should publish any such synthesis as widely as possible since it will otherwise certainly be lost
4. Do not take notes on a criminal conspiracy

I also keep encrypted notes, but the point of encrypting them is so that if I lose access to them then so does everyone. Anything that another person is meant to read is a product of those notes. Read Lenin('s diary)

Please excuse me, I'm only posting so this has to appear on the fed report later

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So you're fine if the integrity of leftist groups are compromised if you don't hit the dead man's switch? Seems like a bad idea.

But for the sake of argument in this fantasy scenario, you can publish all your notes and use shamir's secret sharing. You would then entrust some friends with each part of the decryption key and if they find out that you pass away then they can come together and decrypt your notes.

skill issue, i would simply avoid dying

you put them in your will, either to comrade or an org, ip address and keys if so desired or just location of hard drive, if you are not extremely high profile (i mean assange/snowden level), state won't bother with checking every single lawyer you visited. If you more paranoid considering raids on lawyer firms in the 70s-80s, you can add another layer of obfuscation of some kind, like a switch

I'd suggest either A: not worrying about it, lots of things get lost to time, place the security and safety of your comrades over some people in the future who will find it an object of curiosity and interest but not of help as the revolution will have already won.

Or B: since you want it published long after your death after a point where it no longer compromises op-sec for others I think you need to consider real world solutions. Storing copies with a trusted friend in an encrypted form and giving another very trusted friend the encryption key.

Put both in sealed envelopes on durable storage media for the encrypted notes themselves (a MABL type HTL bluray (possibly two copies on two discs) would be probably my top choice as flash drives and the like often fail or suffer decay and corruption in short periods of time but the alternative would be several copies on several different media or at least multiple of the same) and include instructions for who the other person is to get in contact with ONLY upon your death and to only combine the two and for the person with the decryption info to only release this password to the other if you are dead and the year is at least 20xx or x number of years have passed, whatever. I would also include both on the storage medium with the notes and a paper printed hard copy details about the encryption and what software should be used to decrypt it in case say this is being accessed in 15-20 years it may not be obvious. I would if possible include the executable software and all necessary components for accessing the files on the storage medium itself in case in the future it isn't easily available. You could break up your encryption key among more than just one person so have 3 or more people involved but the problem then becomes what if one of them dies and their stuff is thrown out? There are schemes for breaking authentication data into multiple pieces of which only a certain percentage are required for recovery though I can't recall them at the moment the privacy community people may know what I'm talking about but you'd still need like 4 or more trustworthy people for redundancy not counting the person or persons holding the data (and you may want to consider having two people holding copies in case again one dies). Also for the data itself I'd make sure to include with it a paper that explains what it is or gives some hint is important and who it should be given to if the person in question dies (another close friend) especially if only one copy is being made instead of two copies for two friends.

You could alter this arrangement a bit. You could break a key/password in half, give copies of the same half to several people you trust with instructions and if you're short on people copies of the data as well and then arrange for the other half to be delivered by some means far in the future. Of course that becomes a problem itself as there's no way to know that Google won't delete your gmail account with half the password while you're say in prison or whatever.

You need to evaluate risk of each part of the chain for both security (how few actors it requires to compromise it and how trustworthy x number of actors are) and preservation/longevity as in how will this arrangement function if people die, how immune is it to stuff being thrown out or to the media itself decaying (hence media redundancy and MABL HTL bluray discs which should last several centuries being preferable as most flash drives, SSDs, hard drives will see data decay or corrupted within anywhere from a year sitting unused to perhaps 10 years and it's all a matter of luck).

If you do it like 2 people, one holding the digital copies encrypted, one holding the whole key then collusion between both is needed to get at your data (consideration to coercion by legal means should be given and how well these people will hide this stuff or go to bat to protect it), on the other hand either dying or losing the key or the data means a total loss of it so it's not very strong for preservation purposes. Two people with one holding the data, one holding a partial key, and some electronic mechanism of delivering the other half of the key means an adversary has to get at both those people and the system holding it which also means those two cannot collude on their own against you or be pressured into doing so but introduces another potential area of failure (3 versus only 2 for the previous idea where any one failing means total loss). So redundancy is key. I'd try if possible to have two automated dead-man switches from two companies/services that don't give away the whole thing which send email, snail-mail, etc to a person holding a copy of the data so you have redundancy. Otherwise I'd try to have the dead-man switch located within a service you can pre-pay for many years into the future. If you can only pay for 10 years, you could include if you trust your friends an instruction not to use it for an additional x number of years in your dead-man message. Or you could avoid this automation, and do say 4 trusted people, with 2 getting copies of the data and 2 getting the decryption information and the identities of the people with the data. But you must assess and plan for risks. Would adversaries break into the homes of these people with the decryption info and find it then break into the homes with the copies of the data and find it and then decrypt it? Could you use nick-names that are used off-line and not known to facebook and the like to describe who the people with the data are without naming them directly or so on.

Ultimately it's likely you'll have to make some compromises in survivability of the data or security unless you have a decent amount of trustworthy friends.

You want your encrypted diary to automatically become a blog if your phone doesn't check in often enough?