People in Europe have largely been happy to see Berlin rebuild its military to defend against Russia. But they should be careful what they wish for. Today’s Germany has pledged to use its outsize armed power to help all of Europe. But left unchecked, German military dominance might eventually foster divisions within the continent. France remains uneasy about the fact that its neighbor is becoming a major military power—as are many people in Poland, despite Sikorski’s sentiments. As Berlin ascends, suspicion and mistrust could grow. In the worst-case scenario, competition might return. France, Poland, and other states could attempt to counterbalance Germany, which would divert attention away from Russia and leave Europe divided and vulnerable. France, in particular, may seek to reassert itself as the continent’s leading military power and “grande nation.” This could prompt outright rivalry with Berlin and place Europe at odds with itself.

Such nightmarish outcomes are especially likely if Germany ends up being governed by the far-right Alternative for Germany (AfD), which is rising in the polls. The intensely nationalistic party has long been critical of the European Union and NATO, and some of its members have made revanchist claims about the territory of neighboring countries. An AfD-controlled Germany might use its power to bully or coerce other countries, leading to tensions and conflict.

Berlin does need to build up its military. The continent is in danger, and no other European government has the fiscal capacity that Germany can bring to bear. But Berlin must recognize the risks that accompany its strengths and restrain German power by embedding its defensive might in more deeply integrated European military structures. Germany’s European neighbors, for their part, should make clear what kind of defense integration they would like to see. Otherwise, German rearmament could very well yield a Europe that is more divided, mistrustful, and weaker—exactly the opposite of what Berlin now hopes to achieve.

And yet, as some realist scholars have argued, rivalry among Europe’s countries never really disappeared, and certainly not through the EU alone. It was merely subdued, and largely by NATO and American hegemony. The EU was, and is, primarily an economic organization. Security and defense in Europe were mostly in the hands of NATO and the U.S. military. It was an overbearing U.S. presence, in other words, that ameliorated the European security dilemma that Germany’s size and position have traditionally posed—not just the political and economic integration fostered by the EU.

Analysts who want to understand why Europeans fear German hegemony do not need to look back a century; a decade would suffice. During Europe’s 2010s fiscal crisis, several EU countries were drowning in debt and in need of bailouts from the EU. That meant, in practice, getting approval for bailouts from Germany, the biggest and wealthiest eurozone economy. But rather than showing solidarity and using its enormous wealth to generously help these states, Berlin was concerned about fiscal responsibility and imposed harsh austerity measures as part of bailout packages, resulting in double-digit unemployment and protracted misery for debtor countries.

If Germany does not take steps to mitigate mistrust and discomfort, competition really could return to Europe. To counterbalance Berlin’s military might, Poland, for example, might look to ally itself more closely with the Baltic and Nordic countries and the United Kingdom in the Joint Expeditionary Force. It might also look to join the Nordic-Baltic Eight, a regional cooperation framework among Denmark, Estonia, Finland, Iceland, Latvia, Lithuania, Norway, and Sweden. Either way, the result could be the fragmentation of common European defense efforts. Paris, for its part, might be tempted to reassert itself by significantly increasing its defense spending as a way of catching up with, and containing, Germany, despite France’s domestic fiscal troubles. Paris might also seek closer cooperation with London to counterbalance Berlin.

A militarily dominant Germany could prove particularly dangerous if its centrist domestic leadership starts to lose power—as it just well might. The country is not due to hold national elections for three more years, but the extremist AfD now polls in first place at the national level.

It subscribes to a far-right, illiberal, and Euroskeptic ideology. It is Russia-friendly, opposed to supporting Ukraine, and wants to reverse Germany’s post-1945 economic and military integration into the EU and NATO, at least in their current form. It sees military power as a tool of national aggrandizement that should be used exclusively to benefit Berlin. It hopes to develop a German defense industry that’s entirely autonomous from those of Berlin’s traditional allies. If it wins federal power, the AfD will use the German military exactly as Thatcher feared: to project power against Germany’s neighbors. In the same way that Washington has made once inconceivable claims on Canada and Greenland, an AfD-led Germany might eventually make claims on French or Polish territory.

There is a way for Berlin to expand its military power without sending Europe back to an era of competition and rivalry—perhaps even if Germany is eventually governed by the AfD. The solution is for the country to accept what the historian Timothy Garton Ash, writing in these pages three decades ago, called “golden handcuffs”: restrictions on its sovereignty through greater integration with its European neighbors.

Germany should also push for the stronger integration of Europe’s national defense industries, including by seeking more collaboration on its own projects rather than spending largely on domestic firms. Likewise, Germany should embrace true European defense companies akin to Airbus, which was created as a European aviation consortium to provide an alternative to American manufacturers. All these measures would not only avert fears of a dominant Germany by ensuring that Berlin’s defense base relied on others. It would also provide greater scale and effectiveness in Europe’s overall military buildup.