The anonymous credential signature scheme that is planned to be used is BBS#, I don't know how it handles revocation.

Additionally, BBS# proposes a solution for device-binding from ECDSA-signatures, relying on re-randomization of ECDSA signatures and public keys. Furthermore, a trust model for BBS# that covers revocation and proof of validity is defined in [BBT2025].

[BBT2025]: Trust Model : Securing digital identity with advanced cryptographic algorithms, available at https://github.com/Orange-OpenSource/BBS-SHARP-doc-eudi-wallet , 2025

https://github.com/eu-digital-identity-wallet/eudi-doc-standards-and-technical-specifications/blob/main/docs/technical-specifications/ts4-zkp.md

I haven't found where in that source the implementation of revocation is discussed.

Edit: https://github.com/Orange-OpenSource/BBS-SHARP-doc-eudi-wallet/blob/main/Trust-model-privacy-on-attestation-presentation.md#14-attestation-revocation

Seems like no ways of enabling privacy preserving revocation with bbs# are known jet. This means that arithmetic circuit based proofs would be the only way to enable revocation. And as they can prove any statement in NP with ZK, the fact that they can prove that a revocation id is not part of a given list is obvious. https://github.com/eu-digital-identity-wallet/eudi-doc-standards-and-technical-specifications/blob/main/docs/technical-specifications/ts4-zkp.md#22-proofs-for-arithmetic-circuits-programmable-zkps

https://www.microsoft.com/en-us/research/wp-content/uploads/2016/02/main-51.pdf As crescent by Microsoft is one of the considered implemations, this paper is probably the most relevant work on revocation of anonymous credentials.