Colby's broader doctrinal analysis is also, uh... I pointed out this particularly silly example back then, of saying "The US is never going to abandon its bases or interests in CENTCOM" right as the US was in the midst of doing exactly that to like half its bases in the region. This thread on American theater missile defense doctrine, while it does at least start out with useful information and clearing up misunderstandings about the doctrine, does not in any way interrogate whether this doctrine can really work, and dismisses the critiques of low interceptor inventories - in the end, I feel it ends up being a classic example of the "Western doctrine can never fail, it can only be failed" framing often seen from Western analysts. His final "doctrine works, it just has to be implemented in full" statement, has, I feel, been pretty thoroughly repudiated at this point - the Iran war did involve the US and Israel expending a ridiculous amount of highly valuable munitions in order to destroy Iranian assets, and yet seemingly failed to actually meaningfully attrit Iranian missile and drone capabilities, and ended up with depleted interceptor stocks anyway. He states "In the absence of sufficient TMD, friendly forces are vulnerable to begin with, and do not have any freedom to operate" - and yet Iran proves this wrong, as they went through over a month of bombardment and yet were still able to keep up launches - by relying not on interceptor defense but underground facilities and concealment. He further dismisses worries about interceptor expenditure as "not that dire", midway into the war, despite extensive evidence for the success of Iranian strikes by that point, and this is all in service to the notion that Ukraine... is going to buy interceptors from the Gulf states? This is, again, pro-Ukrainian bias affecting his analysis - firstly believing Ukrainian claims that they totally have a bunch of spare drones sitting around to offer to the Gulf states, and secondly believing that the Gulf states are going to actually send a substantial amount of interceptors to Ukraine despite the performance of their air defense during the war - pro-Ukraine guys have to believe these things, since otherwise they'd have to accept the reality on the ground.

Another example of uncritically assuming Western doctrine will work - this argument, again dismissing critiques by other analysts, that the expenditure of ammunitions' obvious negative impact on military capability against China isn't actually a problem, since, uh, the US needs to eliminate the Iranian threat first, and so it's all justified? This completely fails to tackle the obvious question of "what if a US attack on Iran doesn't work and you just end up with no munitions and still facing two threats", and is also an example of how being a deranged imperialist compromises your material analysis - "acting now is undoubtedly wiser than praying that somehow the regime will not pose a persistent threat into the future" justifies this tremendous waste of ammunition by assuming that the evil Iranians were totally going to strike eventually anyway, despite all evidence from before this showing that the Iranians are moving very slowly, trying to avoid escalation, and having a substantial reformist faction which seeks rapprochement with the West - if anything, attacking has weakened those reformists and strengthened the hardliners by proving they were right about everything, thus making Iran into more of a threat! But the deranged fascist who assumes by default that the Iranians were scheming to attack him cannot really conceive of an analysis like that.

The "Western doctrine can never fail, it can only be failed" framing is also particularly common precisely among pro-Ukraine analysts, as it offers hope - if only Western doctrine was implemented correctly this time, Ukraine could win! The idea that there's just fundamental conceptual flaws there cannot be accepted. There's actually a great response in one of the above threads which exactly lays out one of the trends among pro-Western analysts: "Native English speaking Weapon and Military experts have proven themselves to be zoomed in tactical aspects of this conflict, as if they dictated strategic and geopolitical outcomes".

There's also this other thread I came across later, where he again dismisses expenditure concerns, this time about JASSM. He then states about where he got his numbers from, "The US Air Force's budget? Selected Acquisition Reports too. It's all there. The issue is that very few people understand how to read and cross reference these documents correctly." Except:

1. Budget documents are about procurement, that is orders, not deliveries. The US can order a dozen Constitution-class starships if they wanted to, but that doesn't actually mean anything . It's a well-observed trend that US MIC contractors often fail to meet their procurement targets.
2. The latest Selected Acquisition Reports on the JASSM specifically are from 2022 & '23, and don't in any way include the 3035 number Colby cites, so not sure where he got it from. The '23 document also blatantly has clerical errors, with someone having copy-pasted the "Total Program Quantity Delivered number decreased from 44.9% to 27.2% due to an overall quantity increases" line from the '22 document, when pretty obviously if the percentage changed from 44 to 22 in '22, it didn't again change from the same number to the same other number the next year! Maybe there wouldn't be "very few people [who] understand how to read these documents" if they were actually written correctly.