I understand that no Operating System is 100% safe. Although this backdoor is likely only affects certain Linux desktop users, particularly those running unstable Debian or testing builds of Fedora (like versions 40 or 41), **Could this be a sign that antivirus software should be more widely used on Linux desktops? ** ( I know this time is a zero-day attack)
What if, malicious code like this isn't discovered until after it's released to the public? For example, imagine it was included in the initial release of Fedora 40 in April. What if other malware is already widespread and affects more than just SSH, unlike this specific case?
My point is,
- Many people believe that Linux desktops don't require antivirus software.
- Antivirus can at least stop malware once it's discovered.
- Open-source software is protected by many parties, but a backdoor like this one, which reportedly took 2 years to plan and execute, raises my concern about being more cautious when choosing project code maintainers.
- Linux desktops will likely be targeted by more attacks as they become more popular.
IMO, antivirus does not save stupid people(who blindly disable antivirus // grant root permission) but it does save some lazy people.
OS rely heavily on users practicing caution and up-to-date(both knowledge and the system). While many users don't follow tech news, they could unknowingly be running (this/any) malware without ever knowing. They might also neglect system updates, despite recommendations from distro maintainers.
This is where antivirus software can be useful. In such cases, users might be somewhat protected once the backdoor signature is added to the antivirus database.
The maintainer of xz was pressured into adding a new, unknown maintainer because he was alone and most likely unpaid. Had this critical piece of software been well-funded and the maintainer well-compensated, he probably never would've added the maintainer.
Regardless, I'm not sure how an antivirus would help here. This was a component upon which many others were built. How would this have been detected heuristically? Maybe somebody with a deeper understanding can also weigh in whether SELinux could've helped here, but if it's a
lib*, I guess not.IMO the major problem is upstream: fund critical components. If you work in an org using opensource (and I bet you do), try and get them to set aside some kind of budget for opensource projects they use. For example a simple 100€ distributed across selected projects every month or every year. Or more, whatever.. just something.
Also probably reproducible builds would help. The distributed archives should not differ from that of multiple build services.