The Israeli Agricultural Industry: A Strategic Weakness

Excellently researched article. I shared only the conclusion below.

The structural change in the Israeli agricultural industry not only affected the composition of workers in the industry but also had repercussions on food policy in the entity, which became more reliant on importing foodstuffs. This was due to the slowdown of growth of the agricultural industry, which coincided with a significant expansion in the population, compounded by the political desire to lower prices, which opened the door to imports [11].

As mentioned earlier, the slow growth of the industry in the 1980s was the result of inflationary recession factors that affected the Israeli economy during that period, coupled with the neoliberal policies followed by Israeli governments since the late 1970s, which reduced the amount of government support for agriculture. Consequently, population growth, over time, became faster than agricultural production growth. In the 1950s, the annual growth rate of production was about 12.8%, compared to a population growth rate of 4.6%. However, this dynamic shifted in the 1990s, the decade when population growth surpassed agricultural production growth, remaining so until now, with the former reaching 2.8% while the latter reached 2% [12]. This led to dependence on food imports to meet the increasing local demand. The result was that the entity became completely dependent on imports of sugar, vegetable oils, oilseeds, animal feed, and grains [13]. Moreover, domestic production of animal products relies on imports of feed and live animals.

This coincided with the neoliberal transformation in the Israeli economy, where the focus in the 1990s shifted towards high-value industries, especially the technology industry. Even agriculture took a significant share of this industry, with a focus on developing agricultural technology surpassing interest in agricultural production itself. At this stage, Israel chose the neoliberal model based on export orientation. The purpose of this policy was to improve the current account balance—reducing the deficit or increasing the surplus—attracting foreign direct investment, reducing external debt, and building foreign currency reserves by the central bank [14]. In contrast, other industries, including agriculture, saw declining growth rates, and their products lost competitiveness, even in domestic markets, due to the high production costs.

It is not sustainable to be a First World Country—meaning a country with an economy focused on high-value production while abandoning quantitative production, especially concerning basic goods like food—in a hostile region that does not accept you. No matter how significant Western support may be, there are economic rules in the real-world economy that cannot be bypassed or ignored. Consumers need consumer goods, and herein lies the strategic mistake committed by the Israeli entity during the formation stage of its modern economy, specifically after the neoliberal transformation it underwent in the late 1980s. Under export-oriented neoliberalism, the focus shifted to enhancing the economy’s status on the international stage. In this context, “Israel” was able to achieve its goal. However, it simultaneously relinquished a crucial aspect of its security, which is food security.

Amidst the brutal war that “Israel” is waging against the people of Gaza, other fronts have opened up. The attacks carried out by Yemen in the Red Sea imposing a blockade on Israeli ports from the early weeks of the ongoing war have proven that the anti-Israel camp is capable of reducing its ability to import. This poses an even larger problem in the event of a broader regional war. While today only the port of Eilat is affected by the blockade in the Red Sea, the situation could worsen if a war threatens other Israeli ports, especially those located on the Mediterranean Sea. This could trigger a food security crisis in “Israel,” which abandoned a fundamental element of its survival amidst the transition to neoliberalism.