In the spirit of discussing the Chinese dollar bonds, i’d like to talk about “China’s Foreign Exchange Reserves: Past and Present Security Challenges” by Yu Yongding, published first in July 2022 (so 5 months after Russian forex got seized) and translated here. It concludes, amongst some other things, that “[China] should strive to avoid becoming a creditor as much as possible”.

The internationalization of the RMB is a good for security in the long term, but in the short term “even if China’s foreign exchange reserves consisted entirely of RMB assets, their security would not change.” Why? “Because the key to the problem does not lie in the currency that China’s foreign exchange reserves are denominated and settled in, but in whether China owes the United States money or vice versa.” If the US does not want to service the debt, then China is left in the lurch/ bag-holding even if the $1 trillion US dollars in China’s reserve magically turned into RMB. The security threat outlined in this article is China being stiffed to the tune of trillions, and the security solution outlined is to stop being owed anything. The author repeatedly notes how China’s current foreign exchange reserves generate negative investment returns, largely because they are over-leveraged. Most countries have much smaller reserves of dollars on hand. So Mr. Yu advocates for getting dollars out of the country in a way that generates positive investment income.

But why does China have so many US dollars? Shortly after China’s opening up, “the shortage of foreign exchange was the main bottleneck”. As such, the RMB was devalued sharply. In 2003, financial turmoil caused China to delay the appreciation of the RMB until 2005. As a result of the late appreciation, “China’s trade surplus increased sharply, and, on the other hand, the domestic asset bubble and the strong expectation of RMB appreciation led to a large inflow of ‘hot money’. China’s capital account surplus once exceeded the trade surplus and became the primary source of new foreign exchange reserves. It is fair to say that China’s failure to let the RMB appreciate in time and its lack of exchange rate flexibility were the conditions that led to the country’s excessive accumulation of foreign exchange reserves.”

Why can’t the RMB just replace the dollar? “In short, for the RMB to become an international reserve currency, China must fulfill a series of preconditions, including establishing a sound capital market (especially a deep and highly liquid treasury bond market), a flexible exchange rate regime, free cross-border capital flows, and long-term credit in the market. In short, China must overcome the so-called ‘original sin’ in international finance and be able to issue treasury bonds internationally in RMB. Otherwise, it will be difficult for the RMB to become an international reserve currency and RMB internationalization will remain incomplete.”

China will not do many of those things, because that would be giving up control of the economy to financial markets. But that’s the rub, isn’t it? China can’t establish itself as the world’s reserve currency, not least because its financial institutions are not ‘advanced’ enough. The USA is a decrepit shell that has spent 40 years hollowing itself out to be the best financial market possible. The current proposal seems to be using both of these facts to China’ advantage.

De-dollarization is a non-starter unless the US goes apeshit crazy with SWIFT sanctioning. SDRs are cool, but the World Bank and IMF are USAmerican puppets for shock therapy. A bancor would require a lot of diplomatic work that no one will want to do for a while. Too many debts already exist denominated in dollars. The proposal with re-dollarization is to take advantage of the facts that China has too many dollars and some nice manufactured goods and that most of the Global South has commodities or other inputs for manufacturing and too much dollar debt. The US wants to be the turbo-finance hub of the world. Now, many of us here would argue that’s a broader manifestation of USamerica standing in the role as the current hegemon in a capitalist world and the tendency of the rate of profit to fall. At the ground level though, the finance people are blind dogs chasing blood, and they could not care less from where it flows. If the debts are getting paid, there shouldn’t be anything to complain about. And i personally doubt that the ‘Art of the Deal’ President is going to be some savvy financial genius. i think some guy once said something about capitalists selling the rope to hang themselves. As it is currently argued, China is setting up a win-win-win that slowly de-leverages their oversized dollar reserves and other countries’ debt.

Saudi Arabia may be mostly aligned with the West and the dollar, but that is a role they were forced into, not one they chose. The whole idea of the petrodollar comes from when OPEC tried to grab the “West” by the balls in the 70s and 80s, and then ended up with too much money to do anything with. Cash alone doesn’t do much in the desert. The US won that fight, because the Gulf States ended up recycling all of that money into US debt. Oil price spikes, a global recession, and soaring interest rates were the ingredients in the very first neoliberal shock. Interest rate and currency exchange rate manipulation led to IMF loans conditional on reforms, and the accompanying mass privatization and austerity. The US in 2024 has nowhere near the industrial or political capacity to pull off a second global financialization, mostly because there’s nowhere left in the world that hasn’t already been financialized. Even Russia and China represent financial markets outside the US’ control, not fully untapped markets. After 2008, quantitative easing, and the acceleration of money printing since 2020, domestic investors, banks, and the stock market depend on the federal interest rates in a way they really never have before. The snake is eating its own tail.

If anything, China’s attempts to do literally anything other than buying more US debt represents learning from the 80s. i do not see this as an obvious China L, though it may turn out to be.