Shared peoples

Sharing a border, both have a somewhat sizeable shared populations of their national ethnic groups. However, this is more prevalent in Thailand, where the country has a 5-12% Muslim population (there is conflicting information even between different government sources), mostly concentrated in the Malay-speaking south. This has fueled seperatism due to the Southern provinces being ceded to the Thai kingdom after imperial agreements in the early 20th century. Nowadays the separatism has lessened in militancy but faces a stalled peace process between the separatists, and the military/government. That said, there is still deep resentment and continual securitisation in the Southern provinces, with the endurance of emergency laws that started in 2005. This 'insurgency' has largely been hidden from public media and especially Western media, in which all state and non-state actors seemingly agree to lay low to dissuade foreign interference.

A fun fact is that after the dissolution of the Malayan Communist Party in 1991, past guerrilla members resettled into “peace villages” across Southern Thailand due to Malaysia barring Communist members from re-entering the country. There is some evocative writing there, where chinese migrant labourers who ultimately fought for an egalitarian Malaya forced to reside in a region in which itself was separated from Malaya about 80 years prior.

Southeast Asian developmentalism

Both countries were tailing the main “Asian Tigers” (Taiwan, South Korea, Singapore and Hong Kong), with some level of industrialization and transition towards full industrial capitalism by the early 1990s. This however would see it’s first major cracks in the Asian financial crisis of 1997-8. There has been extensive rhetoric for why Thailand and Malaysia failed to escape the middle-income trap and succumbed to neoliberalism and deindustrialization. Many fall into bourgeois-liberal culturalism or “crony capitalism”/“patronage politics” debates that fails to connect the two countries into the global processes of accumulation, uneven development and imperialism while considering local/national class structures. This neglect is itself a product of neoliberalism, leading to atomized analysis of individualistic policymaking of leaders.

The 1997-8 Asian Financial Crisis

There has been extensive literature on this topic so I won’t elaborate too much on it and urge people to read through the news and literature if they are interested.

Post-crash recovery

I like to highlight this era a bit more, to set the stage of the slowdown but not full crash of the two national economies, unlike that of other countries facing structural adjustment. This is because after the crash, it lead to heightened class-based struggles that were reflected in some rethinking and resistance to the “Washington Consensus” in both countries, highlighted by responses by Thaksin’s and Mahathir’s post-crash administrations. This was through debt moratoriums, targeted low-interest loans for rural populations and improved healthcare access schemes (Thailand), and capital controls, renationalization and greater emphasis on social-based Islamic financial instruments (Malaysia). These policies helped propelled Thai Rak Thai (TRT) and Barisan Nasional (BN) to overwhelming electoral victories in their respective elections in the early to mid 2000s. But as capitalism always does, another resulting cyclical crash occurred globally (the 2008 financial crisis), which was especially detrimental for the export oriented businesses.

Current political-economic developments

Household debt to GDP in Thailand and Malaysia are one of the highest in ASEAN, and generally in the world. This is symptomatic of debt-based financialization and is especially concerning for underdeveloped and semi-industrialized countries. About 65% of Malaysian household debt is due to real estate and 17% from vehicle purchases, compared to Thailand’s 33% (real estate) and 16% (vehicles). Thailand’s debt problem however has increasingly come from credit card and personal loans (18%).

Thailand’s economy is characterised by quite large disparities of urban and rural classes, with the affluent urban middle classes advocating for democratisation against the military aligned national bourgeosie. Other more savvy bourgeois groups also support democratization due to the perceived outdated superstructure of the military. Meanwhile, the rural classes consist mainly of farmers, petty commodity producers and semi-proletarians, with consistent classism by the urbanites of being uneducated and falling for simple rhetoric and vote-buying practices. Although typical of many other economies, what separates Thailand from other semi-industrialised countries is this large gap and continual failure to fully convert into a ‘developed’ capitalist economy via disciplining financial capital for investment in modern industrial sectors. This can clearly be seen in the patterns of urbanization in Thailand compared to other Asian countries.

Malaysia on the other hand face contradictions stemming from the complete proletarianization of the peasantry and other backward classes. The rise of migrant labour consisting of 10-20% of the total population (15-25% of the workforce) and racialization as means to negate class consciousness is representative of this capitalist development. The near immiseration of the countryside and integration into the global economy has lead to a rise in Islamic and petty bourgeois reformist movements that seek to mediate their class interests with international Capital. It has also lead to the rise of the urban poor and the precariat whose livelihoods majorly depends on the whims of property developers, landlords and technology platforms.

Edit: Minor grammar mistakes.

The humanitarian mission trying to break the Israeli blockade on Gaza was the victim of new attacks, which they denounce are for psychological warfare and intimidation. The Global Sumud Flotilla, made up of 50 boats carrying humanitarian aid bound for Gaza, denounced on Tuesday that it was the target of nine drone attacks that targeted five ships, while they were sailing in the Mediterranean Sea south of the Greek island of Crete.

Spanish journalist Néstor Prieto, who is aboard the flotilla, reported that they activated a drone protocol, after about twenty of them began to fly over the flotilla.

Prieto reported that initially, the drones carried out surveillance tasks, carrying out sweeps at different heights. However, shortly after the attacks began, with at least nine impacts documented in videos broadcast on social networks.

The journalist noted that the attacks appear to follow a pattern of psychological warfare, with sound bomb detonations in the air and water, designed to frighten and disable boats, rather than to cause lethal damage.

The most recent of the attacks would have caused damage to the masts of one of the ships, although the information is still confusing due to the effects that the flotilla’s telecommunications are suffering, which force them to constantly change radio channels, according to Prieto.

Explosions, unidentified drones and communications jamming. We are witnessing these psychological operations firsthand, right now, but we will not be intimidated. The lengths to which Israel and its allies will go to prolong the horrors of starvation and Genocide in Gaza are…

— Global Sumud Flotilla Commentary (@GlobalSumudF) September 23, 2025

Although the origin of the drones is unknown at the moment, the pattern of attack points to Israel or related groups, according to the journalist’s report. At 2:27 a.m. local Greek time, drones continued to fly over the boats, including the Al Awda ship.

“Our determination is stronger than ever. These tactics will not deter us from our mission to deliver aid to Gaza and break the illegal siege. Any attempt to intimidate us only reinforces our commitment. We will not be silenced. We will continue sailing,” the participants of the flotilla assured on social networks.

The initiative is part of a global effort to challenge the Israeli siege, denouncing the critical humanitarian situation in Gaza and demanding an end to the genocide.

The plan to procure three LRMVs is outlined in the German Navy’s Kurs Marine document, which outlines the fleet that it wants to operate by 2035. While the LRMVs will serve as arsenal ships to supplement the new class of F127 frigates, the German Navy also wants to buy 18 smaller uncrewed surface vessels, known as Future Combat Surface Systems (FCSS), to supplement its corvettes, and at least 12 Large Unmanned Underwater Vehicles (LUUV) to support its submarines. The most striking development, however, concerns the LRMV, which is planned from the outset for uncrewed operations, although presumably they could also be used in an optionally crewed capacity.

It’s not exactly clear what kind of size the LRMVs will be. Presuming a diagram published in the Kurs Marine document is fairly accurate, they would be around half the length of the F127 frigate, which would make them around 260 feet long, roughly corvette-sized. However, according to the German defense and security website hartpunkt, citing naval insiders, the dimensions and displacement of the vessels hadn’t been determined, so not too much should be read into the diagram. Clearer is the role that the LRMVs will undertake, essentially as floating missile platforms that can bolster the magazine capacity of the planned six F127 frigates, in particular. The arsenal ships will be equipped with vertical launchers for different missiles, to support the F127’s air defense and maritime strike taskings. The number of launch containers is also not yet finalized, hartpunkt reports. Meanwhile, the F127 is expected to feature 64 cells, as part of the popular Mk 41 vertical launch system (VLS). The VLS cells in the LRMV will likely be loaded with the same weapons that arm the F127 frigate: Standard Missile 2 (SM-2) for general-area air defense and RIM-162 Evolved Sea Sparrow Missiles (ESSM) for short-/medium-range air defense. They could also possibly field SM-6 for long-range air and missile defense, as well as strike, and Tomahawk cruise missiles for longer range strike. SM-6 and Tomahawk would require longer “strike length” VLS cells. The preliminary artwork in the Kurs Marine document shows an array of vertical launchers mounted, at least partly, above the deck at the rear of the ship. However, this should be considered highly provisional. The German government is currently reviewing a plan to buy the Tomahawk, which would place it in an elite operators’ club. Other options could include the 3SM Tyrfing supersonic cruise naval missile currently being developed by Germany and Norway, and potentially even the new “deep precision strike” weapon, a missile with a range of over 2,000 kilometers (1,243 miles) that Germany and the United Kingdom are working on.

In its air defense role, the ‘parent’ frigate would be responsible for target detection and targeting, commanding missile launches from the smaller LRMV, which will effectively serve as additional floating magazine capacity. This also means the LRMV doesn’t need to accommodate its own expensive sensors. Alternatively, another surface vessel could provide the data, or it could be received from any other platform, with data relayed via satellite link. Reportedly, the LRMV would also carry some limited self-defense armament, which would presumably have to be controlled from another (crewed) platform. While seen as a ‘wingman’ to the F127 frigate, it could also complement the anti-submarine-warfare-optimized F126 class of frigates. As we have discussed before, these warships are comparatively lightly armed for their size, with a Mk 41 VLS for up to 64 Evolved Sea Sparrow Missile (ESSM) Block 2 missiles, and launchers for eight Kongsberg Naval Strike Missiles (NSM), but no current plans to arm them with Standard Missiles or Tomahawk.

The LRMV makes an interesting parallel with the two new support vessels planned for the Royal Netherlands Navy. These ships will be around 174 feet long and will displace around 600 tons, including containerized weapons and sensors for a variety of different missions, and a relatively tiny crew. Like the German design, the Dutch support vessels will bring additional air defense missiles to help existing Dutch frigates. As well as being entirely uncrewed, the LRMV is also intended to operate in very different conditions. While the Dutch support vessel is optimized for use in the North Sea and for patrol duties, the LRMV will be an ocean-going design that can serve in the Atlantic. The German ships will need to have much more robust seaworthiness and will likely need to be considerably larger. On the other hand, the operating concept for the LRMV foresees them loitering in a specific sea area for an extended period, so they won’t necessarily have to have the same level of performance as the F127 frigate, or an equivalent surface combatant.

While the shipbuilding phase for the LRMV is not necessarily a significant challenge, Germany will still need to develop resilient and reliable command and communications to ensure the ships can operate safely in a potentially highly contested environment. Experience with the Future Combat Surface System (FCSS) program, for a more modest arsenal ship, should help in this regard. Having a lower-cost supplement to the F127 class is also a key consideration, with the new frigates being the most expensive current German defense procurement, with a program cost of more than $30 billion for all six ships. Overall, Germany’s plans for the LRMV reflect a growing interest in support vessels with an arsenal ship role. These tend to be either uncrewed or with very small crews, and they are indicative of the current operational realities, in which conventional ships threaten to be overwhelmed by massed missile and drone attacks.

The need to boost naval air defense coverage, in particular, has been made clear by the campaign against Houthi missiles and drones targeting shipping in the Middle East in recent months, as well as Iran’s unprecedented, massed attack on Israel, using the same kinds of weapons. In particular, the limited stock of air defense missiles found on most warships has emerged as a concern, and one that the support vessels will help address. Developments elsewhere in the world, including in China, suggest that swarming drones as well as ever more capable missiles will be a feature of naval warfare from now on. These same concerns are seeing interest in the United States and other countries in large uncrewed surface vessels with modular weapons payloads, allowing them to be adapted for a range of missions as required. While it’s unclear what kind of modularity the LRMV might offer, having an uncrewed ship, even simply to increase the basic weapons magazine available to surface combatants, could be very useful for the German Navy and help pave the way toward more regular and extensive uncrewed operations at sea. At the same time, there are a lot of unknowns about actually operating an uncrewed ship equipped with heavy armament on operational patrols and over great distances. Command and control and networking architecture will be a huge factor in the success of any such concept. There are also security concerns, clearly. The idea that more naval capacity can be relatively inexpensively gained through uncrewed surface combatants of the larger variety is extremely attractive, but actually doing it reliably is still something that’s yet to be seen on a wide operational scale.

The procurement deal was signed in 2023 and became known after leaked correspondence obtained by the hacker group Black Moon; the analysis of roughly 800 pages of material was carried out by the British Royal United Services Institute(RUSI). According to that information, China purchased:

• 37 BMD-4M infantry fighting vehicles (airborne);
• 11 Sprut-SDM1 light amphibious tanks;
• 11 BTR-MDM Rakushka armored personnel carriers;
• several command-and-staff vehicles produced by NPP Rubin;
• several mobile artillery command posts Reostat;
• a number of Orlan-10 UAVs;
• parachute systems Dalnolyot.

All the equipment is to be fitted with Chinese communications gear. Technical documentation for independent maintenance and modernization of the weapons and equipment is being transferred as well. In other words, China will have more than enough information to reverse-engineer and copy the hardware if it chooses. That raises the obvious question: why would China need to buy equipment from Russia? As Defense Express noted RUSI's material notes the structure of the People's Liberation Army Airborne Corps: five airborne brigades, one air-assault brigade, one special-forces brigade, plus a transport (helicopter) brigade, an attack-helicopter regiment and a support brigade.

However, the inventory of dedicated tracked airborne vehicles is relatively small only about 180 ZBD-03 airborne IFVs and some quantity of CS/VN3 wheeled vehicles. China's airborne troops are even lighter than Russia's VDV, with an emphasis on helicopter insertion. By contrast, the BMD-4M is armed with a 100 mm gun paired with a 30 mm cannon, and the Sprut is effectively a light tank with a 125 mm gun. That represents a significant increase in firepower. The mention of the Dalnolyot parachute is also notable this is a winged parachute designed for special-operations units that, in favorable conditions, can glide up to some 60 km. All the purchased Russian equipment is intended to be air-dropped from Il-76 transport aircraft. China has roughly 75 strategic transport aircraft in this class (about 20 Il-76 plus 55 Y-20s). RUSI estimates that deploying this package by air would require some 35 Il-76-class sorties about half of China's available fleet.

Taken together, this can reasonably be viewed as a noteworthy enhancement of China's airborne assault capabilities a capability that is integral to vertical maneuver operations, where seaborne forces conduct a landing while airborne troops seize key rear objectives and fix or disrupt the enemy. By training Chinese troops in Russia, Beijing also obtained operational know-how for using airborne formations and the tools needed to employ them. In effect, Russia sold China a ready-made turnkey airborne capability.

some further details from the RUSI report directly:

The agreements also require Russia to train a battalion of Chinese paratroopers in employing the equipment. Armoured vehicle drivers will be trained at the Kurganmashzavod base, and the crews of KMN command and observation vehicles and Sprut anti-tank guns will be trained in Penza at JSC NPP Rubin. After completing courses on training equipment and simulators, the collective training of the Chinese airborne battalion will be carried out at training grounds in China. Here, Russian instructors are to prepare the battalion for landing, fire control and manoeuvring as part of an airborne unit. The Russians are also transferring Rheostat airborne artillery command and observation vehicle and Orlan-10 multi-purpose unmanned aerial vehicles. A Centre for Technical Maintenance and Repair of Russian Equipment will be established in China, to which all necessary technical documentation will be transferred. This will allow China to undertake the production and modernisation of these capabilities in the future.

Implications

... If the People’s Liberation Army Air Force, supported in a Joint Firepower Campaign, can successfully suppress Taiwanese air defences, then air manoeuvre offers the fastest means of transferring combat power onto Taiwan, and spreading operations across an expanded area. Helicopters offer the most flexible means of deploying troops, but light infantry, unsupported by armour and fires, will necessarily struggle to hold their objectives against a mechanised adversary, as Russian airborne troops found to their detriment at Hostomel. The capacity to airdrop armour vehicles, therefore, on golf courses, or other areas of open and firm ground near Taiwan’s ports and airfields, would allow air assault troops to significantly increase their combat power and threaten seizure of these facilities to clear a path for the landing of follow-on forces. It should also be noted that an attempt to seize Taiwan would likely see fighting erupt throughout the South China Sea, creating a requirement for the PLA to project combat power further afield. In the initial phases of war air manoeuvre could allow the PLA to move airborne forces with organic firepower and mobility to critical terrain beyond Taiwan, securing airfields or other infrastructure that could otherwise support US operations to counter the PLA amphibious landings on Taiwan. In short, an expanded air manoeuvre capability gives the PLA a diversity of options for rapid power projection.

...

The greatest value of the deal to the PLA, however, is most likely in the training and the procedures for command and control of airborne forces, as Russia’s airborne forces have combat experience, while the PLA does not. The requirement for a battalion’s worth of equipment – with an expanded number of C2 platforms – likely speaks to the desire to conduct battalion scale collective training, and since the Russians are to deliver it, this must be conducted on Russian vehicles. The deal also reflects the growing military-industrial co-operation between Russia and the PRC over the course of the full-scale invasion of Ukraine.

Boeing has received an additional $198 million under the U.S. Navy's F/A-18 Super Hornet modernization program. The goal is to extend the service life of these carrier-based fighters until a sixth-generation replacement arrives, something the fifth-generation F-35C has not managed to achieve. As part of the program, the service life of Block II Super Hornets will be extended from 6,000 to 10,000 flight hours, significantly prolonging their operational use. The upgrades will also include integration of Block III capabilities. It's worth noting that this allocation does not provide new funding directly but instead raises the ceiling of the existing contract by $198 million. Future task orders will be signed under this expanded limit for specific upgrade work. Today, the F/A-18E/F Super Hornet remains the backbone of the Navy's carrier air wings, with over 400 aircraft in service and more still on order. They are already being equipped with the latest weapons, including the long-range AIM-174B air-to-air missile.

Still, the Super Hornet is a 4+ generation fighter. Despite its strong capabilities, it lags behind newer designs, while the F-35C despite solid production rates still makes up only a fraction of the Navys fleet. The long-term solution is expected to come from the next-generation F/A-XX program, for which funding has been secured. However, questions remain about when the aircraft will be ready and how quickly it can be produced in sufficient numbers. Until then, the Navy will continue to modernize the Super Hornet fleet, and further contract expansions are highly likely to ensure incremental improvements. Block III enhancements include the extended 10,000-hour service life, greater range, reduced radar signature, upgraded avionics, and a redesigned cockpit featuring a large touchscreen display. The package also adds improved AN/APG-79 radars, the IRST Block II infrared search and track system, and the IDECM (Integrated Defensive Electronic Countermeasures) suite.

About 3,200 members of the International Association of Machinists and Aerospace Workers (IAM) went on strike on Aug. 4, and on Sept. 12 rejected a subsequent contract offer from Boeing. With no date set for Boeing and IAM to come back to the negotiating table, Boeing is interviewing prospective candidates to start taking what were once union jobs, said Dan Gillian, Boeing’s vice president of Air Dominance and senior executive at the St. Louis site. “We’ve had our first hiring event. We’ve received hundreds of qualified applicants. We’re working through that now,” he said in a Tuesday interview at the Air Force Association’s Air, Space and Cyber conference. Gillian declined to provide specifics on how many permanent workers it intends to bring on and what jobs it will try to fill first, but said that “we certainly have some areas where we think we can more rapidly bring people online than in other areas.” “I won’t comment on specific job codes,” he added, “but we do think that based on the protracted nature of the strike, and per our contingency plans, now is the time to be making some of these decisions to begin bringing on additional staff.”

Boeing’s IAM workforce in St. Louis is overwhelmingly focused on its defense business, producing legacy fighters, several aircraft still in their development stages and a portion of its weapons portfolio. Those workers will also build the sixth-generation F-47 fighter, the first of which is currently being manufactured, according to the Air Force’s top general. Any new hires to the company’s defense unit will join the business at a pivotal moment. Boeing’s defense division has started to show signs of recovery from supply chain and technical challenges that’s cost billions in losses across numerous fixed-price aircraft development programs. At the same time, the company is ramping up production of the F-15EX, sunsetting the Super Hornet line, and standing up production of the F-47, with a sixth-generation Navy fighter contract potentially looming. The strike also comes as Boeing’s commercial arm refocuses on production quality following a 2024 incident where a door plug blew off the fuselage of a 737 MAX in mid-flight. The National Transportation Safety Board in its investigation found that “Boeing’s failure to provide adequate training, guidance and oversight” of its factory staff ultimately led to the incident, according to an executive summary of the report published in June. (Boeing responded at the time that it regretted the accident and was focusing on improving its safety culture.)

Gillian said that Boeing’s current offer, which includes a 24 percent general wage increase and 45 percent average wage growth, is a “compelling” deal that “represents a lot of respect” for the workers in St. Louis. However, he added that the company’s previous two-tier wage structure allowed wages to become “out of control relative to the market.” “I think my teammates should be paid at the very top of the scale. They build airplanes and weapon systems and all kinds of complex things that make sense for them to be paid at the very top of the scale,” he said. At the same time, “I have to balance that with the needs that our customers have and the economics of our business, and I think we’ve done that. And I remain open to talking about how to move things around, but the answer cannot be more.” Just an hour after the interview, the union held a press conference to discuss the ongoing strike. Informed of Gillian’s comments, Jody Bennett, IAM’s lead negotiator, didn’t mince words.

“Why don’t you ask Dan if they’ve ever presented a deal to a union that they didn’t say was a very good deal? Obviously, anything the company slides across, they’re going to say it’s a very good deal,” he said. “Our membership doesn’t think it’s a very good deal. Matter of fact, they rejected it. … So please feel free to ask him if he’s ever given a final offer in which he said, ‘Hey, you ought to turn this down because it’s not worth a shit.’” Boeing’s plans to hire permanent workers is damaging its relationship with its workforce, he said, adding that many machinists were considered essential personnel during the COVID pandemic and have years of experience that cannot be replaced by new hires. “What’s going to happen is they continue to push forward with replacement workers, they’re going to put their product at risk, in my estimation. … It’s hard to find people that can do this work, and when you do get people in and you get them trained, you certainly want to retain their expertise, because they’re very high skilled,” Bennett said. “They’re going to damage the reputation, plus they’re already sending a statement out to our folks by even talking about permanent replacement workers, that a lot of these folks are already talking about looking for other jobs elsewhere, because it’s pretty clear to them that Boeing doesn’t care about them.”

critical support to the US capitalist class in their heroic struggle to sabotage military production (by being too greedy to pay their workers, and trying to replace them with scabs who have nowhere near the level of expertise and knowledge of the ins-and-outs of the various planes)

Gillian said that any new employees hired permanently to take over union roles either already have aerospace manufacturing experience or will be trained by Boeing in the skills needed to successfully do the job. “We won’t compromise on that,” he said. “I also appreciate our partnership with the Defense Contract Management Agency, who is helping with their second set of eyes to make sure that we’re doing things the right way, and I am very confident that the product we’re delivering to our customer meets the highest standard that we have.” Although both Gillian and Bennett indicated that they are willing to restart negotiations to work out a contract agreement, the path forward remains unclear. Last week, IAM members ratified their own proposed deal, which was developed without Boeing’s input. According to Bennett, the union proposal differs from Boeing’s offer in three ways. The proposal keeps wage increases the same as Boeing’s offer, but makes some changes to allow for growth at the top of the pay scale. It increases Boeing’s match on St. Louis workers’ retirement accounts to be at the same level as its union employees in the Pacific Northwest, and it bumps the ratification bonus from $4,000 to $10,000. Gillian said that from Boeing’s perspective, the union’s proposal is “way beyond the economics of what we put on the table” and “isn’t real” because it was not a result of collective bargaining between the company and IAM leadership.

Impacts To Aircraft Production

During a July earnings call, Boeing CEO Kelly Ortberg downplayed the impacts of a potential strike, saying that one wouldn’t reach the magnitude of last year’s machinist strike in Seattle, which lasted about two months and cost Boeing, its suppliers and its customers about $9.6 billion. “The order of magnitude of this is much, much less than what we saw last fall. That was roughly 30,000 machinists,” he said. “So we’ll manage through this. I wouldn’t worry too much about the implications of the strike.” Steve Parker, the chief executive of Boeing’s defense unit, declined to comment Tuesday when asked whether the strike could lead to additional losses on fixed-price defense contracts in Boeing’s third quarter. Even with the ongoing strike, Boeing has been able to keep deliveries of its Joint Direct Attack Munitions roughly at the same pace they were prior to the strike and has continued to deliver F-15EXs and F/A-18s, with Gillian stating that from the customer’s perspective, those aircraft deliveries are “coming about as expected.”

by "coming about as expected" they apparently mean "coming in with glaring reliability issues" https://hexbear.net/post/6018345/6471687

As part of its contingency plan, Boeing has qualified some of its managers to perform work on the production line and brought on temporary workers “to add capacity,” he said. Nonetheless, the production pace for programs like the F-15EX has slowed. “Definitely not having everybody at work every day has an impact down throughout the production system on something like an F-15, and through our contingency plans, we’re working to mitigate that as much as possible, and we are able to continue delivering airplanes. I’d say we are slowing our rate ramp increase a bit as a result of that.” Boeing planned to increase F-15EX production from one to two aircraft a month by the end of 2026, Flight Global reported earlier this year. Asked whether Boeing would be able to keep to that timeline, Gillian said the company would not be able to forecast the timing for the ramp up until the end of the strike. However, he added that the company has been working to incorporate additional process and engineering improvements during the strike in the hopes of increasing efficiency when workers do return. “I’m optimistic that those improvements will help me meet those rate ramp requirements in front of me,” he said.