cross-posted from: https://lemmy.sdf.org/post/47572383
When Angola’s Laúca hydropower dam began operating on the Kwanza River, it was widely presented as a milestone moment in Angola’s green energy grid development. Built by Chinese contractors and financed largely through Chinese loans, the project added more than 2,000 megawatts of capacity to the national grid and was framed as a key step toward cleaner energy.
In official state-sponsored Chinese narratives, projects like Laúca are frequently cited as examples of “green cooperation” in China–Africa relations. Government portals linked to the Belt and Road Initiative (BRI), China’s international development and infrastructure connectivity project, describe overseas hydropower as a low-carbon solution that supports both foreign development and international climate goals.
Yet in Angola, journalists and civil society groups are telling a more complicated story — one shaped not only by megawatts and emissions, but by debt, transparency, and questions around who ultimately benefits from large-scale infrastructure projects.
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In [Chinese] framing, large hydropower projects are positioned not only as development infrastructure but also as climate-aligned investments supporting global energy transition goals.
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Angola is today one of China’s largest borrowers in Africa. The Chinese government and its state media have proudly touted this fact for years. Data compiled by the Global Development Policy Center at Boston University show that the country has received more than USD 40 billion in Chinese loans, much of it tied to oil-backed repayment arrangements.
While Chinese policy researchers have framed resource-backed lending as a stabilizing tool during Angola’s post-war reconstruction, many subsequent reports by international media and independent researchers have highlighted how heavy reliance on oil-backed debt has left the country exposed during downturns.
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[One report] noted that Angola is “saddled with high external debt to various creditors, including oil-backed loans from China,” and has increasingly turned to complicated financing arrangements as access to conventional borrowing narrows. The same report also warned that Angola currently has no financing program with the International Monetary Fund, underscoring the limited policy space available when oil revenues fall.
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When prices [for oil] fell after 2014, debt servicing absorbed a growing share of public revenue, narrowing fiscal space for health, education, and climate adaptation.
Debt sustainability assessments by the International Monetary Fund and the African Development Bank continue to flag Angola’s vulnerability, noting that high repayment obligations constrain public investment.
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Sustainability is not measured only in megawatts or emissions avoided. It also depends on transparency, debt sustainability, and whether projects expand — or constrain — a country’s development goals.
Angola’s experience suggests that clean energy can still come with high political and economic costs, even when framed as green cooperation. At the same time, China’s growing footprint in overseas finance has sparked alarm among analysts who warn that countries such as Angola risk sliding deeper into debt dependency. Under the banner of green finance, Chinese lending is increasingly presented as a superior alternative to Western aid — a message that features prominently in Chinese state media and has found a receptive audience in parts of Africa, both at the governmental level and among the public.