Rybar on today's events on the Lebanon-Israel border, extremely pessimistic

Feels so good iOS has RCS now.

No tinge of anxiety when I’m sending a text to an Android user and not seeing a ‘delivered’ notification, assured that my messages are not going into the void

Edit: and btw the read receipt is auto on for you mfs bwahahahahah i can see when you’re ignoring me

Video of DPRK trash balloon landing in occupied Korea

https://tankie.tube/w/s4aZMeyr8rnPZVQ5XYBorA

The Diplomat- India’s Struggle to Find a Meaningful Role in Southeast Asia

I sometimes read The Diplomat as a guilty pleasure because between their tainted liberal platitudes showcases a deep insecurity and incoherence characteristic of Liberalism.

To establish itself as a significant actor in the region, India needs to consciously seek common ground with Southeast Asian countries on fundamental questions of regional order. 

Prime Minister Narendra Modi’s visit to Singapore and Brunei Darussalam in early September once again underscored Southeast Asia’s enormous significance in Indian foreign policy – not only for strategic and economic reasons but because India cannot credibly claim to be a global power until it demonstrates that it can play a meaningful role within its own extended neighborhood. The Indian government has pursued the Look/Act Eastpolicy for three decades with the aim of strengthening its security, trade, and culturalpresence within the ASEAN region. “For India, no region now receives as much attention as this,” Modi declared at the Shangri La Dialogue in 2018. 

Yet, after 30 years of the Look/Act East policy, the relationship has failed to gain momentum on its own, and India is struggling to define a meaningful role for itself in Southeast Asia. For the last six years, the ISEAS-Yusof Ishak Institute’s The State of Southeast Asia surveys have found that the region’s elites consistently rank India lowest among all major powers in terms of its strategic, political, or economic influence in Southeast Asia. In 2024, nearly 2,000 respondents from academia, governments, and civil society across the region ranked India ninth out of 11 major powers in its strategic relevance to the ASEAN countries. 

These are just stating some facts which are more or less true.

A key cause of India’s inability to carve out a greater role for itself in the region is the fundamental divergence in their international approaches. Although Southeast Asian countries are not a monolith, they have developed a broad consensus on four key questions. India maintains a markedly different outlook on all four. 

Okay I would actually agree with this at face value. But let’s get into the details.

First, as small countries facing significant external threats, Southeast Asians support and wish to strengthen the existing U.S.-led rule-based global order, some misgivings aside. The ISEAS-Yusuf Ishak survey shows that the regional elites continue to favor U.S. leadership of the world. India, on the other hand, espouses a multipolar world. Despite its improving relations with the United States, it has often expressed skepticism toward U.S. global leadership. The ongoing Ukraine War provides a clear instance of the stark divide between India and Southeast Asian countries. While most of the region has supported United Nations resolutions condemning the Russian invasion, India had consistently abstained from voting against Moscow’s interests.

??? And in an instant the article reveals it’s liberalism. Obviously wrong in multitude of fronts.

Perhaps the author has not gotten the memo of multiple ASEAN leaders specifically utilising the word “multipolarity” in their speeches? India has no power in Southeast Asia not because they did not condemn Russia silly liberal. There is no “stark divide”.

Southeast Asians support and wish to strengthen the existing U.S.-led rule-based global order, some misgivings aside

You will find that anti-US sentiment in SEA is not merely just “misgivings” nor as easy to brush over because outwardly most SEA nations engage in bilateral relations with the USA.

Second, Southeast Asian countries have pursued a relatively firm but friendly approach toward China. While wary of Beijing’s rising assertiveness, they have sought mutually beneficial economic cooperation and tried to avoid sustained confrontation with it. They have been careful not to be swept up in the emerging China-U.S. rivalry.

Meanwhile, India’s relations with China have sharply deteriorated following their border skirmish in 2020. New Delhi considers Beijing to be its strategic and economic rival, and it increasingly sees its presence in Southeast Asia as a direct competitor to China. This zero-sum mindset has made many in the region uncomfortable.

Yes, even the annoying liberals in Southeast Asia recognise where the wind blows.

Third, export-dependent Southeast Asian countries broadly support liberal international trade, while India is often ambivalent and hesitant to open up its markets. While calling for an “open” Indo-Pacific, the Modi government has also promoted protectionist policies under its “Make in India” campaign. As per the latest data from the World Trade Organization, the average import tax in India is 18.3 percent, while in Southeast Asia it ranges from 0 to 11.5 percent. In 2019, India backed out of the ASEAN-centered free trade agreement called the Regional Comprehensive Economic Partnership (RCEP) at the last minute. India’s trade deficit with Southeast Asia has grown rapidly in the last two decades to reach nearly a quarter of the total trade, which makes it all the more hesitant to keep its market open to the manufacturing hubs of the region.

Classic free market liberalism that many of the intellectual elites in Southeast Asia regurgitate due to their own moral and intellectual bankruptcy.

The vacuous hole that is liberalism and its understanding of international relations. It can never shed its western bourgeois origins and the compradors in the region lap it up like the obedient dogs they are.

The final point of difference is regional multilateralism, a highly-prized feature of Southeast Asian politics. ASEAN is one of the most successful regional organizations in the world, instrumental in fostering peace and economic cooperation in the region. In contrast, India is a reluctant regionalist. Historically, New Delhi has preferred to deal with its smaller South Asian neighbors bilaterally rather than multilaterally. South Asia is one of the least integrated regions in the world, with moribund regional forums. While New Delhi has sought to act as a constructive partner to ASEAN, it has yet to demonstrate that it can champion regional cooperation and lead the establishment and management of regional institutions.

The divergence between the international outlooks of India and Southeast Asia places limits on what the Look/Act East policy can achieve. India’s incremental investments in the region through trade deals or military exercises are unlikely to bridge the divide. In fact, as the international order comes under growing strain, differences over such first-order principles will become increasingly salient. To establish itself as a significant actor in the region, India needs to consciously seek common ground with Southeast Asian countries on fundamental questions of regional order. Rather than assuming that others will follow its lead by default, it has to invest in understanding the needs and perspectives of its neighbors in order to encourage a united front to confront future challenges. 

To lead Asia, India may need to rethink some of the basic precepts of its worldview.

Guest Author Sandeep Bhardwaj an independent researcher based in Singapore. His doctoral dissertation was on India’s relationship with Southeast Asia during the Nehru years.

Ah that explains it. I was already suspecting Singaporean brainworms from the 5th paragraph.

So in the end the guy got 2/4 of correct but only by coincidence. I think he may need to switch careers since he evidently has failed to do his own job’s namesake.

was the kishida resignation the first stage in japanese decolonization? play for time and wait out the empire's next move in westpac before taking a side materially

Dash cam footage of impact on Route 70 Highway Tamra

https://tankie.tube/w/1rqUFAjHfTPMBfddgrdoUD

So, like, from Satanyahu's point of view, this is the time to accept a ceasefire and hostage deal right?

The whole personal point of continuing the wars for him is that he's in trouble with the law and a lot of people didn't like him, but now with these successes in Lebanon his party is leading the polls again, and the AJ+ guy on the latest chapo said that (and this was BEFORE killing Nasrallah) he was the most popular politician in Israel again, so if he starts moving towards accepting a ceasefire while he's a ugh """hero""" to israelis won't that mean they'll think twice before prosecuting the man who "saved northern israel"?

Bravest IOF goons:
https://xcancel.com/ME_Observer_/status/1838715632184869303

There has been, for lack of a better term, some doomer vs resistance bloomer discourse as of late when it comes to "Israel" vs. the wider rrsidtance formation, particularly Hezbollah.

Bad taste "owns" on either side ar, wu h as they are, not particularly productive, though I understand the catharsis they bring when horrors are visited by our enemies. But I am curious about how individuals and external formations (like your own organizations) arrive at conclusions and what analytical frameworks they bring. I am personally curious about having more correct views but would also like to self-crit my own biases and make my own orgs better.

How do you all find and digest information about Gaza, Lebanon, and the wider movement to oppose "Israeli" settlers and their American backers? Of course I personally ally absorb a mix of mainstream and primary sources, comparing e.g. Reuters to direct Hezbollah and PFLP statements. But how do you personally synthesize this information? Do you do it alone or as a group in your org?

And more importan, how do you concretely assist the resistance? I underst6 I'd this is not safely communicable, but I appreciate any help in providing direction.

Personally, I feel impotent as my audience, via my orgs, are liberal laymen and I try to get them to be less genocidal and to join orgs that are pro-Palestinian. This has direct results by I feel like it is less than, for example, just funnelimg funds to the PFLP. I would prefer to do the latter but I also assume it I'd already highly illegal and would be shut off immedia if I tried it.

I also assume that anyone helping the resistance cannot tell me how to directly assist. Buy I appreciate any hints or direction.