The thing that confuses me about Real Utopias is whether the author rejects revolution entirely, or wants cooperatives within a post-revolutionary Socialist system. The former has no real chance to actually damage Capitalism, while the latter is already used in countries like China as they gradually build into higher and higher stages of Socialism. Socialists already advocate for building up Dual Power, the Soviets for example were already in place before the October Revolution, but also understand that as this Dual Power grows the resistance from Capitalists grows as well, Revolution still becomes a necessity.
What I am getting so far is that he considers the revolutionary strategy to have a low probability of succeeding, and he argues that this is supported by historical evidence. The cooperatives are just one part of the strategy that he describes early on, once I am done with the book if I do think it is interesting enough I can try to summarize his thought.
In the textbook and in one of his online lectures he appears to start off aligned with Marx but diverges from Marxist theory. On Chapter 4 ("Thinking about alternatives to Capitalism, page 69) he describes his understanding of Marxist theory and in what ways he thinks differently. So, I suspect you will probably disagree with him strongly! Maybe I will too.
At this point I am not saying I have formed a strong opinion. The reason why Erik Olin Wright's work brings me value is because his framework is aligned with my unpolished starting opinion of anti-capitalism through structural changes. His work helps me formalize my internal logic as I navigate through uncharted (for me) ideas about revolution as a mechanism for transformation.
In my view, neuroscience may contribute to clarifying questions like:
Do all brains support a conscious predictive model (CPM)?
Does adaptive behavior in brainless organisms suggest a primitive CPM?
What is the relationship between brain and mind?
But deeper questions, such as “What do we mean by mind?” or “Why assume weak emergence?” remain tied to the hard problem of consciousness, which currently lies beyond the reach of empirical science.
In trying to describe promising cognitive models, I buried my main point. I am not arguing that the brain and mind problem is close to a solution, or that science is close to resolving it.
Here is my actual point:
Certain materialist views unintentionally reproduce dualist thinking. Substance dualism claims that the mind exists outside physical law. Materialism, in contrast, holds that the mind emerges from brain activity. But when this emergence is explained only as complexity or undefined processing, a conceptual gap forms: brain -> black box -> mind. This reproduces dualism in practice, even if not in theory.
This gap renders consciousness a passive byproduct. It becomes a new kind of soul, unable to influence the body. A mind without agency.
Predictive processing and active inference models offer an alternative. They describe the brain as a generative system that continuously updates predictions based on sensory input. As summarized in a recent review:
While these models do not resolve the hard problem, they help remove part of the black box. They suggest that consciousness may play a functional role in these feedback loops. It is not a detached illusion but a process embedded in how the brain operates.
For me, this shift changed how I think about free will. Not because it provides final answers, but because it allows me to see mental acts in a similar way to how I see muscle movement. These acts are constrained by physical laws, but they are still mine.