Image is of Assad's presidential palace in 2013. There's more images of it in this article, though the words in it aren't worth reading.
Here is Assad's version of events. I like to imagine he's making one of those Youtuber apology videos where they sigh at the start and talk in a chastised yet somewhat defensive tone of voice.
As terrorism spread across Syria and ultimately reached Damascus on the evening of Saturday 7th December 2024, questions arose about the president's fate and whereabouts. This occurred amidst a flood of misinformation and narratives far removed from the truth, aimed at recasting international terrorism as a liberation revolution for Syria.
At such a critical juncture in the nation’s history, where truth must take precedence, it is essential to address these distortions. Unfortunately, the prevailing circumstances at the time, including a total communication blackout for security reasons, delayed the release of this statement. This does not replace a detailed account of the events that unfolded, which will be provided when the opportunity allows.
First, my departure from Syria was neither planned nor did it occur during the final hours of the battles, as some have claimed. On the contrary, I remained in Damascus, carrying out my duties until the early hours of Sunday 8th December 2024. As terrorist forces infiltrated Damascus, I moved to Latakia in co-ordination with our Russian allies to oversee combat operations. Upon arrival at the Hmeimim airbase that morning, it became clear that our forces had completely withdrawn from all battle lines and that the last army positions had fallen. As the field situation in the area continued to deteriorate, the Russian military base itself came under intensified attack by drone strikes.
With no viable means of leaving the base, Moscow requested that the base’s command arrange an immediate evacuation to Russia on the evening of Sunday 8th December. This took place a day after the fall of Damascus following the collapse of the final military positions and the resulting paralysis of all remaining state institutions.
At no point during these events did I consider stepping down or seeking refuge, nor was such a proposal made by any individual or party. The only course of action was to continue fighting against the terrorist onslaught.
I reaffirm that the person who, from the very first day of the war, refused to barter the salvation of his nation for personal gain, or to compromise his people in exchange for numerous offers and enticements is the same person who stood alongside the officers and soldiers of the army on the front lines, just metres from terrorists in the most dangerous and intense battlefields. He is the same person who, during the darkest years of the war, did not leave but remained with his family alongside his people, confronting terrorism under bombardment and the recurring threats of terrorist incursions into the capital over 14 years of war. Furthermore, the person who has never abandoned the resistance in Palestine and Lebanon, nor betrayed his allies who stood by him, cannot possibly be the same person who would forsake his own people or betray the army and nation to which he belongs.
I have never sought positions for personal gain but have always considered myself as a custodian of a national project, supported by the faith of the Syrian people, who believed in its vision. I have carried an unwavering conviction in their will and ability to protect the state, defend its institutions, and uphold their choices to the very last moment.
When the state falls into the hands of terrorism and the ability to make a meaningful contribution is lost, any position becomes void of purpose, rendering its occupation meaningless. This does not, in any way, diminish my profound sense of belonging to Syria and her people – a bond that remains unshaken by any position or circumstance. It is a belonging filled with hope that Syria will once again be free and independent.
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Israel-Palestine Conflict
Sources on the fighting in Palestine against Israel. In general, CW for footage of battles, explosions, dead people, and so on:
UNRWA reports on Israel's destruction and siege of Gaza and the West Bank.
English-language Palestinian Marxist-Leninist twitter account. Alt here.
English-language twitter account that collates news.
Arab-language twitter account with videos and images of fighting.
English-language (with some Arab retweets) Twitter account based in Lebanon. - Telegram is @IbnRiad.
English-language Palestinian Twitter account which reports on news from the Resistance Axis. - Telegram is @EyesOnSouth.
English-language Twitter account in the same group as the previous two. - Telegram here.
English-language PalestineResist telegram channel.
More telegram channels here for those interested.
Russia-Ukraine Conflict
Examples of Ukrainian Nazis and fascists
Examples of racism/euro-centrism during the Russia-Ukraine conflict
Sources:
Defense Politics Asia's youtube channel and their map. Their youtube channel has substantially diminished in quality but the map is still useful.
Moon of Alabama, which tends to have interesting analysis. Avoid the comment section.
Understanding War and the Saker: reactionary sources that have occasional insights on the war.
Alexander Mercouris, who does daily videos on the conflict. While he is a reactionary and surrounds himself with likeminded people, his daily update videos are relatively brainworm-free and good if you don't want to follow Russian telegram channels to get news. He also co-hosts The Duran, which is more explicitly conservative, racist, sexist, transphobic, anti-communist, etc when guests are invited on, but is just about tolerable when it's just the two of them if you want a little more analysis.
Simplicius, who publishes on Substack. Like others, his political analysis should be soundly ignored, but his knowledge of weaponry and military strategy is generally quite good.
On the ground: Patrick Lancaster, an independent and very good journalist reporting in the warzone on the separatists' side.
Unedited videos of Russian/Ukrainian press conferences and speeches.
Pro-Russian Telegram Channels:
Again, CW for anti-LGBT and racist, sexist, etc speech, as well as combat footage.
https://t.me/aleksandr_skif ~ DPR's former Defense Minister and Colonel in the DPR's forces. Russian language.
https://t.me/Slavyangrad ~ A few different pro-Russian people gather frequent content for this channel (~100 posts per day), some socialist, but all socially reactionary. If you can only tolerate using one Russian telegram channel, I would recommend this one.
https://t.me/s/levigodman ~ Does daily update posts.
https://t.me/patricklancasternewstoday ~ Patrick Lancaster's telegram channel.
https://t.me/gonzowarr ~ A big Russian commentator.
https://t.me/rybar ~ One of, if not the, biggest Russian telegram channels focussing on the war out there. Actually quite balanced, maybe even pessimistic about Russia. Produces interesting and useful maps.
https://t.me/epoddubny ~ Russian language.
https://t.me/boris_rozhin ~ Russian language.
https://t.me/mod_russia_en ~ Russian Ministry of Defense. Does daily, if rather bland updates on the number of Ukrainians killed, etc. The figures appear to be approximately accurate; if you want, reduce all numbers by 25% as a 'propaganda tax', if you don't believe them. Does not cover everything, for obvious reasons, and virtually never details Russian losses.
https://t.me/UkraineHumanRightsAbuses ~ Pro-Russian, documents abuses that Ukraine commits.
Pro-Ukraine Telegram Channels:
Almost every Western media outlet.
https://discord.gg/projectowl ~ Pro-Ukrainian OSINT Discord.
https://t.me/ice_inii ~ Alleged Ukrainian account with a rather cynical take on the entire thing.
There's no way this happens right? The national security state seems committed to confrontation with China and while the CPC has only met USAmerican provocation with a limited response, there's no way they will be ready to "get back under the boot" (which presumably will be a condition in some concrete form) surely
Firefly was right. It's happening.
(It is absolutely not happening lmao)
Prophet Whedon will lead us unto a Golden Tomorrow
Your thing has become somewhat more difficult since at least with Biden we could give the benifit of the doupt that there were 4d chess plays from his administration behind the scenes and that the words of said administration were subbtle push and pull messages to foreign powers. Now you get to do ~Kremlin~Washingtonology with random parts of Trump brainfart ramblings to connect them to hidden empire checkmates. With Trump not only masterfully teasing the US geopolitical moves, offers and threats in his speeches but presumably building an administration that can even see them through. I dont envy you
Just a note. US is ~3% of FDI in China… in good years, FDI is ~4% total investment in China, <2% of GDP for a decade now. (Some of the FDI from HK SAR is also partly from the US, taking a detour to the mainland over HK but still) Im sure China is dismantling one of the pillars of its monetary and economic policy in capital controls in defeat as we speak to get that life saving American FDI. All the signs are there, after all the CPC has announced that "they welcome and urge foreign investment and US cooperation and will try to make the enviroment easier for it" for the 5000th time since reform and opening up
The 16% number is for FIE of all venture configurations and country sources , not just the US which is a small minority of total investment. And capital and revenues of FIE of any short =/= FDI to begin with which is what you mentioned. Also FDI in high tech sectors is at ~10% of total for 2024 but the increase came from non US sources ,is still only 10% and is hillarously dawrfed by China's domestic investment. If we are going to be pulling stats and facts that are only tangentialy true you are better of watching Trumps Joe Rogan episode and search for hints on how he plans on solidifying US dollar hegemony
I already mentioned that some of the FDI from HK SAR is American . Beyond the tax evasion reasons a notable portion of that 70% is outside investment marching through HK into the mainland most of it is still HK Elite and Chinese diaspora. Hong Kong inbound FDI is just as much if not more a mainland round trip reinvestment yeah. So we could be pulling numbers out of our ass all day but based on the above even if lets say the rate of US FDI to other countries FDI that comes through HK is triple their open and direct investment it still doesnt crack 10% of total FDI. Gawking at Chinese FDI flows forget that for over a decade now $100-200 billion is a tiny drop in the now 60 trillion Chinese financial market. China’s growth hasn’t needed foreign capital to fund critical growth for more than a decade now.
As to why they urge it my read is that in a general sense if you still want to be connected to the global economy you will always want foreign businesses input as a channel to the rest of the world. Why give up on something that offers advantage if you can have it? The more direct and practical reason is that in China's view, while they’re trying to manage this transition to a different financial system they would really like imput from experienced foreign investors to show domestic investors how to do their business with smarter and more effective practices. Party directives cant and wont substitute that in the current stage of development. Because let’s be honest a very big reason China landed in this LGFV debt situation in the first place is because most of its financial industry is still extremely sloppy and unserious, maybe even more so than America's. Letting people play finance and after getting immensily rich while also being half a century removed from a non capitalist economy and a litte more from feudalism doesnt create the most competent financial actors. Any other party in charge would have had multiple crises blown on their face vby now
Beyond that sorry i just dont see China's recent monetary and finance moves to be nearly as much of a reaction to US moves and strategies or the attracting of foreign investment being nearly as much of a center focus and need. I see them much more so inwardly focused and reactive to domestic economic restructuring and changes in balance and sentiment. Focused on domestic investors, speculators, elites and doing a balancing act given the real estate bubble popping .
Also once again im confused on how your urge for dedolarization and non exporter economy status coincides with not losening capital controls? The RMB will never take a significant chunk of the global currency share in transactions while RoW remains capitalist and largely financialized with the current level of oppeness and contro of chinese capital markets by the PRC. It can never become a significant reserve currency let alone THE reserve currency. You cant have both that and a closed chinese capital market and controls. Thats why China , while pushing for its use in their own trade and lending more and more doesnt really have any such plans for it. Because if you want to run a hot industrial policy there will inevitably be financial crowding and you will also sustain losses here and there. Lifting capital controls magnifies volatility. Capital flies out more during highly loaded losses. This is prone to creating bubble and bust cycles. If your objective is extractive financial activity you can manage it. But if you want to drive growth of production that kind of volatility is bad. China isn't planning to be a global value extractor. It wants to own its own means of production. So it doesn't make much sense to encourage hegemonic currency dominance. That orientation only favors the financial class right now. I think there will be some “managed” capital account loosening but I don’t think China is ever relinquishing capital controls at any significant capacity so i am strongly skeptical that what they arrive at will ever look anything like an “open” capital account regime. China’s capital controls isolate their financial system from using USD as a primary financial collateral. There's huge quantity of Chinese companies and wealthy individuals recycling their savings into US assets and dollars but that is still a very small amount relative to the size of the Chinese financial system. At most hundreds of billions relative to an 18 trillion GDP and 60 trillion financial system. There is a lot room to relax them a bit without relinquishing sovereignity depending on their geopolitical goals, the yuan strength they target and whatever domestic need
@xiaohongshu@hexbear.net is a lot more partial about the a certain aspect of this but you should be careful that their approach is not the only one that criticizes the current 180 CPC turnaround in 2023/24.
On a rhetorical level the FDI is only a very coincidental part of the narrative. You are correct China is on this course for a long time however it is silly to pretend the conditions of today are the same as even 25 years ago or even when Xi first took power.
By all metrics China should not depend on US external influence, the fact US financial media(and the Fed) got any influence at all is an indictment not an excuse. To recap the FDI is circumstantially important because it perfectly aligns with the financial media attack, if you remember how Yellen and Blinken went to China and everyone started complaining about the insane "overproduction"/"overcapacity" narrative.
Immediately following that the Fed lowered interest rates and China started not only begging for better "investor sentiment" but also they have taken a few notable steps like signaling for more consumption incentives and liberalization of industrial investment(for foreigners).
I say this often it doesn't matter what we observe and think, only how the party is behaving and what they believe and we have more than enough evidence the party cares a lot about the mainstream economic rethoric, they use the same terms and they're starting to use some of the same policies(or at least signaling it).
Ultimately what happened IMO is they gaslit themselves into believing the overproduction narrative by the west. Its obviously nonsense. China shouldn't stimulate "consumption" just because the US doesn't want to import cheap renewables. Worst still is that the diagnosis of this perceived slowdown is entirely withing the neoliberal economic consensus.
If you notice where Chinese FDI drops below the 2020 level at the beginning of this year, it coincides perfectly with both Blinken/Yellen's visits and when the overcapacity narrative gains traction on western media, e.g:
Atlantic Council December 11, 2023 China’s manufacturing overcapacity threatens global green goods trade
FT February 1 2024 China’s overcapacity a challenge that is ‘here to stay’, says US chamber
FT February 4 2024China’s cull of EV overcapacity will bring little relief to Europe
Yellen and Blinken both visited China in April '24.
Likewise MR wrote about this as it happened and he linked this source Part I of Xu Gao: corporate gains fail to boost household income, leading to over-investment & excessive savings in China
That entire article explains what the current mainstream Chinese analysis of the problem was/is and MR's argument in his blog post
"A Chinese academic working in the financial sector spewing neoliberal economic shit? No way!" Yes its obviously not news, but the point is he repeats mainstream nonsense about efficient markets and copying western narratives.
The real worry here is if the CPC follows these advices and realy believes investment in production and technology are no longer necessary or consumption incentives should become the priority.
China would lose one of their main advantage against the west and current signs is they actualy do believe some of it.
They've arrived at the logical conclusion, we can do whatever we want because only China matters, so if the economy is slowing just boost consumption. This is the most mainstream of the mainstream western modern economic theory. Everyone ignores the state of the global economy, the EU crash, the global south debt crisis etc. For both western media and mainstream econ, if China is not meeting growth expectations, its their fault for not being liberal enough. Do you realize how dangerous this path is?
Of course everyone can be wrong and this time next year China is celebrating, FDI is up, Xi is smiling next to Trump etc. Nobody is predicting China will crash in 30 days(probably not even 30 months) because of a few charts and random theories, but alas who is expecting communism "soon" when the party is seemingly embracing mainstream neoliberalism at the first sign of trouble?
For me that is the compelling takeaway. More Dengism with some neolib shit along the way no matter how dangerous it is while paying no attention to the climate abyss right ahead or the global south collectively getting murdered or worse.
Dumb question - what happens when there is no growth left/needed by the chinese people? Right now, any growth is good as it allows them to alleviate poverty, but eventually all chinese citizens will have a good standard of living. Does China value growth above all else, or will they eventually work to prioritize automation and lessen working hours?
This wont come until the middle of the century, but i fear a scenario where foreign investment grows to much and neoliberalism has a stranglehold on China. When the population is out of poverty, infrastructure is solid, and net zero is reached, China can focus on moving towards achieving communism above all else. As we know, the neoliberal reliance on GDP growth would make a transition to communism impossible and economic crisis inevitable.
I am a dumb idiot that doesnt understand how money works. But here is my basic meaning by "no growth needed"
When every chinese citizen is in a comfortable home. All commodities and energy necessary for domestic consumption are produced sustainably with zero emissions. There is a set amount of work left to do annually (maintaining infrastructure, producing those commodities) but as time goes on the labor hours required to meet domestic consumption needs continues to reduce. In this scenario, you are saying China needs to maintain export surpluses to keep their cash reserves as needed. But isnt the end goal of CCP to achieve communism? And at this point why wouldnt they be transitioning towards true communism? Why would pension funds be needed when housing, food, and healthcare can be guaranteed to every citizen? Why would they continue to export, other than the required amount to get goods and raw materials that cant be gotten domestically
"The press hates when I say that but he's an amazing person"
I mean trump thingy is basically deflate dollar, inflate renminbi (which would be good for china if they were pressing communism button). If they aren't in complete holding pattern, they can inflate renminbi like 50 percent no problem and still outcompete western porkies on price. Their issue (where absence of communism button comes in) is that chinese population likes to save money, not consume more. They could do 6 hours work day coupled with this, and be golden (but they playing)
Also you might find interesting from ft:
three dollar problem (stellar name)
There’s been a lot of ink spilled recently over Trump’s threat of 100 per cent tariffs on any country that would “leave the dollar.” Understandably so!While Trump didn’t spell out why, dollar centrality in the international monetary and financial system (IMFS to hipsters) gives the US unmatched powers to surveil cross-border financial flows and curtail them. This seems to override the preferences of VP-elect-Vance, who believes the dollar’s centrality has led to unwarranted currency strength and American deindustrialisation. Trump himself also seems to believe this, telling Bloomberg earlier this year that the US has “a big currency problem”.
All this suggests a conflict between two views — one might call them the National Security Dollar and the Trade Dollar. But there’s a third critical global role in play — the Financial Stability Dollar. And here, the tussles between the Trade Dollar and the National Security Dollar could have a big impact on the rest of the world.
The role of the dollar as the leading denomination for cross-border borrowing and invoicing means that when it is too strong (ie, the Trade Dollar faction loses), it tightens financial conditions in large parts of the world.
There are multiple transmission avenues. It hits emerging markets that borrow mostly in dollars by making repayment more expensive, and subjects others with dollar-sensitive investors in their local currency debt markets to capital outflows. A combination of dollar strength and slower global growth can be especially toxic for commodity exporters who borrow in dollars — and there are a lot of them.
Interactions across these three roles could become increasingly problematic. So far, markets have reacted to tariff threats by lifting the dollar. And while such strength might dampen the price signals that favour import substitution, it would also offer a partial offset to the inflationary impact of tariffs (something Bessent welcomed in the interview above).
This trade-off makes sense if the fundamental conception of tariffs is based less on industrial strategy and more on the idea that the withdrawal of market access to the US can be used as a cudgel, including for geopolitical purposes. And this seems like an administration that likes its geoeconomic cudgels.
Online, there’s a widespread belief that tariffs that lead to a weaker renminbi would exacerbate capital flight from China, alongside the occasional hope that this process would hit the Communist regime’s legitimacy. But to push the country into a deeper economic malaise (more than its own policies already have) would cause a lot of collateral damage
China is still the world’s second-largest economy. Any strategy to weaken it would have consequences for countries that compete with its exports and/or are sensitive to Chinese growth and imports. This would include many US allies, with two of the four members of the Quad —Japan and Australia — checking these boxes.
Anything that hits China would hit other emerging markets even harder. They would see their currencies weaken in tandem with the renminbi, but without the degrees of freedom that come from what China has — at least $3tn in official reserve assets and more in other quasi-governmental institutions; a debt stock that is largely in local currency held by onshore investors; an immense manufacturing export sector; and local bond yields at just 2 per cent. Life would be a lot harder for countries without those buffers.
The above would actually be a relatively restrained geoeconomic outcome compared to some more crypto-friendly ideas floating around the blog/podosphere.
One such idea is that the cross-border availability of dollar-based stablecoins could extend the footprint (or dominance) of the dollar by permitting currency substitution (or capital flight) outside the US. This is sometimes presented as an expansion of rule of law/liberty in places that need one or both, and as a private sector version of reserve accumulation that will support demand for US government debt — the natural asset counterpart to the dollar-stablecoin issuer’s liability.
This might well be the case, but while easy currency substitution might be a good thing for individuals in some countries, it can be a very bad thing for the stability of those countries’ banking systems.
Moreover, stablecoins expand not just the footprint of the US, but also the footprint of its financial cycle, and that is determined to a substantial degree by the Fed’s response to key macroeconomic aggregates within a relatively closed economy.
For more than a decade now, many developing countries have grappled with the problem of having their financial cycles determined in Washington even as critical components of their real cycle — commodity demand and prices, for example — are determined in Beijing. A unipolar force driving the global financial cycle alongside multipolar forces driving local real cycles is a bad idea for financial stability, but that seems to be a significant risk here.
There’s an argument for a multipolar global monetary system that avoids exactly such a divergence between real and financial cycles across hubs and spokes. But the only place that has come close is the Eurozone, where a common currency is not just a denomination for trade, but also for capital markets transactions backstopped by a central bank that has after 2012 begun to take its lender-of-last Resort function seriously.
No one else is close to this — certainly not the BRICS — and that’s a bad thing for global financial stability. What would be even worse is if the proponents of the National Security Dollar actually prevent a multipolar monetary order (presumably with another minor hub in the renminbi at some point in the future) from ever happening.