Since the fall of the former Syrian regime, Israel has gradually begun to realize some of its long-standing ambitions. With the collapse of the modern Syrian state and the disintegration of its army, Israeli forces managed to seize Mount Hermon (Jabal al-Sheikh), a first since its liberation in 1973. On the morning of December 8, 2024, Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu raised a glass of champagne in celebration, marking the takeover of Damascus by Ahmad al-Sharaa, formerly known as Abu Mohammad al-Julani.

Turkish President Recep Tayyip Erdoğan could also hardly hide his satisfaction. In a speech delivered in Ankara, he mocked the collapse of Syria’s Baathist regime and, more broadly, the idea of Arab nationalism. His remarks drew loud applause, and quickly reverberated across the Arab world.

Southern Syria effectively fell under Israeli control, handed to them by al-Sharaa, who used sectarian tension as a pretext to intervene, but walked straight into a trap of his own making.

Over the past eight months, Israel has steadily gained ground.

Politically, al-Sharaa has scrambled to secure a deal with Israel to consolidate his grip on power and meet US conditions. He avoids acknowledging hostile Israeli incursions, and never utters the word “occupation,” choosing instead to emphasize his “desire for peace.”

Socially, Syria’s national identity is unraveling under the pressure of sectarian violence and daily atrocities, affecting Syrians of all sects. Alawites, in particular, became the target of a systematic campaign.

Militarily, the Israeli army pushed deep into southern Syria, thus consolidating its presence in Quneitra, Mount Hermon, and Yarmouk Basin, notably after securing the loyalty of some local Druze and Sunni communities. More than 15 military outposts were established, and infrastructure laid for long-term entrenchment.

But the offensive in Sweida marked a turning point. With it, all of southern Syria effectively fell under Israeli control, handed to them by al-Sharaa, who used sectarian tension as a pretext to intervene, but walked straight into a trap of his own making. By dragging the south into intercommunal violence, he crushed the last hopes of Syrians who longed for an end to years of bloodshed.

The maneuver was so blatant that many now accuse al-Sharaa of deliberately provoking tensions between Sweida’s Druze and Bedouin communities, to give Israeli forces an alibi to intervene, acting in effect on his behalf. This theory is bolstered by reports of a secret understanding reached during the recent Baku summit in Azerbaijan, where al-Sharaa met with Israeli officials, along with his foreign minister, Asaad al-Shaybani, and security envoy Ahmad Dalati. A closer look at al-Sharaa’s inner circle and affiliated media reveals a growing appetite for normalization with Israel.

Adding weight to this theory, a Syrian defense ministry spokesperson said: “What happened today by Israel was contrary to our expectations.” According to this interpretation, al-Sharaa had already informed Israeli officials of his plans to enter Sweida under the pretext of halting the Druze-Bedouin clashes, an operation allegedly agreed upon during Baku talks.

Al-Sharaa hoped that his shared hostility with Israel toward Lebanese and Palestinian resistance groups, and his opposition to the former Syrian regime, would earn him Tel Aviv’s support. He cut Hezbollah’s supply routes to Lebanon, expelled Palestinian fighters from Damascus, courted pro-Israel lobbying groups in Washington, handed over the complete Eli Cohen’s archive, and gave up any Syrian claim to the occupied Golan Heights.

The fact that Ahmad Dalati personally led the Sweida operation only reinforces suspicions. As the newly appointed security chief for the province, Dalati has effectively shifted roles: from Israeli liaison to battlefield commander. Meanwhile, Israel cannot plausibly claim ignorance of the volatile atmosphere in Sweida, or the near certainty of bloodshed if al-Sharaa’s forces attempted to enter the area. Critics argue that any resulting massacre would rival the atrocities his forces carried out along the Syrian coast.

However, according to the Saudi-owned newspaper Asharq al-Awsat, Israel rejected al-Sharaa’s proposal for a “limited-scope normalization” during the Baku summit. Instead, it demanded tangible security guarantees, continued occupation of the Golan Heights and Mount Hermon, and formal recognition of its recent territorial gains. Israeli media reported that the talks also touched on Hezbollah’s weapons, Palestinian factions in Lebanon, the future of displaced Palestinians from Gaza, and the possible opening of an Israeli coordination office in Damascus, without formal diplomatic recognition.

Al-Sharaa hoped that his shared hostility with Israel toward Lebanese and Palestinian resistance groups, and his opposition to the former Syrian regime, would earn him Tel Aviv’s support. He cut Hezbollah’s supply routes to Lebanon, expelled Palestinian fighters from Damascus, courted pro-Israel lobbying groups in Washington, handed over the complete Eli Cohen’s archive, and gave up any Syrian claim to the occupied Golan Heights.

But he misread the moment, and he was not alone to do so. US envoy to Syria Thomas Barrack was also blindsided. “The Israeli strikes on Damascus were surprising,” he admitted.

Years of collaboration ultimately meant little. Since its formation in 2012, Jabhat al-Nusra and its various offshoots have served as the primary military instrument for the Western-Turkish-Qatari alliance in its campaign to dismantle the former Syrian army. Backed by the “MOC” operations room in Jordan and “MOD” in Turkey, these factions overran air defense systems and strategic bases, most notably in Tell al-Hara, which hosted sophisticated surveillance and electronic warfare systems supplied by China, Russia, and Iran.

Between 2011 and at least 2018, Nusra fighters advanced deep into the Yarmouk Basin, reaching the edge of the Israeli-occupied Golan. They executed Syrian soldiers, attacked Druze villages near Mount Hermon, like Hadr, and occasionally raided Sweida. When they massacred Druze civilians in Qalb Loze in Idlib, forcing others to abandon their religious traditions under “Salafi” pressure, Israel said nothing. Instead, it kept offering treatment to Nusra fighters in field hospitals across the occupied Golan and Upper Galilee. This sparked outrage among Druze communities in Syria, Palestine, and within Israel. Israel even arrested Majdal Shams native and former Syrian prisoner Sidqi al-Maqt for filming Israeli soldiers assisting Nusra fighters.

Al-Sharaa’s dilemma is that he has already given Israel everything. Still, Tel Aviv still views him as unfit for any role beyond limited security coordination in southern Syria. In Israel’s way of thinking, even if al-Sharaa were to sign a peace agreement, he still lacks legitimacy and power to implement it. For this reason, Tel Aviv prefers to handle security on its own, through large-scale military deployments.

In parallel, the Israeli government is closely monitoring tensions among various armed factions aligned with al-Sharaa, aware that a conflict between rival jihadist groups is only a matter of time. It is also watching the growing sense of despair felt by Syria’s religious minorities. Iran has withdrawn, Russia is confined to its bases, Thomas Barrack is backpedaling, and Arab states fully endorsed the transitional president.

Al-Sharaa’s dilemma is that he has already given Israel everything. Still, Tel Aviv still views him as unfit for any role beyond limited security coordination in southern Syria. In Israel’s way of thinking, even if al-Sharaa were to sign a peace agreement, he still lacks legitimacy and power to implement it.

There is no doubt that Syria after the Sweida offensive is no longer the same. Al-Sharaa has once again failed, from the coast to the south, squandering the opportunity granted to him by Arab and Western powers, who overlooked his brutality for lack of an alternative. Now, even UN Secretary-General António Guterres is once again invoking Resolution 2254, while al-Sharaa’s hopes on lifting Western sanctions are quickly fading. In fact, new sanctions may soon target his security apparatus, much like the European Union sanctions imposed on factions like the Hamza and Amshat brigades for war crimes.

As sectarian violence intensifies, and retaliatory attacks spread between Druze and Bedouin groups, Israel’s de facto invasion of southern Syria is underway. Al-Sharaa is no longer able to preserve Syria’s territorial integrity. He cannot reclaim the east or the south, rules the coast through repression, and has lost control over both armed and jihadist groups.

Faced with such powerlessness, al-Sharaa may soon realize that his only remaining path to relevance lies outside Syria. He might try to further serve Israeli interests in Lebanon, tighten the screws on Hezbollah, and rebrand himself, yet again, as an ally to Tel Aviv. But this time, he has nothing left to offer