THE THIRD OFFSET

Developing a successful offset strategy has two distinct phases: first, identifying an operational concept, or specific plan, to defeat the adversary; second, identifying, developing, and deploying the weapons, systems, and equipment that the operational concept calls for. Doing these steps in order sends a clear message and strengthens deterrence. If the United States’ goal is to prevent a Chinese invasion of Taiwan, it is useful to imagine how that would play out. A war so close to the Chinese mainland would be a major challenge for the U.S. military because of China’s ability to deploy a large number of missiles, aircraft, ships, and other capabilities to the fight. It would also be difficult for China’s military, the People’s Liberation Army, which would have to move massive amounts of troops, weapons, and materiel through an amphibious landing, air assault, airborne landings, or a combination of these means. The first troops to land would have to seize a foothold in Taiwanese territory before allowing follow-on PLA forces to flow into Taiwan. The United States would need to act within hours or days to prevent a territorial fait accompli, and it would need to be able to rapidly strike at the heart of the PLA’s invasion force, dislodging it from any territory it had gained. Consequently, the United States needs to strengthen and expand its force posture in the region to respond immediately to a Chinese invasion. The United States can, for example, deploy additional bombers to bases in Australia, harden shelters for aircraft at such locations as Kadena Air Base in Japan, establish active defenses for missiles in Guam, and stockpile fuel, spare parts, munitions, and other materiel across the Indo-Pacific that can be used for a fight.

uh, might need to manufacture those munitions first... which isn't a given with the way Western industry's going

For the United States to carry out rapid strikes on Chinese forces, it will have to be able to see all high-value PLA targets on the battlefield at any time, hit targets with mass and precision, and destroy any target that can be hit. Such targets include PLA amphibious assault ships, landing craft, air assault helicopters, and planes carrying PLA soldiers, weapons systems, and air defenses, as well as the operational command-and-control centers supporting the invasion force. The United States would need to generate combat power that can operate both inside and outside the reach of China’s strike systems. As Admiral Paparo has remarked, “I want to turn the Taiwan Strait into an unmanned hellscape using a number of classified capabilities so I can make their lives utterly miserable for a month, which buys me the time for the rest of everything.” This would require a major increase in the U.S. inventory of precision-guided long-range missiles that can strike PLA vessels and aircraft. Long-range antiship missiles are effective against PLA targets, but they are expensive at over $3 million per missile, and the United States does not have enough of them. The United States needs to ramp up the research, development, and production of long-range missiles—especially antiship missiles to strike PLA surface vessels—that are cheaper. The United States will also need a lot more relatively cheap unmanned aircraft systems, or drones, particularly drones that do not need runways to launch. Manned aircraft, however, are still important, especially bombers and stealthy fifth- and sixth-generation fighters. The range and strike capabilities of stealth bombers such as the B-21 Raider presents China with a particularly daunting challenge. They can be based beyond the range of Chinese ballistic missiles, and they can carry substantial conventional and nuclear bombs to thin Chinese forces. Some fifth- and sixth-generation stealth aircraft such as the F-35 are also helpful because their speed, sensor packages, and strike capabilities allow them to operate inside the first and second island chains for air-to-air and air-to-ground missions, as well as to collect and share battlefield data across ground, air, and maritime forces. Finally, the United States needs a mix of large nuclear-powered attack submarines and cheap underwater drones. The PLA is relatively weak in the undersea domain and struggles to detect, identify, and track U.S. submarines. In multiple iterations of war games by the Center for Strategic and International Studies, for example, U.S. submarines wreak havoc on Chinese ships, including large amphibious vessels, escorts, and logistics vessels. The United States must lean into this undersea advantage and prioritize maintaining it.

FOCUS THE FIGHT

Other capabilities are also important, such as software that leverages next-generation artificial intelligence, which allows the U.S. military to share massive amounts of data quickly between forces. But the future of warfare is not just about unmanned systems, artificial intelligence, and other technologies. U.S. military capabilities need to be grounded in a viable operational strategy. Inventing technologies or being the first country to use a technology has never guaranteed an advantage on the battlefield. British engineers at William Foster & Co. developed and produced the tank. But it was German military officers, such as Heinz Guderian, that used the tank to devastating effect during blitzkrieg operations in World War II. There is also a lot the United States will not need for a potential conflict with China, such as large numbers of surface ships and aircraft carriers, which are vulnerable and highly exposed in a war. The United States is also still investing in land systems, such as tanks, that will not be necessary for this fight. An offset that focuses on China, of course, does not exclude preparing for contingencies elsewhere, such as against Russia in eastern Europe, Iran in the Middle East, or North Korea on the Korean Peninsula. But it does mean that the United States needs to prioritize defeating and deterring China, much as the United States focused on the Soviet Union during the Cold War.