From page 20:

In Russia, where operations extended over great distances, the Germans experienced the need for closer control over the crews of disabled tanks. The tank crews usually remained at the field repair shop until the repairs to their vehicles had been completed. The unannounced arrival of replacements presented another personnel problem because tank company commanders were often unable to take charge of the new men while operations were under way. On such occasions these replacements were temporarily attached to the field repair shops, where they, as well as the crews of disabled tanks, constituted an administrative liability for the tank maintenance companies.

The number of tank personnel immobilized while awaiting repairs to their vehicles at the field repair shop averaged from 80 to 100 men. The commander of the maintenance company had to provide themwith quarters and rations, in addition to keeping them occupied. During the winter months the administrative problem was aggravated by the scarcity of heated billets. While the tank drivers were able to assist in minor repair work, an attempt was made to keep the other crew members busy with first echelon maintenance of their vehicle. As a rule, however, the crew members would stand around and interfere with the work of the shop personnel.

Page 24:

e. Supply Problems and Tentative Sollutions. During the first 3 months of the Russian campaign, the German armored units had sufficient spare parts. In the autumn of 1941, however, parts grew scarce in the Russian theater. The supply lines were overextended at the time when the muddy season set in. Most of the roads in Russia became impassaple and truck columns were therefore unable to move up supplies. At the same time the railroads proved incapable of carrying the entire supply load. Damaged tanks could not be repaired for lack of spare parts and could not be evacuated to the zone of interior because of the transportation bottleneck.

Throughout this period the Ministry of Armaments pushed the production of new tanks to the detriment of the manufacture of spare parts. With the increase in the number of tank models and the continuous changes in design, many parts became obsolete by the time they reached the maintenance units in the field. : This was primarily the result of excessive procurement lead time for parts.

In May 1942 the Ministry of Armaments decided to curtail new tank production and increa-se the output of spare parts. This change failed to remedy the situation because the total quantity of spare parts thus gained amounted to no more than the loss in new tank production, but in disassembled form. In other words, for each tank that was not a-ssembled, only 1 engine, 1 transmission, and 1 steering mechanism, etc., were made available as spare parts. This solution was very unsatisfactory and did little to alleviate the spare-parts problem. Urgently needed parts, such as engines and transmissions, were produced in equal number to hulls and other parts which were not in great demand.

From page 41:

b. Personnel. An efficient tank maintenance service must be organized before the outbreak of hostilities, otherwise it will not function properly during military operations. Failure to provide such a service in peacetime cost the Germans heavy losses in tanks and equipment. The training of tank maintenance personnel, for instance, had been neglected because of the generally accepted assumption that men who had worked as automobile mechanics and in related professions in civilian life would instantly qualify for work in a tank maintenance company. With regard to officer personnel, it was found that engineers and technicians were unsuitable for the command of tank maintenance units unless they were given thorough military training. The civilians who were given direct commissions were primarily concerned with the repair of equipment. If there was any change in the tactical situation, they lacked the ability to initiate independent action and relied too heavily on detailed orders from their immediate superiors. In fluid situations such procedures were impractical because unit commanders had to be capable of using their own initiative and of making the correct decision at the proper time.

The Germans also found that the 6-week specialized training course for tank maintenance personnel was much too short to be really effective. Both in the North African and in the Russian theaters the tank maintenance personnel had to opera~ independently and often without the support of major depot maintenance installations. Their performance under pressure failed to live up to expectation, and many a valuable tank had to be abandoned or destroyed on the battlefield because the maintenance crews were unable to recover or repair it.

No mechanic of a tank maintenance detachment or company adhered to fixed working hours when a deadline for the repair of a tank had to be met. On the other hand, tanks 'that were removed to depot maintenance installations in the rear were in transit for an indefinite period. Upon arrival at their destination they were handled like any other disabled vehicle, no one taking a personal interest in their repair. After a delay of many weeks the tanks would occasionally be returned to their original unit, but as a rule the tank regiment never saw its vehicles again.

--Historical Study: German Tank Maintenance During WWII

Department of the Army, 1954

https://www.govinfo.gov/content/pkg/GOVPUB-D114-PURL-gpo81652/pdf/GOVPUB-D114-PURL-gpo81652.pdf

Fascists can't help themselves from thinking the Free Market^tm will solve all their problems lmao