So, I guess we can split the training up in two branches - training on how to operate equipment, and training of officers in tactics & strategy.

For the first one, China does of course export plenty of military tech, and that obviously involves training people on how the equipment works. Recently there was a bunch of drama over Argentina's fighter jet procurement, where the US pulled all the stops, even including diverting equipment meant for Ukraine, in order to make sure Argentina bought American rather than Chinese - and their explicit stated motivation was to prevent "a way for China to make inroads in what the US considers its backyard" as a "Chinese jet buy would come with Chinese infrastructure — PRC provided contractors and trainers, at the very least". So, clearly the US is pretty worried about the prospect of countries developing a military training relationship with China, and considers countering it a higher priority to their other imperial misadventure in Ukraine. Now, while the failure in that case .... reasons to be optimistic

As far as officer training though, they're nowhere near where the Soviets were (I recently posted something about Mogadishu, and a fact I learned myself for the first time was that the guy behind it trained at the Soviets' Frunze Academy). They have been increasing their joint trainings, but from the maps shown in that article it does still seem to be mostly "in their backyard" as it were, in Southeast Asia and neighboring countries. And this is still joint training, not other countries' officers coming over to China and living there for years while they study at an academy. Now, there are a lot of African immigrants going to China for higher education, but I assume very few of them are going for military stuff specifically (and China itself would need to have academies that actually accept foreign students in large numbers, which I'm not sure they do, @xiaohongshu@hexbear.net might be able to better clarify on that question).

One of the "good" things about being an imperialist piece of shit is that since you're constantly getting in all these fights, you get to regularly advertise your military prowess and technology to prospective clients. A more peaceful country doesn't get that opportunity. Now, back in the day many guerilla movements were influenced by Mao's writings (and there were numerous cases of movements in third world countries turning Maoist after being disappointed with their Soviet advisors not really giving them anything that they could work with, being in an undeveloped and non-industrialized country), but as far as modern conventional militaries, China's record in that area just isn't very good. Their intervention in the Korean war was impressive, but it was mostly a light infantry force, certainly one that came up with very clever tactics in order to effectively fight a technologically superior foe, but this still means that they didn't exactly get to demonstrate much prowess in combined arms warfare. And the later Sino-Vietnamese war isn't exactly a shining example.

(Although it can be argued that geopolitically it was actually a rather successful move as part of the greater post-Sino-Soviet-split maneuvering - in fact, this ties into exactly what I've been talking about with power projection and how getting into defense cooperation that you can't actually back up can be very discrediting - China was essentially trying to make the point to the Vietnamese of "don't buddy up with the Soviets, they won't be able to actually help you", and the conflict served as a very direct demonstration of that. But, however clever it may have been in the realm of subtle geopolitical intrigue, the way the conflict actually proceeded still just doesn't serve as good advertising for the military.

We can contrast this here with the American wars in Iraq, which were great advertising, even if the eventual outcome was a brutal grinding insurgency - I've talked about before how the "shock-and-awe" method of war did, in fact, have a lot to do with why the later insurgency could happen, because for however impressive it looked on a map timelapse video to see how quickly coalition forces advanced, in reality they

1. Didn't actually destroy the Iraqi military as a fighting force, and when they later did like the most incompetent occupation government of all time and fired everyone, there were now suddenly a whole lot of not-dead former soldiers with an axe to grind. Contrast this with a grinding attritional conflict like WW2, where there wasn't any post-war Nazi insurgency because basically every able-bodied male, and a whole bunch of non-able-bodied ones, was either dead, in a hospital, or in a prisoner camp.

2. Didn't actually bother securing a whole bunch of military targets, which allowed large swaths of military materiel to be taken by insurgents. The IED crisis that coalition forces suffered was literally their own fault - they moved so fast they kind of forgot to make sure that there weren't a bunch of bases with tonnes of bombs sitting around, unguarded since they had, in their infinite wisdom, fired the guards.

But the American political establishment cleverly drew a clean dividing line between the invasion and the post-invasion insurgency - as we all know, events in the past don't actually affect events in the future

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