Mearsheimer always has good takes. He’s treated as a pariah these days because at the start of the Ukraine war he was saying “the west is provoking Russia and Ukraine will lose” which was verboten wrong think so since then he’s been treated as a crank, but he was fucking right and before then he was highly respected. He’s also an anti-China hawk and is explicitly pro- US imperialism so his angle is very interesting for coming from a perspective of “US power is declining and this is what the US is doing wrong in terms of maintaining its power.”

He writes a lot but also he gives many interviews so for his views on very recent events you have to search him on YouTube.

He’s an interview where he discusses among other things the balance of power tensions in the Middle East between Iran and Israel

https://www.newstatesman.com/the-weekend-interview/2024/02/john-mearsheimer-israel-ukraine-middle-east

Big Serge is a transphobic chud who has excellent insight into the military aspects of geopolitics. He has written about how disproportionate overreaction sits at the core of Israeli defense policy, and how that reflex is no longer viable but that for ideological (he argues even eschatological) reasons, Israel can’t give it up and it’s forcing Israel into a corner.

https://bigserge.substack.com/p/the-age-of-zugzwang

You can also see western intelligentsia acknowledging the issue, that the “divide and conquer” strategy Israel has employed for generations now has run its course, has failed in the face of the their opponents beginning to coordinate.

https://archive.ph/qz0xj

I also saved this article from an Indian general which analyzed the issue mostly because it was fascinating to see an Indian take that was level-headed and focused on the viability of Israel’s strategy, pointing out that a strategy that relies upon disproportionately overreacting means Israel needs to always be much stronger than its enemies, which dooms the doctrine to failure since Israel needs to be exponentially more powerful than its threats and that is simply not sustainable. That the psychology of Israeli deterrence means the next response is always more violent than the previous and if you keep doing this decade after decade you reach the point where your capacity to inflict violence doesn’t meet your desire to inflict violence.

https://wavellroom.com/2021/09/13/israels-cumulative-deterrence-strategy/

There’s also an amazing article I read talking about the Roman Empire and how, as it declined, it was forced to use more military force. I can’t find it now but I wish I saved it.

The thesis was that when a power is strong, it doesn’t need to use its strength since it’s enemies know they will lose so they don’t try. But when a power declines, now it actually needs to use its muscle.

The essay used the example of Jerusalem being destroyed by the Roman’s in the year 70. The Roman Empire at the height of its power faced an inconsequential threat from some religious zealots rebelling, but this was Rome at the height of its power so it used an absolutely profligate display of force to take out the rebels. Four legions were sent to Jerusalem and instead of simply laying siege to Jerusalem and starving them out, they wanted to demonstrate the degree of overmatch to send a message. So they built a sand ramp to climb the walls, enter the city, kill everyone, and the first wave of the modern Jewish diaspora began as their leadership were expelled from their capital.

This was contrasted with the conquest of Dacia centuries later. Rome had been able to rule with remarkably little use of military power for centuries because it was so much more powerful and so when Rome was powerful they didn’t need to conquer Dacia since Dacia would always do what Rome wanted anyway. It’s much more economical to have your enemies fear your power than to have to use your power.

But as Roman power went into relative decline, now Dacia wasn’t scared and so Dacia made the mistake of acting against Roman interests and Rome was forced to conquer Dacia. Rome still kicked Dacia’s ass and won that war but this was a real drain on resources. Rome won the war and reached its territorial zenith, on paper stronger than ever, but this was really a sign of weakness since it was a sign that the threat of Roman power was no longer a deterrent.

The article was fascinating in arguing that frequently deploying military power for its deterrence value is a sign of true weakness even if victorious. Being in a state of having to frequently employ military power is expensive and draining and a sign of imperial decline.