612
submitted 2 months ago* (last edited 2 months ago) by nokturne213@sopuli.xyz to c/privacy@lemmy.ml

Not only does the credit bureau max out their password length, you have a small list of available non-alphanumeric characters you can use, and no spaces. Also you cannot used a plused email address, and it had an issue with my self hosted email alias, forcing me to use my gmail address.

Both Experian and transunion had no password length limitations, nor did they require my username be my email address.

Update: I have been unable to log into my account for the last 3 days now. Every time I try I get a page saying to call customer service. After a total of 2 hours on hold I finally found the issue, you cannot connect to Equifax using a VPN. In addition there is no option for 2FA (not even email or sms) and they will hang up on you if you push the issue of their security being lax. Their reasoning for lax security and no vpn usage is "well all of our other customers are okay with this".

you are viewing a single comment's thread
view the rest of the comments
[-] frezik@midwest.social 6 points 2 months ago

That's not how salt works. It will be stolen alongside the password hash, because salt is necessarily in plaintext. It doesn't increase the guessability of passwords. It just makes it infeasible to precompute your guesses.

[-] UnfortunateShort@lemmy.world 1 points 2 months ago

Yes, what I meant is actually a kind of pepper. Although I would like to point out that literally the only difference is that it's stored elsewhere.

[-] krolden@lemmy.ml 1 points 2 months ago

So what does the password length matter if they also get the salt?

[-] frezik@midwest.social 1 points 2 months ago* (last edited 2 months ago)

A password only 8 chars long can still be brute forced, salt or not.

Without salt, the attacker would make a guess, run the hash on the password, and compare it to the stored version.

With salt, the attacker would make a guess, combine it with the salt, and then run the hash and compare like before.

What salt does is prevent a shortcut. The attacker has a big list of passwords and their associated hash values. They grab the hash out of the leaked database, compare it to the list, and match it to the original plaintext. When the hashes have a salt, they would need to generate the list for every possible salt value. For a sufficiently long salt that's unique to each password entry, that list would be infeasible to generate, and infeasible to store even if you could.

If your passwords were long and random enough, then it's also infeasible to generate that list to cover everything. It really only works against dictionary words and variations (like "P4ssw0rD").

this post was submitted on 21 Aug 2024
612 points (98.0% liked)

Privacy

31949 readers
536 users here now

A place to discuss privacy and freedom in the digital world.

Privacy has become a very important issue in modern society, with companies and governments constantly abusing their power, more and more people are waking up to the importance of digital privacy.

In this community everyone is welcome to post links and discuss topics related to privacy.

Some Rules

Related communities

Chat rooms

much thanks to @gary_host_laptop for the logo design :)

founded 5 years ago
MODERATORS