You'll first want to lock down the laptop with using the TPM so it only boots kernels signed by you, and also encrypt the drive using the TPM as the locking key so the key is only ever available to a kernel you signed. From there you'll probably want to use dm-verity to also verify the integrity of the system or at least during the boot process.
Then, on top of that, once online and the machine is still authorized to access that data, you download a key from a server under your control to unlock the rest of the drive (as another partition). And log those accesses of course.
Then, when you want to revoke access to it, all you have to do is stop replying with the key whenever requested. That just puts a ton of hurdles to overcome to access the data once the server stops handing the key. They would have to pry out the key from the TPM to unlock the first stage and even be able to see how it works and how to potentially obtain the key. They could still manage to copy the data out while the system is fully unlocked and still trusted, which you can make a lot harder by preventing access to external drives or network shares. But they have physical access so they kind of have the last word if they really really really want to exfiltrate data.
This is the best you can do because it's a passive: you stop supplying the unlock key so it's stuck locked encrypted with no key, so the best they can do is format the laptop and sell it or use it for themselves. Any sort of active command system can be pretty easy to counter: just don't get it online if you suspect the kill signal is coming, and it will never come, and therefore never get wiped. You want that system to be wiped by default unless your server decides it's not.
That's why I focused on platform security. You can't fully eliminate the possibility, but you can make it as hard as possible to pull off. TPM+dm-verity is to make it hard for the user to even look at how it works and prevent filesystem modifications that would give them root access to intercept the key loading mechanism.
The part where the laptop continuously check and refreshes the key is to address the second part about just turning off WiFi: make it so if you do that, you have N hours to break the system open before it reboots itself and you've lost access to the key for good. This can also depend on hardware-backed checks like TPM measurements and signature, to make sure the data key is only handed over to the expected environment.
It's the same fundamental principles as Android and Play Integrity: use the security processor to attest the state of the device before the server agrees to send you stuff over. It's been worked around via leaked keys mostly because Google is lenient for older devices, but the actual secure enclave hasn't been broken yet.
The point is for the security to hold long enough the key's gone before they can get it, and without the key the laptop is effectively wiped. That's plenty for the overwhelming majority of "employee got fired and is pissed off and wants to retaliate", and the best that can be done without going remote desktop/VDI.