I agree with this idea that reality without a viewpoint doesn't make much sense (maybe it's not logically impossible, but our reality surely isn't like that), but I don't think an unconscious viewpoint can exist. Really, I would say having/being a viewpoint is precisely what consciousness is about. 

It's easy to think of reality as some space you can just freely float around (like your unity example), but that's not how we experience it. The only viewpoints we can be absolutely sure actually exist, are our own. Let's say we extrapolate to other conscious beings to avoid solipsism. This still severely constrains the pool of all known viewpoints, but what they have in common is this; their movement is always constrained to some body, which others percieve as matter. In my opinion this hints at the fact that matter is probably not merely some symmetry within how reality is observed. Since it correlates so well with where other viewpoints are (viewpoints are always located where matter appears to be), it makes sense to say that at least a subset of viewpoints appear as matter when viewed from the outside. I think this dissolves the idea that there is no object being observed.

The reason I'm calling reality subjective rather than relative is because I think the fact we can perceive it rather accurately and that human viewpoints are mostly coherent is more the exception than the rule. Take the hallucination example; when you hallucinate an object, what is being observed? I think the only possible answer is that the "viewpoint" in your head is observing some other stuff in your head. Since brain activity during visual hallucinations is very similar to brain activity when viewing a "real" object, this is likely always the case! What our brain is actually doing is collecting massive amounts of information from the environment and constructing integrated experience based on it, which represents the macroscopic features of reality accurately, because that was evolutionarily favourable. This means that the accurate and coherent perception we experience is likely only inherent to sufficiently complex evolved systems. If other viewpoints exist, they probably perceive reality in a completely different way than we do, and for all we know, they could be completely incoherent. 

In short, my metaphysical stance is something like this:

• The only ontic thing is experience, which is concentrated into minds

• Reality is a plurality of interacting minds

• Observation is when one mind affects the experience of another

• Matter is what minds appear like from the outside

• Space isn't some backdrop, but instead emerges from the relationships between minds, specifically the strength of interaction between them

What I mean by subjective experience is what you might refer to as what reality looks like from a specific viewpoint or what it appears like when observed. I'm not sure whether you're assuming a physicalist or idealist position when you say "what we observe is the physical world". My issue with this is that observation usually implies the existence of something which is being observed, the appearance upon observation, and possibly also an observer. 

If you claim that the physical world doesn't exist independently of observation, and is thus nothing beyond the totality of observed appearances (seems to me like a form of idealism), then what is being observed? If there is no object being observed, and the fact it it apparent from multiple perspectives is simply a consequence of the coherence of observation, where do the qualities of those appearances originate from? How come things don't cease to exist when they're not being observed?

If you claim that the appearances don't exist independently of the physical world being observed (the physicalist interpretation), why does the world appear different from different perspectives? How do you explain things like hallucinations (there is no physical object being observed, but still some appearance is present)?

The reason I brought up that example is because physicalists usually deny the existence of qualia and claim they're nothing beyond the brain processes correlated with them. 

My line of thought is this: the most epistemically primary thing is subjective experience, because it can be known directly, thus it is undeniably real. Due to the principle of ontological parsimony, if everything can be explained in terms of experience, there is no reason to postulate something beyond it (the physical). So the way I would formulate the hard problem would be something more like "Why does our experience contain the appearance of a physical world at all, and how are they related?".

I guess this might not resonate with you either, if you don't believe in phenomenal consciousness as all. Personally I have a hard time understanding physicalist reductionism, how can you say that something like the experience of redness is the same thing as some pattern of neurons firing in the brain? These are clearly very different things, and even if one is entirely dependent on the other, it doesn't mean it's non-existent or illusory.

The reason is trying to work towards a model which could actually solve the hard problem, something which the physicalism prevalent in science has failed at completely. Consciousness is a fundamental aspect of reality, and it needs to be taken seriously, any model which doesn't include it is either inacurrate or incomplete. Yes, a single particle might act randomly, but that might not hold for a more complex entangled system, especially an orchestrated one inside a living being.

My idea is that the agent is the particle itself, and the laws of physics are simply the statistics of what decisions it tends to make. I imagine that if a fundamental particle like an electron was phenomenally conscious and had some kind of agency, it wouldn't have any intention or self-awareness, so it would decide practically randomly, based on its quantum state, which would be some kind of rudimentary experience it has.

You're assuming quantum indeterminism is random in the sense that there is no agency behind it, but there is no evidence of that. If anything, the fact we feel like we have free will suggests there might be some agency somewhere, and if it manifests anywhere, that is as indeterminism at the fundamental level.

The laws of physics are not deterministic at the fundamental level, we clearly experience some kind of agency, so doesn't it make sense to assume that it could be the origin of this indeterminism?

I wholeheartedly agree, and as funny as this sounds, I just started writing a manifesto about this yesterday lmao.

I think the main issue is the way morality is framed in neoliberalism, many religions etc.—as something prescriptive. We follow laws not because of some internal moral principles, because we conform to authority and fear punishment. This isn't rational but deeply instinctual, and it leads to immoral action. Similarly, I think tribalism is a consequence of instinctual action and probably one of the main causes of evil in the world. Racism, nationalism, xenophobia, homophobia, etc. can all be explained in this framework. We need to educate people to recognize instinct and transcend it. A political system, however perfect, cannot be forced on people who aren't ready for it.

The main issue with this idea of punishment and reward, in the sense that you mean them, is that their results depend entirely on the criteria by which you are punished or rewarded. Say, the law says being gay is illegal and the punishment is execution, does that mean it's immoral?

Being moral boils down to making certain decisions, the method by which they are achieved is irrelevant if the decisions are "correct". Most moral philosophies agree that moral decisions can be made by applying rational reasoning to some basic principles (e.g. the categorical imperative). We reason through language, and these models capture and simulate that. The question is not whether AI can make moral decisions, it's whether it can be better than humans at it, and I believe it can.

I watched the video, honestly I don't find anything too surprising. ChatGPT acknowledges that there are multiple moral traditions (as it should) and that which decision is right for you depends on which tradition you subscribe to. It avoids making clear choices because it is designed that way for legal reasons. When there exists a consensus in moral philosophy about the morality of a decision, it doesn't hesitate to express that. The conclusions it comes to aren't inconsistent, because it always clearly expresses that they pertain to a certain path of moral reasoning. Morality isn't objective, taking a conclusive stance on an issue based on one moral framework (which humans like to do) isn't superior to taking an inconclusive one based on many. Really this is one of our greatest weaknesses, not being able to admit we aren't always entirely sure about things. If ChatGPT was designed to make conclusive moral decisions, it would likely take the majority stance on any issue, which is basically as universally moral as you can get.

The idea that AI could be immoral because it holds the stances of its developers is invalid, because it doesn't. It is trained on a vast corpus of text, which captures popular views and not the views of the developers.

Why do you think renewables are better for the environment? Nuclear is very clean and produces next to no emissions. In comparison, solar panels have a production process which produces considerable emissions, once they fail (which is in around 25 - 30 yrs), they basically turn into toxic waste. Similar goes for wind turbines, but they also totally ruin the landscape, since roads have to be built in order to access and maintain them. Additionally they're not viable everywhere and look ugly af.

Looks a lot like Artemisia sp., possibly Artemisia vulgaris, though the leaves are somewhat wrinklier than usual. Maybe check whether the undersides of the leaves are silvery, since that's typical for mugwort.

The ham/bacon they use is guanciale and the sauce is actually not made from cream but instead eggs. They are added into the pasta while it's still hot, which cooks them.