tl;dr:

1. If the password manager server is hacked and compromised, then syncing your passwords with the compromised server will lead to compromised passwords (duh)
2. None of the providers tested have (or have had in the past) compromised servers.

and an observation or two:

• Vaultwarden is free, self-hostable, and doesn't rely on trust in a third party.
• Keepass (and its client variants, like KeepassXC which is pretty great) is even more secure because there is no server, just an encrypted file you can store anywhere.

OMFG can people please fucking go away with this stupid "password managers are worthless" bullshit today. They are exactly as secure as promised, unless you went to the obviously shady ones that use web interfaces. People have been saying this for years, if you want security, keep your password manager offline.

From the paper itself:

We had a video-conference and numerous email exchanges with Bitwarden. At the time of writing, they are well advanced in deploying mitigations for our attacks: BW01, BW03, BW11, BW12 were addressed, the minimum KDF iteration count for BW07 is now 5000, and their roadmap includes completely removing CBC-only encryption, enforcing per-item keys and changing the vault format for integrity. On 22.12.25 they shared with us a draft for a signed organisation membership scheme, which would resolve BW08 and BW09. At our request, to maintain anonymity, they have not yet credited us publicly for the disclosure, but plan to do so.

I didn't look at the response to other Password managers, but the gist here is that the article is overblowing the paper by quite a bit and the majority of the "issues" discovered are either already fixed, or active design decisions.

Don't store your stuff in the cloud unless you don't mind someone else accessing it.

If you store things in the cloud that you don't want other people to access, you better be encrypting it yourself and only opening it locally.

This has been a cardinal rule since day 1.

For people interested there were 3 cloud based password managers tested and this is what they found

The researchers demonstrated 12 attacks on Bitwarden, 7 on LastPass and 6 on Dashlane.

“We want our work to help bring about change in this industry,” says Paterson. “The providers of password managers should not make false promises to their customers about security but instead communicate more clearly and precisely what security guarantees their solutions actually offer.”  

Great.
Now which password vault was the most cooperative and clear in their security communication and which one wasnt?
The author said that they have given the providers time to fix the issues. Now highlight the ones that did it the best.... >_>

Would having a synced Keepass database with a composite key protect against this?

When I made my database I created a composite key file that never goes online. I locally copy it to any device that needs to access the database. The idea was even if the password got compromised you can't access the database without the key file

Many providers promise absolute security

This struck me as wrong, because that would be a technically impossible and liability-inviting thing to promise.

And after checking the homepages of the 3 services they tested, yep, none of them promise “absolute security.”

Bitwarden have published a blog addressing this audit:

Security through transparency: ETH Zurich audits Bitwarden cryptography against malicious server scenarios

Everyone using online password manager services deserves everything he gets

That's why mine is a physical book.

Copy pasting a comment that I saw on Reddit

——

Link to the original study (with a less sensationalized title):

https://zkae.io

A few important notes:

• the study is about Bitwarden, LastPass, Dashlane and 1Password. Proton Pass isn't mentioned.

• the study presumes that they're working with a malicious server (read this as compromised server, controlled by an attacker). The attacks they talk about in the article would not work on a normal server. Here's their quote:

No need to panic: all of our attacks presume a malicious server. We have no reason to believe that the password manager vendors are currently malicious or compromised, and as long as things stay that way, your passwords are safe. That said, password managers are high-value targets, and breaches do happen.

• Here's another quote, about other password managers:

You can ask your provider the following questions:

1. ⁠Do you offer end-to-end encryption? What security do you provide in case your server infrastructure were to be compromised?

2. How do you check that public keys and public-key ciphertexts are authentic?

3. How do you authenticate security-critical settings, such as the KDF type and the iteration count?

4. Do you provide integrity guarantees for a user's vault as a whole? Can a malicious server add items to your vault?

You can also ask your favourite password manager to commission an audit checking for our attacks in their products.

• If you still feel unsure/unsafe, then adopt an offline password manager (I highly recommend keepassXC).

Assume the breach - that includes your password manager host. Especially your password manager host.

The summary is here; the linked article is a bit short on detail. https://zkae.io/

I read the summary but haven’t gotten into the details on each. It is concerning that Bitwarden has so many issues, as it’s the only one that is offered as a self hosted solution in addition to SaaS - I do think it’s unlikely for a home lab to get the kind of attention that would result in using these methods against the vault, but it’s possible. Attackers have been known to go after admins. Lastpass has had their run ins with breaches before and shouldn’t score so highly. 1Password seems to have good architecture and a responsive team.

I pitty the fool that stores anything important on ~~the cloud~~ somebody elses computer.

Use a offline password manager. Problem solved.

With pretty much every major company being hacked at some point, credit card companies being hacked, everyone selling our details and data, doge and palantir. Feels like post it notes under the keyboard isn’t that bad of an idea.

I use one of the password managers mentioned in the article, purely for the convenience of apps on all my devices, syncing and complex individual passwords. Should I be looking to move to self hosting something instead? Would my host (likely a synology Nas or raspberry pi) not then have the same risks?