In the past few years, with Hezbollah acting as a shield, Iran has inched closer to acquiring a nuclear weapon.

According to a recent report by the U.S. Director of National Intelligence, the regime in Tehran had recently begun to undertake "activities that better position it to produce a nuclear device, if it chooses to do so." Most American experts believe that Iran has enriched enough uranium to about sixty-per-cent purity to build about three nuclear weapons.

If the Iranians were to decide to deploy a nuclear weapon, they would need to enrich that uranium to ninety-per-cent purity—a process that could be done in a matter of weeks. Then the regime would have to build a trigger for the device. Some U.S. experts maintain that the Iranians do not yet have that capability, but others think that they are, at least, much closer to it than they were.

In a report published in August, David Albright and Sarah Burkhard, of the Institute for Science and International Security, wrote that Tehran appeared to have shortened the time it needed to achieve "breakout"—acquiring a bomb—to less than six months.

"Iran can make a crude nuclear weapon far faster than commonly assessed," they wrote. That brings us back to Hezbollah: if the Iranian insurance policy in Lebanon has been diminished, Khamenei could decide that the time has come to deploy a nuclear weapon. This could give him a sense of security that recent events have stripped away. "The simplest thing for Khamenei to do is build a bomb," Gerecht, the former C.I.A. officer, said.

Few of the American and Israeli officials I have spoken with believe that Israel, acting alone, could destroy Iran's nuclear infrastructure, especially the underground nuclear-enrichment site at Fordow, south of Tehran. The only air force capable of destroying that reactor is that of the United States.

Like Presidents Donald Trump and Barack Obama before him, Biden has never ruled out using military force to stop the Iranian regime from acquiring a nuclear weapon, but he has shown little willingness to contemplate such a momentous action. On Wednesday, Biden said that he would not support an Israeli attack against Iran's nuclear facilities.

That does not mean the Israelis wouldn't attempt one, and a strike that only partially succeeded could put enormous pressure on the United States to finish the job. Israel's success against Hezbollah could encourage the Israelis to undertake more aggressive action against the Iranian regime, including encouraging dissent within the country or even attacking it directly.

What might such a campaign look like? Possibly strikes against Iran's leaders, or its oil-export facilities, or its military bases. In a three-minute video addressed to the Iranian people, released on Monday, Netanyahu suggested that such activities may be about to begin. "When Iran is finally free—and that moment will come a lot sooner than people think—everything will be different," he said.

Some preliminary thoughts on this new phase in the war focusing on key developments: 1) Israel’s act of state terrorism which killed Seyyid Hasan Nasrallah and its impact on Hizbullah, 2) The impact of Israel’s elimination of Hizbullah’s military command, 3) The current transition phase and Hizbullah’s strategic recalibration. It’s evident that Israel, with the full backing and partnership of the US, aimed to dismantle Hizbullah in one decisive strike. This effort began with the assassination of Fuad Shukr in late July, followed by the pager attacks, but it was Nasrallah’s killing that served as the key trigger intended to spark Hizbullah’s expected implosion. While Israel's push for a regional war seems evident, it's still uncertain whether the US is fully prepared to commit to such a course.

It is difficult to quantify the magnitude of Nasrallah's loss for Hizbullah and the Axis as a whole. However, this does not mean Hizbullah is anywhere near the verge of collapse. Israel and the US misunderstand the nature of his leadership—people didn’t support the cause because of him; they supported him because he personified their cause of justice and liberation, and while he was a revered figure, the cause he embodied will outlive him. Nasrallah will live on not just as a model of resistance or political consciousness, but as a rationality—a kind of 'Nasrallah raison'. To think the group would crumble without Nasrallah is a fundamental misreading, and a racist assumption that reduces Hizbullah—a complex and deeply-rooted movement—to a single individual, reinforcing a stereotype that such groups in the Middle East rely on charismatic "strongmen" rather than institutional strength, resilience, or popular grass-roots support. It reflects a broader Orientalist view that discounts the ability of non-Western organizations to function as sophisticated political or military entities, capable of enduring beyond the loss of one leader.

Similarly, while Israel’s elimination of Hizbullah’s entire military command [has this been confirmed? I was under the impression that Hezbollah denied this and that only a small number of officials were present with Nasrallah] was a devastating blow that would have crippled most states, Hizbullah's ability to continue launching sustained strikes against Israel highlights its operational continuity and the resilience of its command-and-control structure. The reason Hizbullah has been able to withstand such significant losses is its exceptionally robust continuity of command, enabling a seamless transition of leadership even in times of severe crisis.

It's important to recall that Hizbullah was born out of war and invasion, shaping it into an organization with built-in resilience. It’s designed to continually regenerate its leadership, producing new generations of military commanders. This resilience was most evident in 2008 when Hizbullah lost its senior military commander, Hajj Imad Mughnieh, who was not just a foundational figure but the pioneer of the Resistance’s “New School of [hybrid] Warfare”. Far from being weakened by his assassination, and the killing of his successor, Mustafa Badereddine in 2013, Hizbullah’s military capabilities have since grown exponentially, with its tactics being adopted by allies across the Resistance Axis. Since Mughnieh’s assassination, Hizbullah has implemented a sophisticated system of knowledge distribution at the operational level. This distributed expertise ensures that the loss of any single leader, even one in a high-ranking position, does not create a critical gap in the group’s operational capabilities, allowing for rapid reorganization and continuity of operations. Hizbullah has made contingencies for multiple lines of commanders, so if the first is killed and replaced, the second can immediately step in, and if he too is killed, a third will take over, and so on. Several men are delegated with overlapping roles and tasks, ensuring that any void left by a fallen leader is quickly filled, allowing for rapid reorganization and seamless continuity of operations.

None of this suggests that Hizbullah hasn't been severely bruised and momentarily weakened—more so than at any point in its history. This is undeniably a turning point. The organization is navigating a critical transition phase, absorbing consecutive shocks while attempting to recuperate, reconfigure, and reorganize. It is likely revising both its grand strategy and military approach, shifting from its previous support front with Gaza to developing a new defense strategy that will likely focus on repelling Israel’s seemingly imminent ground invasion and forcing it to end its aerial aggression. At the same time, Hizbullah is likely drawing up contingency plans for a broader "Great War" strategy—one that would be offensively driven, should Israel and the U.S. seek to engulf the entire region in war.