cross-posted from: https://mander.xyz/post/43940614
In October 2023, a Hong Kong-flagged cargo ship dragged its anchor across the Baltic seabed, severing a gas pipeline and two communications cables between Finland and Estonia. In November 2024, cables linking Lithuania, Sweden, Germany and Finland—critical routes for regional internet connectivity and data transmission—were damaged in a similar way.
Chinese ships also seem increasingly clumsy in the Taiwan Strait. In the first two months of 2025 alone, Taiwan recorded four instances of damage to cables responsible for 99% of the island’s international internet traffic. One such incident in February involved the “Hong Tai 58”, flying a Togolese “convenience” flag. By April, prosecutors had indicted the ship’s Chinese owner for sabotage, which China vehemently denies.
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Accidents happen. But these incidents involving cargo ships are more likely examples of China’s “military-civil fusion” strategy, through which it blends the military and civilian sectors and uses both to pursue its global interests. The maritime strand of the strategy goes well beyond errant anchors. Yet countries on the receiving end have struggled to find definitive proof of state-level coordination.
This has significant geostrategic implications. China’s deployment of non-military forces poses a silent but serious challenge to the norms that govern warfare and maritime security. It can also reproduce and scale up its strategy in any body of water. Europeans need to work with their allies in the Indo-Pacific to respond to China’s evolving maritime playbook—for the sake of Taiwan’s security, but also for their own.
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China claims sovereignty and jurisdiction over the waters of the Taiwan Strait. But Western countries see the strait as international waters, where freedom of navigation applies, and oppose any unilateral change to the status quo. Moreover, China’s leader Xi Jinping has instructed the military to be ready for a Taiwan invasion by 2027. As part of this preparation, forces have drawn lessons from Russia’s war against Ukraine. Chief among these is that their victory needs to be swift, which becomes less likely if external actors get involved in helping the island defend itself.
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As part of this, China has built up a an increasingly organised and coercive “maritime militia”. The militia is, in effect, an integral part of the country’s armed forces, trained and funded by government, but disguised as fishing cooperatives and fishers. The militia vessels are outfitted with Beidou satellite navigation systems and heavy-lift capabilities, which means they can conduct seabed-mapping and deploy hydrographic sensors.
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In recent years, European navies—including those of Britain, France and Germany—have increased freedom-of-navigation operations in the Indo-Pacific, including transits through the Taiwan Strait. Though these they aim to safeguard supply chains of, for example, semiconductors, over 60% of which are made in Taiwan and without which European industries and militaries would grind to a halt. Since the start of 2025, vessels from Britain and France (and allies including America, Australia and Japan) have passed through the strait. As their presence grows, similar patterns of coercion to those in the South China Sea seem likely to emerge. Such incidents could become precursors to conflict, whether through miscalculation or deliberate false-flag incidents.
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Given China’s use of covert and deniable strategies, the EU and European governments need to underpin their approach to China’s military-civil activities with clear policy signalling. More regular naval activity, such as transits through the Taiwan Strait and joint exercises in Indo-Pacific waters, would send a stronger signal that international attention and engagement in the region are steadily increasing.
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European and Asian governments must further integrate their policy expertise and experience. Promising platforms to strengthen dialogue and cooperation with Indo-Pacific partners include the EU’s ESIWA, a programme to enhance security cooperation with allies in Asia; and CRIMARIO, the bloc’s project to safeguard critical maritime routes. European states have established strong information-sharing mechanisms and maritime capacity-building initiatives with countries such as the Philippines. They have also developed security and defence partnerships with Japan and South Korea. They should build on this to expand their maritime domain awareness and identify emerging patterns of maritime security threats.
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Taiwan is on the front line of China’s military-civil fusion activities and has extensive experience identifying and responding to related threats. Europeans should therefore expand their dialogue with Taiwan on subsea-cable security and support Taipei’s participation in regional discussions on non-traditional security threats. This could even include participation in regional exercises related to such threats. This would reinforce information-sharing, strengthen collective preparedness and enhance resilience across the wider region. These efforts are not only for Asia’s benefit; they are a safeguard Europe needs for itself.
