171
submitted 1 month ago* (last edited 1 month ago) by ptz@dubvee.org to c/mildlyinfuriating@lemmy.world

Developers: I will never ever do that, no one should ever do that, and you should be ashamed for guiding people to. I get that you want to make things easy for end users, but at least exercise some bare minimum common sense.

The worst part is that bun is just a single binary, so the install script is bloody pointless.

Bonus mildly infuriating is the mere existence of the .sh TLD.

Edit b/c I'm not going to answer the same goddamned questions 100 times from people who blindly copy/paste the question from StackOverflow into their code/terminal:

WhY iS ThaT woRSe thAn jUst DoWnlOADing a BinAary???

  1. Downloading the compiled binary from the release page (if you don't want to build yourself) has been a way to acquire software since shortly after the dawn of time. You already know what you're getting yourself into
  2. There are SHA256 checksums of each binary file available in each release on Github. You can confirm the binary was not tampered with by comparing a locally computed checksum to the value in the release's checksums file.
  3. Binaries can also be signed (not that signing keys have never leaked, but it's still one step in the chain of trust)
  4. The install script they're telling you to pipe is not hosted on Github. A misconfigured / compromised server can allow a bad actor to tamper with the install script that gets piped directly into your shell. The domain could also lapse and be re-registered by a bad actor to point to a malicious script. Really, there's lots of things that can go wrong with that.

The point is that it is bad practice to just pipe a script to be directly executed in your shell. Developers should not normalize that bad practice.

top 50 comments
sorted by: hot top controversial new old
[-] Godort@lemm.ee 72 points 1 month ago

It's bad practice to do it, but it makes it especially easy for end users who already trust both the source and the script.

On the flip side, you can also just download the script from the site without piping it directly to bash if you want to review what it's going to do before you run it.

[-] Deello@lemm.ee 14 points 1 month ago

It's bad practice to do it, but it makes it especially easy for end users who already trust both the source and the script.

You're not wrong but this is what lead to the xz "hack" not to long ago. When it comes to data, trust is a fickle mistress.

[-] thebestaquaman@lemmy.world 9 points 1 month ago

Would have been much better if they just pasted the (probably quite short) script into the readme so that I can just paste it into my terminal. I have no issue running commands I can have a quick look at.

I would never blindly pipe a script to be executed on my machine though. That's just next level "asking to get pwned".

[-] WolfLink@sh.itjust.works 5 points 1 month ago

These scripts are usually longer than that and do some checking of which distro you are running before doing something distro-specific.

[-] Korne127@lemmy.world 34 points 1 month ago

Installing Rust: curl --proto '=https' --tlsv1.2 -sSf https://sh.rustup.rs | sh (source)
Installing Homebrew: /bin/bash -c "$(curl -fsSL https://raw.githubusercontent.com/Homebrew/install/HEAD/install.sh)" (source)

I understand that you find it infuriating, but it's not something completely uncommon, even in high end projects :/

[-] felbane@lemmy.world 23 points 1 month ago

Common or not, it's still fucking awful and the people who promote this nonsense should be ashamed of themselves.

[-] SnotFlickerman@lemmy.blahaj.zone 10 points 1 month ago

Don't forget Pi-hole! It's been the default install method since basically the beginning.

[-] xavier666@lemm.ee 6 points 1 month ago

Thankfully, I'm using the docker version, which everyone should use.

[-] perishthethought@lemm.ee 4 points 1 month ago

Yah, when I read this, I was like, pretty sure pi-hole started this as a popular option. I dig it though, so I guess OP and I are not on the same page. (I do usually look over the bash scripts before running them piped to bash, though.

[-] possiblylinux127@lemmy.zip 9 points 1 month ago

It should be uncommon

[-] PlexSheep@infosec.pub 4 points 1 month ago

For rust at least, those are packaged in Debian and other distros too. I think rustup is in Debian Trixie too.

[-] ChaoticNeutralCzech@feddit.org 3 points 1 month ago* (last edited 1 month ago)

There is even a Windows (Powershell) example for Winutil:

Stable Branch (Recommended)

irm "https://christitus.com/win" | iex

Better than explaining how to make a .ps file trusted for execution (thankfully, one of the few executable file extensions that Windows doesn't trust by default) but why not just use some basic .exe builder at this point?

Obligatory "they better make it a script that automatically creates a medium for silent Linux Mint installation, modifies the relevant BIOS settings and restarts" to prevent obvious snarky replies

load more comments (2 replies)

Don't forget everyone's favorite massgravel script

[-] scrubbles@poptalk.scrubbles.tech 21 points 1 month ago

I've seen a lot of projects doing this lately. Just run this script, I made it so easy!

Please, devs, stop this. There are defined ways to distribute your apps. If it's local provide a binary, or a flatpak or exe. For docker, provide a docker image with well documented environments, ports, and volumes. I do not want arbitrary scripts that set all this up for me, I want the defined ways to do this.

[-] needanke@feddit.org 20 points 1 month ago* (last edited 1 month ago)

Would you prefere

$ curl xyz
$ chmod +x xyz
$ ./xyz

?

[-] ozymandias117@lemmy.world 27 points 1 month ago

You can detect server-side whether curl is piping the script to Bash and running it vs just downloading it, and inject malicious code only in the case no one is viewing it

https://github.com/Stijn-K/curlbash_detect

So that would at least be a minor improvement

[-] eager_eagle@lemmy.world 5 points 1 month ago* (last edited 1 month ago)

In most cases the script already installs a pre-compiled binary that can be anything, they wouldn't need to make the script itself malicious if they were bad actors.

[-] ptz@dubvee.org 6 points 1 month ago

I mean, how about:

  1. Download the release for your arch from the releases page.
  2. Extract to ~/.local/bin
  3. Run
[-] masto@lemmy.masto.community 16 points 1 month ago

I think you missed the point.

Why is that safer/better? That binary can do anything a shell script can, and it’s a lot harder to inspect.

[-] ptz@dubvee.org 3 points 1 month ago* (last edited 1 month ago)
  1. That's been the way to acquire software since shortly after the dawn of time. You already know what you're getting yourself into.
  2. There are SHA256 checksums of each binary file available in each release on Github. You can confirm the binary was not tampered with by comparing a locally computed checksum to the value in the release's checksums file.
  3. Binaries can also be signed (not that signing keys have never leaked, but it's still one step in the chain of trust)
  4. The install script is not hosted on Github. A misconfigured / compromised server can allow a bad actor to tamper with the install script that gets piped directly into your shell. The domain could also lapse and be re-registered by a bad actor to point to a malicious script. Really, there's lots of things that can go wrong with that.

The point is that it is bad practice to just pipe a script to be directly executed in your shell. Developers should not normalize that bad practice

[-] uranibaba@lemmy.world 6 points 1 month ago

If you trust them enough to use their binary, why don't you trust them enough to run their install scripts as well?

[-] jatone@lemmy.dbzer0.com 5 points 1 month ago

How do you know the script hasnt been compromised? Is every user competent enough to evaluate it to ensure its safe to run?

Using package managers to handle this provides a couple things: First: most package manager have builtin mechanisms to ensure the binary is unmodified Second: they provide a third party validating them.

load more comments (2 replies)
[-] MicrowavedTea@infosec.pub 19 points 1 month ago

I agree but hey at least you can inspect the script before running it, in contrast to every binary installer you're called to download.

[-] possiblylinux127@lemmy.zip 14 points 1 month ago* (last edited 1 month ago)

You really should use some sort of package manager that has resistance against supply chain attacks. (Think Linux distros)

You probably aren't going to get yourself in trouble by downloading some binary from Github but keep in mind Github has been used for Malware in the past.

[-] treadful@lemmy.zip 10 points 1 month ago

I'm with you, OP. I'll never blindly do that.

Also, to add to the reasons that's bad:

  • you can put restrictions on a single executable. setuid, SELinux, apparmor, etc.
  • a simple compromise of a Web app altering a hosted text file can fuck you
  • it sets the tone for users making them think executing arbitrary shell commands is safe

I recoil every time I see this. Most of the time I'll inspect the shell script but often if they're doing this, the scripts are convoluted as fuck to support a ton of different *nix systems. So it ends up burning a ton of time when I could've just downloaded and verified the executable and have been done with it already.

[-] rustymitt@lemmy.world 5 points 1 month ago

I assume your concern is with security, so then whats the difference between running the install script from the internet and downloading a binary from the internet and running it?

[-] ozymandias117@lemmy.world 7 points 1 month ago

To add to OP's concerns, the server can detect if you run curl <URL> | sh rather than just downloading the file, and deliver a malicious payload only in the piped to sh case where no one is viewing it

https://github.com/Stijn-K/curlbash_detect

[-] eager_eagle@lemmy.world 5 points 1 month ago

You're already installing a binary from them, the trust on both the authors and the delivery method is already there.

If you don't trust, then don't install their binaries.

[-] johntash@eviltoast.org 4 points 1 month ago

You aren't just trusting the authors though. You're trusting that no other step in the chain has been tampered with or compromised somehow.

[-] ptz@dubvee.org 4 points 1 month ago

See post edit. I've already answered that twice.

[-] cupcakezealot@lemmy.blahaj.zone 5 points 1 month ago

I'll do it if it's hosted on Github and I can look at the code first but if it's proprietary? Heck no

[-] Azzu@lemm.ee 3 points 1 month ago* (last edited 1 month ago)

You are being irrational about this.

You're absolutely correct that it is bad practice, however, 98% of people already follow bad practice out of convenience. All the points you mentioned against "DoWnlOADing a BinAary" are true, but it's simply what people do and already don't care about.

You can offer only your way of installing and people will complain about the inconvenience of it. Especially if there's another similar project that does offer the more convenient way.

The only thing you can rationally recommend is to not make the install script the "recommended" way, and recommend they download the binaries from the source code page and verify checksums. But most people won't care and use the install script anyway.

If the install script were "bloody pointless", it would not exist. Most people don't know their architecture, the script selects it for them. Most people don't know what "adding to path" means, this script does it for them. Most people don't know how to install shell completions, this script does it for them.

You massively overestimate the average competence of software developers and how much they care. Now, a project can try to educate them and lose potential users, or a project can follow user behavior. It's not entirely wrong to follow user behavior and offer the better alternatives to competent people, which this project does. It explains that it's possible and how to download the release from the Github page.

[-] pixxelkick@lemmy.world 2 points 1 month ago

Can you actually explain what concerns you have, that wouldnt be any more of a concern if you downloaded and installed a binary directly?

At least a shell script you can read in plaintext, a binary can just do who the fuck knows what.

[-] ptz@dubvee.org 8 points 1 month ago

If they expected you to read the install script, they'd tell you to download and run it. It's presented here for lazy people in a "trust me, bro, nothing could ever go wrong" form.

  • There are SHA256 checksums of each binary file available in each release on Github. You can confirm the binary was not tampered with by comparing a locally computed checksum to the value in the release's checksums file.

  • Binaries can also be signed (not that signing keys have never leaked, but it's still one step in the chain of trust)

  • The install script is not hosted on Github. A misconfigured / compromised server can allow a bad actor to tamper with the install script that gets piped directly into your shell. The domain could also lapse and be re-registered by a bad actor to point to a malicious script. Really, there's lots of things that can go wrong with that.

[-] ozymandias117@lemmy.world 5 points 1 month ago

I've gone through and responded to the other top level comments as well, but another massive issue you could add to your edit is that servers can detect curl <URL> | sh rather than just curl <URL> and deliver a malicious payload only if it's being piped directly to a shell.

There's a proof-of-concept attack showing its efficacy here: https://github.com/Stijn-K/curlbash_detect

[-] possiblylinux127@lemmy.zip 2 points 1 month ago

On Github you can look at the CLI to see if the build process looks reasonable.

I would still get packages from a distro though

load more comments (1 replies)
[-] TrickDacy@lemmy.world 1 points 1 month ago

I'm curious, op, do you think it's bad to install tools this way in an automated fashion, such as when developing a composed docker image?

[-] possiblylinux127@lemmy.zip 4 points 1 month ago* (last edited 1 month ago)

Very much yes

You want to make your Dockerfile be as reproducible as possible. I would pull a specific commit from git and build from source. You can chain together containers in a single Dockerfile so that one container builds the software and the other deploys it.

[-] TrickDacy@lemmy.world 1 points 1 month ago

I mean, you're not op. But your method requires all updates to be manual, while some of us especially want updates to be as automated as possible.

[-] possiblylinux127@lemmy.zip 2 points 1 month ago

I don't think it is that hard to automate a container build. Ideally you should be using the official OCI image or some sort of package repo that was been properly secured.

[-] Moonrise2473@feddit.it 2 points 1 month ago

Protect from accidental data damage: for example the dev might have accidentally pushed an untested change where there's a space in the path

rm -rf / ~/.thatappconfig/locatedinhome/nothin.config

a single typo that will wipe the whole drive instead of just the app config (yes, it happened, I remember clearly more a decade ago there was a commit on GitHub with lots of snarky comments on a script with such a typo)

Also: malicious developers that will befriend the honest dev in order to sneak an exploit.

Those scripts need to be universal, so there are hundreds of lines checking the Linux distro and what tools are installed, and ask the user to install them with a package manager. They require hours and hours of testing with multiple distros and they aren't easy to understand too... isn't it better to use that time to simply write a clear documentation how to install it?

Like: "this app requires to have x, y and z preinstalled. [Instructions to install said tools on various distros], then copy it in said subdirectory and create config in ~/.ofcourseinhome/"

It's also easier for the user to uninstall it, as they can follow the steps in reverse

[-] TrickDacy@lemmy.world 1 points 1 month ago

Yes I understand all of that, but also in the context of my docker containers I wouldn't be losing any data that isn't reproducible

[-] IceFoxX@lemm.ee 1 points 1 month ago

4.Since MS bought github, github is no longer trustworthy. Databreaches etc have increased since MS owns github. Distribution of malware via github as well. What is the 4 point supposed to say?

[-] lastweakness@lemmy.world 1 points 1 month ago

What's a good package manager right now for stuff like this if i don't want to use the distro package manager though? I want up to date versions of these tools, ideally shipped by the devs themselves, with easy removal and updates. Is there any right now? I think Homebrew is like that? But I wish it didn't need creating an entire new user and worked on a user account basis.

In an ideal world, i would want to use these tools in such a way that I can uninstall them, including any tool data (cache, config, etc), and update them in a reliable manner. Most of these tools are also hellbent on creating a new "." folder or file in the home folder ignoring the XDG spec.

[-] fraksken@infosec.pub 2 points 1 month ago

It says in the comment of the script:

npm install

[-] lastweakness@lemmy.world 2 points 1 month ago

npm is JS-specific

load more comments (2 replies)
[-] clutchtwopointzero@lemmy.world 1 points 1 month ago

I saw many cases of this with windows PowerShell and those Window debloating scripts

load more comments
view more: next ›
this post was submitted on 19 Feb 2025
171 points (92.1% liked)

Mildly Infuriating

38920 readers
1065 users here now

Home to all things "Mildly Infuriating" Not infuriating, not enraging. Mildly Infuriating. All posts should reflect that.

I want my day mildly ruined, not completely ruined. Please remember to refrain from reposting old content. If you post a post from reddit it is good practice to include a link and credit the OP. I'm not about stealing content!

It's just good to get something in this website for casual viewing whilst refreshing original content is added overtime.


Rules:

1. Be Respectful


Refrain from using harmful language pertaining to a protected characteristic: e.g. race, gender, sexuality, disability or religion.

Refrain from being argumentative when responding or commenting to posts/replies. Personal attacks are not welcome here.

...


2. No Illegal Content


Content that violates the law. Any post/comment found to be in breach of common law will be removed and given to the authorities if required.

That means: -No promoting violence/threats against any individuals

-No CSA content or Revenge Porn

-No sharing private/personal information (Doxxing)

...


3. No Spam


Posting the same post, no matter the intent is against the rules.

-If you have posted content, please refrain from re-posting said content within this community.

-Do not spam posts with intent to harass, annoy, bully, advertise, scam or harm this community.

-No posting Scams/Advertisements/Phishing Links/IP Grabbers

-No Bots, Bots will be banned from the community.

...


4. No Porn/ExplicitContent


-Do not post explicit content. Lemmy.World is not the instance for NSFW content.

-Do not post Gore or Shock Content.

...


5. No Enciting Harassment,Brigading, Doxxing or Witch Hunts


-Do not Brigade other Communities

-No calls to action against other communities/users within Lemmy or outside of Lemmy.

-No Witch Hunts against users/communities.

-No content that harasses members within or outside of the community.

...


6. NSFW should be behind NSFW tags.


-Content that is NSFW should be behind NSFW tags.

-Content that might be distressing should be kept behind NSFW tags.

...


7. Content should match the theme of this community.


-Content should be Mildly infuriating.

-The Community !actuallyinfuriating has been born so that's where you should post the big stuff.

...


8. Reposting of Reddit content is permitted, try to credit the OC.


-Please consider crediting the OC when reposting content. A name of the user or a link to the original post is sufficient.

...

...


Also check out:

Partnered Communities:

1.Lemmy Review

2.Lemmy Be Wholesome

3.Lemmy Shitpost

4.No Stupid Questions

5.You Should Know

6.Credible Defense


Reach out to LillianVS for inclusion on the sidebar.

All communities included on the sidebar are to be made in compliance with the instance rules.

founded 2 years ago
MODERATORS